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Community forestry is an expanding model of forestry whereby a significant portion of 
responsibility for forest management is transferred from the state to the lower community 
levels. As such, community forestry aims to enhance accessibility of the direct forest users 
in forests and common decision-making process, as well as to improve forest 
management and restoration. Centralized forest management practices have been unable 
to successfully implement these promises on the ground; however, it remains to be seen 
whether community forestry can find success where the forests continue to be governed 
by the powerful relevant actors. It is observed that there exists a relationship between the 
context of political processes and the dynamics of social interactions among the actors 
involved in community forestry; when these actors and their power sources are focused 
upon, key factors might become identifiable. Scholars note that poor communities are 
vulnerable to the influences of powerful relevant actors, suggesting that these may be 
driving the processes and outcomes of community forestry. Based on this argument, the 
research hypothesis is “the activities and outcomes of community forestry are driven 
by powerful relevant actors”. 
To investigate the issue, this research will examine cases of community forestry in Hoa 
Binh and Son La provinces as compared with the larger community forestry programs of 
Vietnam. Hoa Binh and Son La were selected for study as they contain both the largest 
amount of forest-covered land and the highest rate of poverty in Northwest Vietnam, both 
of which may serve to illuminate the features and practices of powerful actors in the 
community forestry movement. Qualitative and quantitative approaches have been applied 
to identify actors involved in community forestry as well as their power features and 
interests. In this research, power is defined as a social relationship whereby a potentate 
alters the behavior of a subordinate without recognizing his or her will. Resting on the 
power theories of Weber and Krott (citation needed), this research focuses on three 
elements of power: coercion, incentives and dominant information. The most powerful 
actors are identified across 15 case studies using quantitative analysis; of these, actors 
belonging to the political group are estimated to be the most frequent relevant actors 
involved in community forestry (see Figure 5.3). Further investigation demonstrates that 
forest administration and political actors are the most influential individuals in community 




forestry in Vietnam. The results of the quantitative calculation of these actors’ power 
elements show how actors build and consolidate their power to influence the outcomes of 
community forestry.  
The outcomes, analyzed in Chapter 6 and displayed in Table 6.13, are estimated to be 
medium (valued 2) in most cases. This proves that the powerful relevant actors do not 
expect high social and economic outcomes for forest end users. Further studies on the 
interests of the powerful relevant actors provide scientific basis from which to conclude 
that the outcomes of community forestry are influenced by the powerful relevant actors. 
These results are in contradiction to the goals of community forestry, which aims to 
empower direct forest users and provide them with a means of economic contribution. 
Analyses of the influence of powerful relevant actors in Chapter 8 clearly indicate that the 
appearance of the political actors and public administration validates the notion that 
community forestry programs are being implemented to serve state forestry goals. In other 
words, community forestry in Vietnam is, as the saying goes, old wine in a new bottle.  
This research has discovered that community forestry programs in the research sites have 
created mixed impacts in terms of forest greenery and socio-economic improvement. 
However, the forest administration is still seen as the most influential of actors and as such 
is involved in most community forestry activities. Based on these findings, this study 
concludes that the activities and outcomes of community forestry mostly depend on 
the interests of the powerful relevant actors.  
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Chapter 1: The Context of Community Forestry in Vietnam 
1.1. Overview 
Located in Southeast Asia, with three forth of natural area covered with hills and 
mountains, Vietnam is recognized as one of the countries with the richness and diversity of 
the tropical forest ecosystems. In the 60th decades, many co-operatives had been 
established in the northern rural regions by the collectivization policy; accordingly, a new 
kind of controlled and centralized land management policy was developed in stark contrast 
with traditional forest management systems. This conversion would force the displacement 
and relocation of five million people across the high- and lowland areas, most of them 
ethnic minorities (Ngai 2009; Sang 2009). Consequently, forest degradation and soil 
erosion occurred on a large-scale,  and forests rapidly declined both in quantity and 
quality, indeed, forest coverage was reduced from 43% in 1943 to 20% in 1990 (Sunderlin 
and Huynh 2005). 
To address the rapid decline in forest coverage, the Vietnamese government implemented 
many policies, programs and projects, including: 
- LA - 36, which strengthened the management of the exportation, exploitation and 
transportation of wood by order of the Prime Minister. This in turn forced the Ministry of 
Forestry (now the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, or MARD) to better 
protect forests of all types, including special-use, limestone, and poor forests in need of 
regeneration;  
- LA – 37, The Decision No. 327 of the Chairman of the Minister Council which called for a 
program to green bare lands, hills and mountains from 1992-1997.  
- The Forest Development and Protection Law (1991) and Land Law (1993), mandated 
and approved in 2013, which together have formed the legal basis for community forestry 
implementation in Vietnam (LAs-02, 38). 
Especially, that with the promulgation of two legal Acts: Forest Development and 
Protection Law in 1991 and Land Law in 1993 mandated and approved in 2013 have 
brought out the legal basis and facility for the community forestry implementation in 
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Vietnam (LA – 02, 38). These laws and policies create favorable conditions for forest 
management via forest allocation and protection under households, individuals and 
communities and are as such the foundation for effective community forestry in Vietnam. 
Accordingly, the Vietnam Forest Development Strategy 2006-2020 has ranked community 
forestry as one of its 20 top priorities (LA – 39). 
To go with the changing forestry sector, external investment and support by sponsors and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the area of forest management in general and 
community forestry in particular have been growing. Notable projects include the Social 
Forestry Development Project in Son La and Lai Chau sponsored by the German Society 
for International Cooperation (GIZ) and the pilot project in community forest management 
sponsored by the Trust Forest Fund (TFF) under the management of MARD. In recent 
years, similar projects in community forestry have been piloted under the investment of the 
German Reconstruction Bank (KfW) in Quang Ninh, Hue, Bac Kan, Son La, and Hoa Binh 
provinces.  
1.2. Community forestry in Vietnam 
In reality, community participation in forest management is attracting much attention at the 
local, national, and international levels (Agarwal 2001; Pagdee et al. 2006; Charnley and 
Poe 2007). The term “Participatory Management” has become an indispensable word in 
development programs and projects in which emphasizing mostly to people’s participation 
(Agarwal 2001). By looking at definitions of participation as defined by Narayan 1995; and 
Conge 1998; participation can be understood as a move to the higher levels that manifest 
the people’s ability and activeness in the decision making process; equity enhancement. 
The importance of this engagement is undeniable and has been repeatedly demonstrated 
by researchers (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Kellert et al. 2000; Pagdee et al. 2006).  
In Vietnam, forestry practices of utilization and protection are closely tied to the local 
traditions of highland communities, most of which are ethnic minorities. Community forests 
have historically been closely connected to the lives and beliefs of the resident 
communities, as they rely on the forests and forest resources for survival. Confronted with 
the decrease and degradation of forests as a result of practices like legal/illegal wood 
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harvesting and slash and burn agriculture (Castella et al. 2005; Meyfroidt and Lambin 
2008a, 2008b, 2009), the Vietnamese government has acknowledged community forest 
management as an effective practice garnering state concern and encouragement. As a 
result, they have implemented a policy of forest land allocation (FLA) in which communities 
in the northern, central, and highland regions of the country have been made responsible 
for the sustainable management and long-term use of their local forests (LAs-02, 09, 30, 
35, etc.). FLA is considered essential in order for local communities to sustainably 
manage, profit from, and participate in forest policies and practices.  
Along with the FLA policy, the Vietnamese government has been building the legal basis 
for community forestry management by renovating the policies of land profit and ownership 
up to now. With perception that FLA is an important, prerequisite and essential for local 
community to manage forest sustainably, profit from forest directly, and participate in 
decision making process actively; at the end of 2011, there are about 2,792,946.3 ha of 
total forest area that were allocated to and managed by organizations, households or 
individuals (Ngai 2009). Of this land: 1,916,169.2 ha is forested land; 867,777.1 ha is bare 
land and hills. The forested land areas managed by communities make up 15% of the total 
forest area of Vietnam (12,873,815 ha), most of which is natural forest comprising 
protection forest and special use forest that makes up 96% (Anonymous-12 2008; Phuong 
2008). The popular types of community forest management are as follows: 
- Type 1: Forests and forest lands used for forestry purpose are allocated to community to 
manage with the goal of long-term, sustainable use.  
- Type 2: Forests and forest lands are recognized and managed by community for period 
of time, but are not officially allocated by the state (without any legal document: 
unallocated). These are often sacred forests, or forests otherwise providing traditional 
forest products for the local community.  
- Type 3: Forests and forest lands owned by state organizations (e.g. forest enterprises or 
management boards of protection and special use forests) and used for forestry purposes 
are given to communities to protect, sustain, and regenerate based on a fifty-year  
perennial forest contract. 
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Whatever the source, community forests come under the management of one of three 
subjects: the local community, a family or a group of households/interest group. Each 
community forest management type has its own characteristics that correspond to and 
depend on the specific conditions (e.g., natural, cultural) of each region. These can be 
subdivided as follows: 
- Community forests under the management of local communities or families are generally 
situated in remote areas, characterized by large populations of ethnic minorities and 
underdeveloped markets/production levels. Community forest management practices in 
these areas must therefore meet the subsistence demands of the local inhabitants. Forest 
products are mainly used for housing, fuel, and NTFPs for household and community 
demands. Based on these characteristics, the forests are managed in a traditional fashion 
based on local regulations by the community.  
- The community forests under the management of an interest group or group of 
households are normally located in regions with developing markets and production. In 
such cases, the community forest management is organized in the various ways and 
higher level such as establishment of community forest economic organizations; co-
operatives of community. 
Community forest management in Vietnam is thus defined as “the management patterns 
through which the local people manage natural resources within their boundaries 
where the forests have been controlled according to custom for long-time and/or 
legal rights by community” (Wode and Huy 2009). 
In addition to the legal framework for community forest implementation, sets of the 
technical instructions guiding community forest management have been designed; 
however, the local people are generally unfamiliar with legal documents, and as a resultthe 
contents of those documents are inadequately understood and applied within the 
community. Research on the subject has demonstrated that most community forest 
management models are self-forming and self-regulating inconsistent and mainly based on 
local experience and competencies (Nguyen 2008; Ngai 2009). These current patterns of 
community forest management consist of two significant aspects: the establishment of a 
locally organizational system within a community and the creation of local regulation as the 
basis for self-management and benefit adjustment. In these cases, responsibility and 
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benefit are self-regulated and self-implemented among the community members based on 
the interests of both the community and the individuals involved.  
Realities of the patterns of community forest management indicated that local communities 
manage community forest in three management instruments as following: (1) by 
establishing management organization and operation based on the principle of the 
people’s trust and choice with respect to the village patriarch or chief of hamlet; (2) by 
drawing up forest regulation that relies on local regulation; (3) by designing a mechanism 
of benefit sharing based on the community’s agreement and the state policy. 
Community participating in forest management is a reality, despite it is institutionalized or 
unrecognized; hence, community participation and the acknowledgement of their status as 
a legal entity is always profitable to forest management. Kellert et al. (2000) have argued  
that only the effective involvement of the people can contribute to forest conservation and 
produce expected outcomes for local community and forest practices. This is likewise 
noted in much of the existing body of literature, e.g., Oakley (1991), Singh and Khare 
(1993), Buchy and Hoverman (2000), and Stem et al. (2003). Like many other countries, 
Vietnam has implemented community forestry in the forested regions throughout the 
country; today, the program is often promoted as a means of tackling forest degradation 
and alleviating pervasive poverty among the ethnic minorities living in the highlands.  
Strongly stressed by scholars, to realize and foster the potentials on overcoming the dual 
forest-related problem, the genuine devolution politically from state government to local 
authorities even at community levels is required in the program (Fisher 1999; Lachapelle 
et al. 2004; Nygren 2005). In this process commonly local forest users are involved in the 
decision making process and execution of forest practices. As indicated by Larson 2005-
p.33 “decentralization is a process of the transfer of powers from central government to 
lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy”. This process consists of 
two models which can be seen from its definition, they are administrative decentralization 
and political decentralization. Case studies (Dachang and Edmunds 2004; Edmunds and 
Wollenberg 2004; Larson 2005) have indicated limitation of devolution that it is rarely 
followed by genuine power devolution to local forest users. Regarding to the forest sector, 
Wollenberg et al. (2008) pointed out whether the decentralization is executed in other 
ways (co-management and local governance); they chiefly serve to meet the objectives of 
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forestry programs. One hand, it (decentralization model) meets ecological goals 
(biodiversity, forest coverage, timber) and some economic benefit, but narrowly restricts 
available options of forest user. On the other hand, it can contribute to local development 
via increasing funding from forestry practices, but not public goals. This allows to conclude 
that none type is yet to fully met the expectations of community forestry programs 
(Wollenberg et al. 2008). 
Abundance of studies on community forestry has sought to reasons/causes for community 
forestry process and/or analyzed this process over the related aspects. Many of them 
however concentrate on answering questions of attributes of local forest users, such as 
what is the role of local forest user (Singh and Khare 1993; Gibson et al. 2000); obstacles 
to the effectiveness of community forestry (Lachapelle, Smith et al. 2004); linkage between 
forest users and the forests (Pokharel and Nurse 2004; Nguyen 2006; Meyfroidt and 
Lambin 2008a); institutions for community forestry (Thomson 1992; Ostrom 1998). 
Although these studies provide crucial insights and explain the reasons that promote 
community forest management; the causes of failure or success of forest management 
programs, they do not answer whether political framework drive the outcomes and 
activities of community forestry. In reality, community forestry practice is yet to meet its 
perspective outcomes under the influence of political processes and interactions among 
actors related to community forestry. 
1.3. Research Hypothesis 
Scientific research on community forestry has pointed out success and failure as well as 
hindrance to community forest practices across the global. Despite its potential, 
nonetheless the outcomes gained via community forest activities have not met expected 
goals yet. By looking at community programs, besides causes leading to unsuccessfulness 
such as vulnerability, transparency, effective participation in decision making process, etc.; 
crucial factors hidden inside the political dynamics might be recognized by studying and 
analyzing the actors and their power resources. The question is if actors and their 
respective power influence activities and community forest outcomes while setting up 
community forestry program. Studies on local community and its institutions indicate that 
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there exists the interaction between local organizations and relevant actors that affect the 
expected outcomes of community forestry (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Adhikari et al. 
2004). 
Looking at community forestry definitions defined by Martel and Whyte (1992), Eckhoml et 
al. (1984), Rao (1991) and other authors1, although community forestry is approached in 
various ways, it on the commons agreed to each other at a very significant point that 
community forestry practice relies on the basis of community participation. In other words, 
participation of local community is an indispensable factor ensuring the success of 
community forestry practice. Lachapelle (2004) emphasized the importance of people’s 
participation by observing the obstacles to the effective community forestry in Nepal. 
Several studies describe the related benefits that favor advantage groups or individuals 
(Sen and Das 1987; Oakley 1991; Malla et al. 2003). In fact, weakness of caste, low 
education and lack of necessary resources are considerable reasons causing local 
institutions to be vulnerable to the influences from the powerful relevant actors and 
advantage groups (Lachapelle et al. 2004). This unbalance amongst actors might lead to 
inequity during negotiation process. Edmunds and Wollenberg (2001:p245) argue that 
“powerful groups are likely to exert more influence over the course of negotiation and the 
implementation of agreements”. Also Edmunds and Wollenberg (2002) continue arguing 
“the benefits of multi-stakeholder negotiations to disadvantage groups depend on how 
negotiations are undertaken. Our research suggests that many approaches to multi-
stakeholder negotiation mask abuses of power and inequity”. Analysis presented above 
leads us to confident consideration that the powerful relevant actors are those determining 
the processes and outcomes of community forestry. 
We therefore bring forward a hypothesis that “Community Forestry activities and 
outcomes are dominantly driven by interests of powerful relevant actors”. 
In this research, relevant actors are defined as “those who have directly involved to and 
specific interests in community forestry and the potential to influence the community 
forestry processes”. Thus, stakeholder refers not only to person, individuals but also 
organizations and social groups. Relying on the definition, research put assumptions: (1) 
                                                          
1
http://www.rainforestinfo.org.au/good_wood/comm_fy.htm 
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relevant actors have impacts on the forest users’ access to forest and participation in 
decision-making processes. They shape community forestry rested on the functions and 
values of forests. (2) Actors have their own specific interests over the forest practices with 
the expectations covering the entire social, economic, ecological and political scopes. (3) 
In community forestry process, actors always try to influence the others by using their 
advantages such as knowledge, customs, finance, legal rights. These advantages are 
considered as power elements that determine the power of respective actors in community 
forestry network. (4) Community is expected by political programs to produce positive 
outcomes in terms of economic, ecological and social benefits for direct forest users by 
decentralizing the state-centered power to local government units and local forest users 
over the forests.  
In case, if the outcomes show open and or hidden benefits for the interests of the powerful 
actors, research hypotheses are proven. Moreover, the research assumes the powerful 
actors are not in the inner circle of community forestry network, but the outer circle. It will 
be really considerable for diagnosing community forestry practices, if this assumption is 
proven. This suggests new approaches and strategies for improving community forestry 
activities effectively. 
1.4. Research objectives 
With the effort to elucidate how powerful relevant actors drive and influence activities and 
outcomes of community forestry, this research comprises the following objectives: 
(1) Identify the actors and their interests in community forests 
Actors and their interests are diverse depending on specific localities and their positions at 
different levels. Stakeholder identification is a fundamental step to execute subsequent 
study paces. In this case, the research focuses on the actors those are involved in 
community forestry directly, instead of dealing with all of them.  
(2) Estimate how actors’ interests influence on CF’s outcomes 
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Actors exert their influence on community forestry by wielding the assigned power in 
various modalities in specific circumstances. This means different modalities will be 
applied by the same actors to deal with the others that own the different power potentials. 
Thus, interest of the research is to explain how the actors promote their power and 
influence the relationships among actors in community forestry practices.  
(3) Evaluate the outcomes of community forestry 
The outcomes will be evaluated by comparing with the formal objectives of programs and 
policy on community forestry. Moreover, study result will examine if the outcomes of the 
specific community forestry support the interests of the powerful actors. 
(4) Provide practical and scientific basis for proposing CF policies which are appropriate to 
the current conditions of Vietnam 
This research reckons that only powerful actors hold enough power to influence the 
processes in community forestry network. Obtained results of powerful actor identification, 
CF outcome evaluation and correlation between the real-obtained outcomes and the 
interests of powerful actors over the community forestry programs are the scientific 
fundament to propose and improve community forestry policy in particular and forest policy 
in general in Vietnam. 
1.5. Thesis structure 
 Chapter 1briefly introduces context of community forestry in Vietnam and lays 
foundation of the whole research. Examination of the social relationships of actors 
involved in community forestry to identify the gaps for the research is also 
implemented in this chapter which is believed to be key factors in defining activities 
and outcomes of the community forestry programs. 
 Chapter 2 presents both logically and theoretically foundations to know how power 
elements are examined and how power is manifested on the field. Following the 
vein, power elements is further defined and explained how power is developed, 
manipulated, and wielded amongst actors in community forestry practices. 
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 Chapter 3 will provide an overview of research methodology will be presented to 
explain the ways of approaches applied in the research from selecting the research 
sites, procedures of identifying actors involved in community forestry network. Also 
in this chapter, before doing qualitative approach to assess actors’ features, a 
quantitative approach is applied to indicate their power in community forest 
network. Further, particular indicators evaluated outcomes of community forestry 
are justified in detail. 
 Chapter 4, 5, and 6 are the main parts of the research. Chapter 4 brings readers 
an overview of community forestry at formal contexts. Related issues in community 
forestry such as definitions, goals, objectives, and actors are presented in this part. 
Chapter 5outlines actors identified in the cases of community forestry network and 
examines the power features of powerful actors, how they build power and exert it 
over the other ones. Chapter 6 will focus on evaluation on the outcomes of 
community forestry rest on defined indicators presented in chapter 3. 
 Chapter 7 and 8are dedicated to discuss whether current outcomes of community 
forestry fit to functions of powerful actors and how the powerful relevant actors 
influence the outcomes of community forestry through PIDOs and their power 
features. Lesson learnt will be presented in Chapter 9 aiming to propose 
suggestions to the most powerful relevant actors in community in Vietnam case. 
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Chapter 2: Analytical Framework of Power Elements 
“Herrschaft ist, wie gleich zu erörtern, ein Sonderfall von Macht” 
(Authority is, as will be discussed, a special kind of power) 
 
2.1. Determining the power elements 
This chapter examines and identifies elements of power both logically and theoretically in 
order to gain a crucial, fundamental understanding of how powerful actors influence 
community forestry outcomes. Power itself is an abstract term, but most people however 
have an intuitive notion of what it means. Here, “power” indicates a relationship between 
people in society. Power is an important phenomenon in social relations and as such has 
attracted the attention of various scientific disciplines (Dahl 1957). Krott, in his book 
“Forest Policy Analysis”, relies on Max Weber’s classical definition of power in forestry 
when he says “those who utilize or protect forests are forced to subordinate their interests 
to politically determined programs in the face of conflicts… in fact, actors and political 
players both avail themselves of power” (Krott 2005:14). Because community forestry 
requires the devolution of forest management from state to local governments, an 
understanding of the ways in which power is distributed and wielded among actors is 
required in order to see how those actors  influence and manipulate community forestry 
practices.  
Starting with a dictum of power definition by Max Weber (1964:53) “the probability that one 
actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite 
resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”. As noted above, power 
is manifested in social relationships, meaning that power also indicates the political 
standing or “will” of an actor. Relying on Max Weber’s definition, power can be observed 
only elsewhere with the presence of resistance that is broken by coercion (Krott 1990). 
However, the question of how to verify power makes this definition difficult to apply to an 
empirical study. Although Max Weber mentioned “possibility of” exercising power as 
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equivalent to power (Weber 1978), the behavioral concept of power has its attribute 
weakness’, for example Offe in Devkota R. R. (2010:8) noted that how influence cannot be 
verified. However, with the threat of power, the behavioral concept avoids Offe’s paradox; 
the question then becomes how to measure the threat of power. To this end, Etzioni 
proposes examining the actor’s resources and instruments (1975:333), while Krott 
(1990:90-93) asserts that by looking at what the threat is based on, power potential can be 
indeed be verified beyond its simple exercises.  
Power can also be verified by observing the behavior of the subordinate. A subordinate 
can appropriate the preferences of a potentate in two ways: first by obeying the potentate’s 
order without question (unchecked obedience) also known as “dominant information”; and 
second by a congruence of interests which requires information to accomplish a critical 
check and autonomous decision making. Only in the case of dominant information, 
processes of power are evident in the former instance as here the subordinate does not 
make a decision of his own free will; rather he or she follows the powerful actor regardless 
of interests, but instead based on a brief review of that actor's resources. The 
subordinate’s anticipatory obedience can be verified empirically when he/she makes a 
decision on the information he/she possesses (Simon 1981, p.155). 
However, even if a subordinate posses all the relevant information and is capable of 
making an autonomous decision, his behavior can still be altered through “Incentives”. In 
this manner, the potentate compensates the subordinate’s surrendering of his interests by 
“paying” to the self-interest of the subordinate. Thus, the decision-making process will 
never be completely outside the structures of power because the resources available to 
the potentate and the subordinate set the stage for the subordinate’s decision. If the 
potentate has significantly more dominance in resources, he can increase the incentives or 
disincentives up to a level the subordinate will accept. The subordinate who has little 
resources only has no chance to follow his own interests. E.g., if the subordinate prefers 
picking mushrooms the potentate can set a fine or price for picking them. If the 
subordinate has insufficient money to pay, he/she must to stop picking mushrooms 
regardless of their personal preferences. This also holds true for incentives, a subordinate 
with insufficient resources has no other choice than to change behaviors in order to 
receive the incentives. A free decision is possible only in the case of sufficient resources 
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on both sides; unfortunately, the fixed distribution of resources is the “hidden” power frame 
linked to any disincentive or incentive (Hubo, Krott 2016). Following Max Weber’s 
definition and the aforementioned considerations, the concept of power applied in this 
research can thus be stated as follows: “Power is a social relationship, where actor A 
alternates the behavior of actor B regardless to B’s will”. 
For this research, concepts of power presented above reveal that power itself is comprised 
of three elements: coercion, (dis)-incentives and dominant information. 
2.2. Actors’ power in community forestry 
As has been discussed and dictated by many scholars (e.g. Agrawal et al. 2008; 
Kleinschmit et al. 2009; Cashore and Stone 2012; Krott et al. 2013), community forestry is 
often viewed as a new trend in the ways of forest governance whereby responsibility for 
governing forests is decentralized and transferred from state to local governments. The 
failure of community forestry programs is often due to powerful actors who misuse 
community forestry for their own interests, a reality that represents a significant obstacle to 
comprehensive success (Krott et al. 2013). Forest governance should therefore be seen 
as an integration of public and private structures in the utilization and conservation of 
forests, in the interactions of which many actors are involved.  
Political actors and their power play a decisive role in the broad trends of forest 
governance, which in turn has been identified as an important factor in implementing 
community forestry (Shackleton et al. 2002; Edmunds and Wollenberg 2004; Agrawal et al. 
2008; Kleinschmit and Krott 2008; Kleinschmit et al. 2009; Maryudi 2011). Studies on 
community forestry by Devkota (2010), Maryudi (2011), Maryudi et al. (2012), and 
Schusser et al. (2012; 2015) have pointed out the driving forces behind actors’ power in 
community forestry. Although community forestry theoretically is a process of handing 
control and responsibility over forests to the local people for sustainable management 
goal, this transfer is often incomplete, with higher-level governments still retaining some 
control (Sikor and Nguyen 2007) as a result of political/economic processes and local 
power relations (Wollenberg et al. 2008). Devkota (2010) and Maryudi (2011) emphasized 
in their research that actors dominating power drive community forestry for their specific 
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interests. Such power is difficult to observe without political research; however, such 
research can shed light on the power processes behind and wielded by political actors. 
Krott et al. (2013) resting on studies on community forestry approached power relationship 
analysis to find out powerful actors involved in community forestry network. Consequently, 
a new theory-based and empirically applicable framework has been developed for 
assessing actors’ power called as Actor-Centered Power, in which power process and its 
elements; linking power; the ways actors influence forestry; and empirical observation of 
power of specific actors are taken into account while analyzing power.  
Power practically is hidden by proxy terms used by forest policy authors like "influence", or 
"capacity". Regardless of used terms, Silva (1997) and Winkel and Sotirov (2011) address 
that those terms refer to power essentially. As previously stated, powerful actors 
implementing National Forest Programs serve their own strategic goals and although 
power itself is the most fundamental building block of political science, it is an abstract 
term that has been defined in many ways and via many approaches (e.g. power is 'having 
resources', or dispositional power such as money, knowledge, personnel, weapons, etc.) 
(Arts and Tatenhove 2004). According to Arts and Tatehove (2004, p.347), power theories 
are sorted along important dichotomies: "Some power theories situate power at the level of 
the acting agent, while some others situate power at the level of structures". Focusing on 
the acting agent therefore supports our goal to clarify the power of specific actors. 
However, power may also be considered in another dichotomy—in organizational and 
discursive terms, it may be linked to 'having resource' and 'achieving outcomes'. These 
dichotomies of power are guidelines for analyzing the roots of actor-centered power. 
2.3. Definition and theoretical roots of actor-centered power analysis 
Weber's definition of power  takes into account the political standing and "Will" of an actor 
and makes clear that an actor can do specific things with his power (Weber 1993). In 
community forestry, “actor” is defined as acting entities (e.g. individuals, groups, 
organizations, traditional authorities, forest administration, community forest committees, 
etc.) taking part in the formulation and implementation of community forestry. (Krott et al. 
2013). These actors have their own strategies for using their available power resources 
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and applying them to another entity in pursuit of their goals (Few 2002). Tracing the power 
elements of different actors in this way in order to analyze power relations is called the 
actor-oriented power approach Initially applied by Dahl (1957) and further developed by 
various scholars (Arts and Tatenhove 2004), this approach is capable of examining power 
structures in which the actor can make use of rules, discourses, ideologies or other 
structures as sources of power to strengthen/consolidate what power he already has (Krott 
et al. 2013). Scharpf (2000) believes that a considerable portion of power can be observed 
by focusing on actors, their perspectives and the way they wield.  
Krott (2005:282) notes that outcomes in forest policy are caused by a complex set of 
factors such as economic intervention, technology used, and reaction of the ecosystem. 
Many power theories fully link and integrate the outcome into the definition of power, 
meaning that a part of power lies in achieving policy outcomes. However, as said by Krott 
(2005) a specific outcome is caused by a variety factors and not just the activities of actors 
alone. Unexpected and undesirable changes in factors can influence the expected 
outcomes of a specific actor, regardless of how that actor intervenes in the process (Krott 
et al. 2013); it is therefore important to keep separate the definitions of a specific actor’s 
power and achieved outcomes. Within a social relationship, an actor can manipulate his 
power to adapt a specific activity (Dahl 1957), raising the question of who the most 
powerful actor is and how that actor can be defined? As analyzed above, actors' 
interactions relate to structures, discourses, and achieved outcomes; from these, actors 
can be well-defined. Following the given argument, actor-centered power is defined as "a 
social relationship in which actor A alter the behavior of actor B without recognizing B's 
will" (Krott et al. 2013:4). 
2.3.1. Coercion 
Coercion is the practice of forcing another party to behave in an involuntary manner by 
using threats, intimidation or other forms of force and pressure expressed through: 
physical coercion and/or psychological coercion. Coercion is thus built on the basis of a 
power source's force and is defined as "altering the behavior of the subordinate by force". 
As the application of pressure, coercion is the exerted force of the potentate over the 
subordinate and can include physical harm through another person and/or weapons. 
Because force requires extensive control and can result in the subordinates’ use of 
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counterforce, it tends to be the most obvious but least effective form of power. Krott et al. 
(2013) emphasized that the threat of force is very important and that the effects of the 
threat depend on both the visibility of the sources of the force of the potentate and on the 
imagination of the subordinate.  
On the basis of thee arguments given above, coercion can be defined as "altering behavior 
with force" which includes the threat of force regardless of whether an actor is capable of 
carrying through that threat. In addition to physical force, subordinates may experience 
psychological force (Popitz 1992) that attempts to alter their minds without using physical 
means. Such psychological processes are considered incentives or disincentives these will 
be presented later. Krott et al. (2013:4) once again stressed that "the key impact of 
physical force is that it alters the behavior without recognizing the will". 
Coercion is not hard to be seen because the force caused by physical actions provides 
proof which can be observed in the field. In forest policy, physical actions associated with 
force could include the building of a fence, running the forest ranger force equipped with 
weapons. In fact, threats can be observed directly or indirectly depending on whether they 
are announced in political processes or public/in closed discourses (Krott et al. 2013). 
Moreover, the threat of force can also be identified via the means of physical actions that 
the potentate wields.  
Although the threat of force alters the subordinate's will, it does not necessarily mean that 
the interests of the subordinate are threatened. Because our definition of coercion has 
clearly stated that the subordinate's will goes unrecognized in power processes, it is 
possible that the subordinate’s goals are still served by the powerful actor’s manipulation 
of those processes. For example, the obligation to harvest a sustainable amount of wood 
only is often implemented by coercion of forest administration, but serves the long term 
interests of forest owners well. 
In the forestry sector, the potentate can use physical means to influence both the 
subordinate (e.g., by using equipped weapons) and nature (e.g., by cutting off a branch or 
cutting down a tree) to impose the potentate's will. However, this use of force is different 
from those within social relationships because it does not alter one's behavior later. This 
distinction helps to separate ecological-technical forces from physical actions, in which 
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ecological-technical interventions can be better analyzed by natural sciences on one hand, 
while potential of altering one's behavior belongs to the social sciences. Krott et al. (2013) 
emphasize that ecological-technical influence is easily mistaken for coercive power; thus, 
by applying the criteria of behavioral change, both types of forces are clearly distinguished.  
In a community forestry network, an actor can stand alone or interact with others within the 
network. The most important characteristic of such networks is the formation of coalitions 
between actors through which they provide each other with additional sources of power. A 
coalition is comprised of formal and/or informal allies who provide a broad array of visible 
power options, including regulations stipulated by law which create legal rights of control 
and sanction to specific actors in a community forest process.  
2.3.2. Incentives and disincentives 
Incentive is something that motivates an individual to implement an action to achieve 
oriented goals. It could be materials, finance, or knowledge which improves actor's 
competence to higher grade in term of self-implementation of a specific action. In 
economic theory, incentive is as an important factor that helps to explain how markets 
work (Starr 1978:171 in Krott et al. 2013).  
Although opportunistic behavior has strong negative connotations from a moral standpoint, 
it is also more neutrally defined as: a) putting one's own self-interest before other interests 
when there are opportunities to do so, or b) flexibly adapting to changing circumstances in 
order to maximize self-interest. In addition to looking at models of opportunistic behavior, 
we also look at behavior from the perspective of both potentate and their subordinates in a 
community forest network. Both potentate and subordinate have their own wills to inform 
their opportunistic behaviors; however, the former rests on dominant sources of incentives 
he has at his disposal, whereas the latter has insufficient resources to offer incentives.  
As mentioned above, one's personal desires and goals will be put before other interests 
when the opportunity arises. The subordinate will thus keep his own will in mind, even 
when following the potentate's wills. This means that if the subordinate were to find a 
better source of incentives, he would no longer follow the potentate's will (Krott et al. 
2013). In actor-centered power approach, incentives offered by potentate are not 
integrated into the overall evaluation, but are instead considered external to subordinate's 
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will about what to do in the forest. This acceptance does not mean the conflict between the 
interests of the potentate and prior interests of the subordinate is over, even though the 
latter's behavior will be adapted to the potentate's will.  
Unlike incentives, disincentives are seen as something that prevent or discourage an 
action. Krott et al. (2013) defined disincentive as something that "altering the behavior of 
the subordinate by means of disadvantages or advantages". This means that in power 
processes, the potentate creates disadvantages for the subordinate with the aim of altering 
the subordinate's behavior and disregarding his will. Such disadvantages are applied until 
the subordinate changes his behavior in the direction of the potentate's goals. In case the 
subordinate does not agree with the penalties by the state and will not support them with 
his will, the state can increase disadvantages to such a higher level that force the 
subordinate to follow the wishes of the state. In Vietnam, for exam, a state decree (LA-02) 
prohibits hunting, illegal logging, and other activities that damage the forest ecosystem. On 
the basis of this law and binding guidelines, the subordinate must adjust his behavior to 
follow the state's wishes regardless of his will; doing otherwise could result in a penalty. 
However, the state must obviously prove the misbehavior of the subordinate in order to 
apply the consequences.  
The power process of advantages is implemented in much the same was as that of 
disadvantages. Advantages work as an exchange mechanism in which the potentate 
influences a specific behavior of the subordinate by offering incentives. Both disadvantage 
and advantage processes are linked to power processes and appear more flexible than 
the use of coercive power. Applying disadvantages (penalties) and advantages 
(subsidies), especially over poor communities, might be more effective in altering behavior 
and overruling the will of the subordinate. Krott et al. (2003) argued that "within a power-
free environment, all actors would have free access to all sources. Limiting the sources of 
specific actors is a power process and without such limitation the value decision of the 
actor would be different. Therefore decisions are not only value-driven but also power-
driven as well".  
As with coercion, the sources of disincentives and incentives are very diverse. “Incentives” 
refer to both tangible material gains like economic capital and technical support like 
machines, furniture, plants, seedlings, food, or even labor. “Disincentives,” on the other 
Community Forestry in Vietnam: Actors and Political Process 
 
 20 
hand, refer to immaterial sources and penalties that affect the psychology of the 
subordinate. Yet another aspect in play here is that of morality, which, when imagined in 
terms of right vs. wrong, can comes to label a potentate's actions. Morality can be 
observed through discourses and is often a disciplinary means within a given society. A 
public and professional discourse of morality often informs popular thought and the 
demands of public policy to a great extent. Powerful actors may use discourses of morality 
as a source of power and to manipulate subordinates.  
2.3.3. Dominant information 
Information is any propagation of cause and effect within a system; it is knowledge and 
data conveyed through direct or indirect observation, and when compared with coercion 
and disincentives, seems gentle and positive. In community forestry, dominant information 
is defined as "altering the behavior of the subordinate by means of unverified information". 
In power process, apart from coercion and (dis)-incentives, the potentate can use 
information to alter the subordinate's behavior regardless of his will in cases where the 
subordinate is unable to verify the information provided by the potentate. If the subordinate 
uses information provided by the potentate to make a decision without checking its 
accuracy, he has become dependent on the potentate (Simon et al. 1981 in Krott et al. 
2013). Not checking information could either be voluntary or mandatory, depending on the 
subordinate's confidence, relationship to the powerful actor, or competence in doing 
research.  
When the relationship between actor and subordinate is based on mutual trust, the 
subordinate’s decision not to verify the actor’s information may be a voluntary one. In this 
power process, the subordinate expects benefits and good will from his cooperative 
behavior with the potentate. Krott et al. (2013) emphasized that "ideologies demand from 
the subordinates that they follow the key arguments and prevent them from checking 
truths of these arguments". These ideological discourses thus provide a strong basis for 
dominant information in the interests of the potentate. An ideology of integrating forest 
management with social demands from forest makes it difficult to clarify the links between 
forest management, wood production, and other functions of forest such as biodiversity 
conservation, protection. Schusser et al. (2013) noted the role of dominant information and 
power provided to foresters and forest owners in community forest case studies in 
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Germany. There the foresters provided false information to members of the community in 
order to gain the acceptance of community on forest management plan. This is a typical 
example of dominant information as utilized in community forest process.  
When the subordinate accepts the provided information due to a lack of relevant 
information, research capacity, or sources, it is seen as compulsory. Certainly forest 
administration staff trained at universities possess more professional knowledge on forest 
management and protection than laymen, but this expert knowledge makes the foresters 
more powerful than the other actors in terms of dominant information on forest 
management, as they are the only ones capable of verifying that information (Brain and 
Freidson 1988). Ribot (2001) noted that NGOs and other such associations can play a 
monitoring role over natural community resources and demonstrate their power via 
dominant information. His argument -"democratic decentralization experiment has not yet 
happened"- emphasizes that natural resource management in general and community 
forestry in particular has served to improve state control over forests and forest resources 
rather than decentralized it. However, knowledge exchange and making use of local 
knowledge are among the core factors of a participatory approach in community forestry, 
meaning that dominant information is not always used against the best interests of the 
subordinate, even though it at times negatively affects them (Ribot 2001; Krott et al. 2013). 
It is concluded by Krott et al. (2013) that despite the best interests and / or right advice for 
the subordinate, his behavior is manipulated according to the will of the experts, which 
means that there is a power process in action.  
Moreover, the foresters’ knowledge can be used to either support or go against the 
interests of the forest users, in some cases, it may do both. One case study done by 
Schusser et al. (2013) discussed an instance in which foresters used their information to 
manipulate the community by giving them false information on the amount of harvestable 
timber. On subjects like biodiversity, expert knowledge is the only way to get data, but due 
to the complexity of the subject matter, the subordinate is unable to verify information and 
make a decision on it. As a result, Schusser (2013) noted that powerful actors determine 
biodiversity because they are better informed and do not share all their information with 
forest users or less powerful actors. In this vein, Devkota (2010) stated that a 
subordinate’s decision-making process can be observed as follows: if the subordinate 
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neglects to verify information due to a lack of knowledge, confidence, or other causes, he 
is exposed to the power of the potentate. 
Summary 
On the basis of the explanation presented above, the power elements, power instruments 
and examples of actor-centered power can be summarized as following. 
Power elements Definition Observable facts Example 
Coercion Altering behavior by 
force 
Physical action, or threat 
with, sources for physical 
action 
Decision on removal of 
forest use rights based 
on threat, law 
(Dis)-incentives Altering behavior by 
(dis)-advantages 
Providing of, or threat 
with, sources of material 
or immaterial benefits or 
detriment 




Altering behavior by 
unchecked information 
Providing of, or threat 
with, sources of 
information uncheck due 
to lack of knowledge or 
will 
Expert knowledge on 
how to manage forest 
sustainably such as 
forest management plan 
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Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
3.1. Introduction 
In the course of this research, a mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches were 
used to 1) provide a complete, detailed description of the research topic (quantitative) and 
2) classify features and construct statistical data/figures to explain what is observed 
(qualitative). To this end, qualitative methods supported the generating of our hypotheses, 
while quantitative methods tested them (Kelle and Erzberger 2004); the results were 
mutually reinforcing (Bryman 2012). A case study approach was used to investigate and 
explore multi-faceted, complex issues, as well as deliver in-depth knowledge regarding 
specific inferences (Crowe et al. 2011) an appropriate approach for investigation at the 
field level. By using a case study approach, interrelations among actors in a community 
forestry network will be examined via formal and informal interviews from the micro- to the 
macro-levels. Much of the research is based on interviews and secondary documents; the 
primary field data was gained from semi-structured and open interviews, discussions, and 
other contact with actors in the community forest network. Additional records, informal 
interviews, and observations complement the research data. 




Table 3.1: List of interviewed actors’ members* 
Source: Field survey 2012 
*Note: further and detail information of informants and interviews can be seen in the Appendix 3 
No. Type of Actors Position Date 
1 University 
Chief of Environment and Forest Ecology Institute, 
Forestry University of Vietnam 
10 Oct 2012 
2 University 
Deputy of Post Graduate Faculty, Forestry University 
of Vietnam 
11 Oct 2012 
3 University 
Deputy of Training Department, Forestry University of 
Vietnam 
11 Oct 2012 
4 Forest Administration 
Chief of forestry development department, Son La 
Province 
20 Oct 2012 
5 Donor 
Chief Coordinator, Management Board of KFW7 
project, Thuan Chau district 
5 Nov 2012 
6 Donor 
An officer, Management board of KFW7 project, 
Thuan Chau district 
5 Nov 2012 
7 Forest administration  Vice director of Thuan Chau Forest Protection Section 5 Nov 2012 
8 Forest administration  An officer of Thuan Chau Forest Protection Section 5 Nov 2012 
9 Village administration Chairman of Muoi Noi Commune 6 Nov 2012 
10 Village administration 
Vice chairman of Muoi Noi Commune, Thuan Chau 
district 
6 Nov 2012 
11 Traditional Authority Chief of Muoi Noi Commune, Thuan Chau district 6 Nov 2012 
12 Forest user group 
Group Leader of forest patrol, Muoi Noi Commune, 
Thuan Chau district 
6 Nov 2012 
13 Village administration An officer of Chieng Bom Commune 7 Nov 2012 
14 Village administration Chairman of Chieng Bom Commune 7 Nov 2012 
15 Traditional authority Chief of Hon hamlet, leader of CF management board 7 Nov 2012 
16 District government Chief of Agriculture department, Thuan Chau district 7 Nov 2012 
17 Forest administration Chief of Bac Yen forest protection section 8 Nov 2012 
18 District government Deputy of Environment and resource department 8 Nov 2012 
19 District government Deputy of Agriculture department 8 Nov 2012 
20 Donor 
Vice director of management board of KFW7, Chief 
coordinator 




An officer of Forest Protection Section, Muong Khoa 
Commune 
9 Nov 2012 
22 Village administration 
Vice chairman of Muong Khoa commune, a member 
of KFW7 project 
10 Nov 2012 
23 Village administration 
An agriculture and forestry officer, Muong Khoa 
commune 
10 Nov 2012 
24 Traditional authority 
Chief of Chen hamlet, leader of CF management 
board 
10 Nov 2012 
25 Forest user group Group leader of forest patrol, Muong Khoa commune 10 Nov 2012 
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Data collection was divided into two phases over eight months. The first phase, from 
October 2012 to January 2013 in Son La province, focused on the selection of community 
forests and implementation of a network survey. Data and information gained from 
informants and documents was the basis from which to identify powerful actors in each 
community forest network, and in-depth, qualitative interviews were conducted with the 
identified powerful actors. Also during this period external meetings and discussions with 
researchers and forest user groups were conducted to enhance and reinforce collected 
information via interviews and available records.  
The second field survey was conducted from March 2014 to June 2014 in Hoa Binh 
province. As in the first stage, a quantitative survey was conducted among all actors in the 
community forest network in order to identify the most powerful actors. A second 
qualitative survey was conducted among these powerful actors to make a power 
prognosis.  
3.2. Selection of Community Forest User Groups 
As mentioned above, selected case studies were carried out in two neighboring provinces 
(Son La and Hoa Binh) in Northwest Vietnam. According to reports, these provinces have 
the most remarkable community forestry activities in the country (Ngai 2009; Sang 2009). 
Because of the variety of communities, there is no common, one-size-fits-all community 
forestry model that has been applied; rather, various models appropriate to the provinces’ 
specific conditions are needed. Social and natural characteristics such as the high poverty 
rate, high concentration of ethnic minorities, and amount of forest cover -in tandem with a 
long history of social forestry (Lung and Anh 2001)- are advantages for the effective 
implementation of community forestry practices. These practices in turn directly contribute 
to the alleviation of poverty and hunger in the region. 
3.2.1. Community forestry activity in selected sites 
In Vietnam, although forests are under the state administration, allocated to individuals, 
households, organizations to manage; protect and develop according to the state’s 
legislations (LA - 02). As previously mentioned, there is no single community forestry 
model applied across all regions of Vietnam; rather, the ways in which community forestry 
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activities are implemented depend on the specific conditions of region (e.g., customs, 
cultures, natural conditions) as well the communities themselves. Currently, community 
managing forests in Vietnam is a practical activity. This practice has pointed out many 
forms and the ways that community participates in managing forests. Whereas, the legal 
and political respects of beneficial mechanism to the community are gradually, but 
continually, improving (see Box 3.1). 
Box 3. 1: Rudimental issues of forest administration in Vietnam 
In the period from 1955 – 1975, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was established 
with the goal of using logging as a means of rebuilding the country. By 1975, 200 state-
forest enterprises had been established to this end. Since the establishment of a forest 
ranger force at the district level (LA-31), forestry activity has begun to focus on forest 
protection, although overlaps in forestry management/responsibilities between state forest 
enterprises and the forest protection agency have muddied the waters. As a result of the 
program, forest management at the commune level has been handed over to commune 
officials, as the local government has proven itself unable to undertake its assigned tasks 
due to the lack of manpower and professional ability (To and Tran 2014). 
In the early 1980s, the decline of the forests (in both quality and quantity) and the 
depletion of forest resources (e.g., timber) precipitated a period of crisis for the forestry 
sector (Sikor 1998). The resulting “Đổi mới” policy of 1986 changed a centralized economy 
into an oriented market economy, which in turn has generated essential improvements in 
economic management in Vietnam. The allocation of forest land to the local population, in 
tandem with policy and methodological modifications in the forestry sector, has paved the 
way for development in the highland areas (Sikor 2001). Land Law (1993)2 and Forest 
Protection Law (1991)3 form the important legal basis for forest land allocation to the 
various entities. By the end of 2011, 2.6 million certificates of land use rights had been 
licensed to entities receiving forestland4. Although the role of households would become 
more important in producing forest resources and contributing to poverty alleviation in the 
                                                          
2
 The first law was approved by the National Assembly on July 14
th
, 1993. It has since been amended several 
times.  
3
 The first Forest Protection Law was approved by the National Assembly on August 12
th
, 1991. It has since 
been amended several times.  
4
 The official website of General Department of Land Management: 
http://www.gdla.gov.vn/index.php?option=com_tailieu&task=detail&id=66. 
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highlands, state forestry still played a decisive role by means of forest enterprises and 
management boards (UN-REED and MARD 2010; To 2012). 
In 1999, Decree No. 163/1999/NĐ-CP (LA-32) provided guidance for the allocation and 
leasing forest land to organizations, individuals and households for forest management 
purposes. This has created favorable conditions in which community may conduct forest 
management activities. However, the legal basis for communities was not recognized until 
the passing of the Land Law in 2003 and the Forest Protection and Development Law in 
2004, which created a barrier for legitimizing these approaches. Along with Decree No. 
163, the National Forest Development Strategy made it clear that planted forests, 
production forests, and protected areas/forests (historically attached to a community) are 
available for allocation to villages. With these positive changes in public administrative 
reforms and poverty alleviation, there is now a legal framework for implementing forest 
management, protection, and utilization, in which communities are considered key actors. 
Community forestry activities in the research sites are marked by both the 2002 allocation 
of forest land to households and individuals and a 2010 community forestry development 
project (KfW7). 
3.2.2. Criteria on research site selection 
Because there exists a wide variety of community groups currently in different phases of 
community forestry, the case studies for this research were selected according to several 
factors: the developmental phases of the forest user group, the condition of the community 
forests, and with and/or without the support of international donors. Field observations 
revealed that some groups have implemented community forestry activities without the 
support of international donors, while others have already been established or are in the 
process of formal registration with international venues of support. Community forest 
conditions, including designations of “rich” vs. “poor” forests, are determined by both the 
production potential for and demands on the forest. In this research, a community forest is 
considered rich if it has high potential for production, whereas poor community forest 
refers to those with low production potential. 
- Development status: Development status consist of two stages: the initial stage, where 
community forests have been so registered but not yet formally handed over to forest user 
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groups, and the advanced stage, where community forests have been under the formal 
control of forest user groups for at least five years at the time of this study.  
- Production potential of outcomes: Every community forest has social, economic, and 
ecological outcome potentials, or a combination thereof. The production potential refers to 
a community forest’s capacity to handle the social, economic, and ecological outcomes 
that are the result of site conditions. Short-term indicators, like forest state conditions (rich 
or poor) and total forest areas (absolute or relative) are used in tandem with long-term 
indicators like soil productivity to assess high (rich) and low (poor) production potentials of 
particular community forests.  
We used those as generic criteria for the research group. Even so, it was observed that 
forest management in Hoa Binh and Son La provinces has been implemented by: (i) 
allocating (mainly production) forests to households, individuals and organizations; and (ii) 
allocating protected forests with restricted access to communities. 
3.2.3. Cases 
By relying on the given criteria and realistic conditions of the areas, the following research 
sites were selected for study.  
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Table 3.2: Selected research sites in Hoa Binh and Son La province 












Sang Muoi Noi Thuan Chau protection initial poor yes 
2 Hon Chieng Bom Thuan Chau protection initial rich yes 
3 Chen Phieng Ban Bac Yen protection initial poor yes 
4 Cao Da Muong Khoa Bac Yen protection initial poor yes 
5 A Ma Long Sap Moc Chau protection initial rich yes 
6 Coc Lac Tu Nang Yen Chau protection advanced poor no 
7 Cang Chieng Hac Yen Chau protection advanced rich no 
8 Ngoang Chieng Khoi Yen Chau protection advanced poor no 




Mu Cuoi Ha Kim Boi protection initial poor no 
11 Vo Khang Kim Tien Kim Boi protection advanced poor no 
12 Mo Kim Son Kim Boi protection advanced poor no 
13 San Hop Dong Kim Boi protection initial poor yes 
14 Bac Hung QuyetChien Tan Lac protection advanced rich no 
15 Bo Ngo Luong Tan Lac protection advanced rich no 
(Source: Field survey 2012, 2013 – 2014, Vietnam) 
Since 2002, the District Authority has handed 15 forests over to local government units 
and legally recognized community forest user groups based on Provincial Decision Nos. 
2396 and 3011 (LA-33, 34). During the field survey, we observed that the forests allocated 
to households and individuals are small production forests; protection forests (natural 
forests) are handed over to local governments and organizations for management and 
conservation purposes. On the basis of specifically allocated forest areas, local authorities 
entrust communities with forest management and establish community forest management 
boards, but do not provide a certificate of land use rights. Members of the forest user 
group committee are nominated by local forest users based on trust and good standing. 
For these reasons, we consider such the cases to be in the advanced developmental 
stage. In other cases, although they have officially received certificates of land use rights, 
forest user group committees have only just been established with the support of 
international donors; these are therefore considered to be in the initial stage of 
development.  
The selected cases are located in six districts within Hoa Binh and Son La provinces. Six 
of the 15 case studies have been selected as part of a pilot project in community forestry 
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supported by international donors (KfW7) since 2010 (Anonymous-3 2006); the others 
have no external donor involvement. The criteria for rich and poor forests are based on the 
classification of forest status issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD) (Huong 2009). Community forest management is run by the Community Forest 
User Group Committee, normally led by village patriarchs. Of the six cases in the pilot 
KfW7 project, forest protection and management activities run by local communities are 
evaluated and recognized as more successful when compared with others. Moreover, that 
these community forest committees have been in existence for some time is advantageous 
for the effective implementation of a community forestry program in the research areas the 
expectations for community forestry here is therefore be higher. 
3.3. Identification of the most powerful actors 
The most powerful actors in the community forest network are identified by using a 
quantitative framework for determining power; this framework, developed by the research 
group, allowed us to recognize the most powerful actors within the networks at the 
selected research sites. The power features of these powerful actors, who we believe have 
the potential of influence the processes, activities, and outcomes of the community forests, 
can be explored further through research framework.  
3.3.1. A complete network survey 
The processes of field research in Vietnam were carried out in two phases: the first one 
was from October 2012 to February 2013 in Son La province and the second one was 
from February to July 2014. To be facility for the field work process, at the initial stage, 
case studies were selected through official meetings with the Directors of Forestry 
Development Department and Forest Protection Department those are in charge of forest 
protection and development at provincial level. By this means, I was formally 
recommended to the forest protection units and the project management boards at district 
and local level who accompanied and connected me to the actors in the community forest 
network at local level during field survey period. By means of this approach, the trust and 
good rapport with local government units and local communities were founded.  
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To identify actors involved in the community forest network, the first interviews with 
selected user groups have been conducted to get information of organizational structure, 
forests and respective tasks of the committee. In addition, the questions on the partners 
from whom the users’ committee has received information and supports have been raised. 
This allowed the research to get general notion of actors whom the users’ committee was 
in collaboration with. At the same time, power elements were also examined in detail 
through quantitative measurements, called as “quantitative analysis” in this study.  
The contacts and interviews with the referred actors by the first stakeholder and the 
stakeholder mentioned during interviews will be implemented. By doing successive 
referring and contacting (snowball effect) all actors more or less involved in community 
forests in the research sites were identified. This process of identifying stakeholder was 
supposed to be complete if new partners were no longer mentioned in the interviews. The 
list of the interviewed actors and used questionnaires of the fieldwork are attached in 
Appendix-3 and 4. 
3.3.2. Power elements 
As theoretically analyzed in Chapter 2, there are 3 power elements: dominant information, 
incentives and coercion which have been used to identify the group of the most powerful 
actors in a specific community forest network. During the complete network survey, the 
interviews- started by asking the interviewed actors- on the perception and reasoning the 
level of trustworthiness toward other partners in the network. By using a four-point ordinal 
scale, each stakeholder was asked to label the degree of trust toward the other actors 
based on the received information, with a score of “3” indicating complete trust and “0” 
indicating no trust at all.  
Likewise, Yes (1) or No (0) were used to identify the stakeholder necessary in securing 
community forest activities in order to approve some activities or whether giving 
permissions or directives to implement community forest activities. This aims to measure 
coercive capacity of the actors in the community forest network by using qualitative 
information. Therefore, coercion measured by quantitative figures was just an indication of 
actors’ coercive capacity in community forest network and mainly depends on the forest 
condition and prevailing regulatory framework. The reasons of actors for their 
coerciveness toward the others were explored through open-ended question.  
Community Forestry in Vietnam: Actors and Political Process 
 
 32 
To measure the contribution of incentives (finance, materials, and technical support) of the 
particular actors to their own programs was a difficult task. Hence, we chose a two-point 
scale as the measurement of incentives, where a value of “0” pointing out the particular 
actors who did not receive any incentives at all, and a value of “1” indicating incentives that 
were received from a specific stakeholder(s). Follow-up questions were asked about the 
types and extent of supports provided by specific stakeholder(s) to the partners in the 
network. 
The accumulative results of power elements through a complete network survey were 
used to identify the group of powerful actors in each network of community forests.  
3.3.3. Identifying the group of powerful actors 
After accomplishing the complete network survey, we used the calculation of “individual 
concentration value – Xi” and “dominant degree – Di” (Schusser 2012) to identify the group 
of powerful actors in each network of community forests. The detailed procedures for the 
calculation of Xi and Di were followed: 
First, the quantitative value of each power element (Dominant information, Incentive and 
Coercion) of each identified actors measured by the other partners in the community 
forestry network was entered and quantified by using formulas (See Appendix 5, item I). 
The calculation of “total accumulated value” of each power element was done for each 
actor separately, and the corresponding element has to be seen as independent.  
Percentage of relative power element (Xi) was calculated based on total accumulated 
value and sorted from high to low (See Appendix 5, item II, 1). It is applied to each power 
element separately. Based on Xi calculated value, the ‘individual concentration value’ (hi) 
of each stakeholder under each power element was calculated (See Appendix 5, term II, 
2). Hence, ‘hi’ is the ratio of power per actor and per power element. By doing so, the sum 
of ‘individual concentration value’ (hi) is always ‘1’ and 0≤hi≤1.  
Relying on the determined value of hi, the ‘Concentration Ratio – Cri’ of each power 
element, which shows the distribution of power per actor (i.e., Cr3 = 0.6 means that the first 
three actors hold 60 percent of the total available power per power element in the 
network), was calculated (See Appendix 5, item II, 3). The calculated result of Cri allows 
us to determine the ‘Dominant Degree Value – Di’ of each power element which is the 
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basis for identifying the group of powerful actors qualitatively. The formula for Di has been 
adopt and developed by Schusser then applied to the research group (Schusser 2012).  
The first highest peak, which is considered as the boundary between the group of powerful 
actors and group of less powerful actors in the specific community forest network due to 
the specific power element, was considered as a criterion for evaluating the power of a 
stakeholder in the network. Therefore, the actors ranged up to the first highest peak fell 
under the group of powerful actors and coded as ‘2’, and remaining actors are considered 
as less powerful actors and coded as ‘1’ for qualitative evaluation.  
Similarly applied to case studies, the groups of the most powerful actors were identified by 
evaluating the power elements (Dominant Information, Incentive and Coercion). The 
quantitative analysis of power elements under the specific actors is presented in Appendix 
7.  
3.3.4. Qualitative assessment and further data collection 
Quantitative assessment phase allows the research to identify the group of the most 
powerful actors in the community forest network. In this process, the strength and 
weakness of actors which determines the power position in the network are equally 
assessed and mutually verified by the others. Moreover, the ‘snowball effect’ applied 
during the field survey has aided the research to avoid the personal preferences of people 
asked. 
Like other methods, however, this method is not free from the weakness such as: i) 
identification of actors in the network is based on the subjective opinion of individual of 
specific actor group; ii) Hidden actors who were influencing the  community forestry 
processes informally or indirectly, but were not mentioned during survey, were not 
identified in the quantitative power calculation; iii) At times the presence of the third party 
could affect the informant in term of expressing his/her thought over the other actors.  
To limit the weaknesses mentioned above, the hidden actors were included in the 
following stage ‘qualitative approach’. In this process, the quantitative power elements will 
be further checked by qualitative sources(interviews, documents, empirical observations). 
By doing cross-check, the power position of a specific actor per each power element was 
validated and enhanced due to both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Hence, by 
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means of triangle check, qualitative and quantitative information and knowledge of the 
researcher, a model of improved power network was developed as the basis for examining 
how powerful actors influence outcomes of community forestry in practice.  
In the qualitative assessment stage, semi-structured questions were applied to obtain 
detailed information concerning to the interaction among actors in the network; sources of 
finance, human resource, as well as legal documents. Such documents were important to 
give the explanation the ways the actors build power over the others. 
3.3.5. Data triangulation 
Triangulation, known as cross-check applied to social science to point out that at least two 
methods are used in the study to check the results, aims to increase the credibility and 
validity of the results. It is important to do cross-check due to involvement of using 
methods to collect data such as direct field observations, interviews, documents, person, 
time and questionnaires in studying the same phenomenon (Denzin 2006; Hussein 2009). 
In quantitative and qualitative research process, data collection can be affected by 
subjective and objective causes from either socio-political context or researcher’s 
competence or both, e.g. during field survey, at times the actors do not expose themselves 
or the interaction among the others over the use and management of community forest. 
So, data collected from primary as well as secondary sources were cross-checked 
through: direct field observations, legal documents, and written documents, formal or 
informal interviews. Thus, triangulation is for increasing not only wider and deep 
understanding of the study (Olsen 2004) but also the study credibility (Jick 1979; Morse 
1991; O’Donoghue and Punch 2003; Hussein 2009). 
3.4. Evaluation on the community forestry outcomes 
Why evaluating the outcomes of community forestry? Maryudi et al. (2012) stressed that it 
is important to assess whether the community forestry program reached and produced its 
promised outcomes in terms of environmental and socioeconomic as well as political 
objectives as launched program. Community forestry, together with a comprehensive 
blend of environmental and socioeconomic objectives, was considered as a new approach 
to improve the sustainable forest management and livelihood for rural communities living 
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close proximity to the forest (Pagdee et al. 2006; Coleman 2009). Even if forms and 
models of community forestry with such large samples were done, evaluation on the 
success of community forestry comes up against difficulties due to the complicated nature 
of community forest management, the broad dimensions of success and conflicts among 
local and official criteria (Agrawal 2001; Pagdee et al. 2006; Pokharel and Larsen 2007). 
Scholars, for years, were increasingly aware that different forms and models of community 
forestry are yet to realize its potentials (Wollenberg et al. 2008) because the studies 
applied to a single case in specific conditions. For instance, although improvement of 
forest condition may have reached, fulfillment of local demands has insignificantly 
improved due to restrictive rules and regulations promulgated to be applied to forest 
protection.  
3.4.1. Outcome definition 
Generally, outcomes are understood as changes in knowledge, actions and/or conditions. 
In community forestry realm, particularly, evaluation on the outcomes of community 
forestry program needs a comprehensive dimension which ensures the social, economic 
and ecological indicators (Glasmeier and Farrigan 2005; Pagdee et al. 2006; Pokharel et 
al. 2007; Maryudi et al. 2012) as the idea of community forestry that relies on the close 
relation between forest resources and local people living in the  vicinity. Hence, in this 
research, two important components of community forestry, people and forest, will be 
focused and assessed. For this purpose, by applying the logic of Krott and Stevanov 
(2008) in seeing the importance of limiting the focuses accordingly to the core policy 
objectives, there are three main objectives of community forestry widely accepted as 
indicated in various studies in the following: 1) reduction of community poverty; 2) 
improvement of forest conditions; 3) and empowerment to community (Glasmeier and 
Farrigan 2005; Pagdee et al. 2006; Charnley and Poe 2007; Pokharel and Larsen 2007).  
As mentioned at the beginning, it is important to clarify outputs and outcomes for further 
study. Outputs in community forestry refer to the social, economic and technical means to 
produce certain results after implementing activity. While outcomes are considered as mid-
term results those cannot be seen after the end of activity. Thus, outcomes in community 
forestry define as effects of outputs on the forests and people in terms of social, economic 
and ecological dimensions. The outputs and outcomes are influenced by internal and 
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relevant actors within a complex process. In this study, assessment of outcomes focuses 
on the relevance for the forest users, actors and sustainability, instead of comprehensive 
assessment.  
3.4.2. Economic outcomes 
As early mentioned, one of the substantial goals of the community forestry program is 
poverty alleviation to the local communities living in the vicinity and the forest end users 
whose their life depends on the forest resources (Wunder 2001; Gilmour et al. 2004; 
Glasmeier and Farrigan 2005). Since forests have been declined in both quality and 
quantity, this dependence becomes the more and more obvious in the rural areas in the 
forest vicinity. Moreover, the forestry activities conducted by relevant actors have 
contributed to improve the local life as well as their livelihood limitedly. Forest 
management in co-ordination with poverty alleviation and improvement of rural life is a 
wide gap that has been criticized in studies (Sunderlin and Huynh 2005; Sunderlin 2006; 
Maryudi 2011) for years. Wunder (2001) emphasized that “poverty to me thus retains a 
strong economic component”. Following this suggestion, this study continues focusing on 
the poverty alleviation (asset poverty and welfare poverty) in evaluation on economic 
outcomes of community forestry.  
In fact, there have a great number of researches on the assessment of economic 
outcomes of community forestry (Wunder 2001; Acharya 2002; Sunderlin and Huynh 
2005; Iversen et al. 2006; Sunderlin 2006). Many of which chiefly concentrate on the 
aspects such as financial profitability and economic efficiency, but not directly related to 
the evaluation on the roles of and how community forestry contribute to poverty alleviation 
(Glasmeier and Farrigan 2005; Pagdee et al. 2006). Attempts of governments based on 
changing State Forest Enterprises to State Forest Companies to improve the 
socioeconomic conditions for rural areas and forest dwellers have not reached expected 
results, at times and elsewhere it might be the causes leading to conflicts between local 
community and companies (Mayers and Vermeulen 2002; To et al. 2014). In this process, 
local community seems to be an outsider and passively participates in community forestry 
practices (Acharya 2002). This indicated that there is a close and strong linkage between 
poverty alleviation and equity in accessing to forest resources (Bardhan 1996). 
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Sunderlin (2006) pointed out in the research which emphasized the importance of poverty 
alleviation of community forestry program. So, poverty alleviation is one of the 
indispensable goals of each program. Poverty alleviation does not include of ‘poverty 
elimination’, ‘poverty avoidance’, and ‘poverty mitigation’ which have special meaning in 
term of forest resources. At one point, poverty elimination means the use of forest 
resources as a source to serve as a safety-net function, a gap fillers(FAO 2003), meeting 
the basic demands of forest users (Acharya 2002). In developing countries like Vietnam, 
expectations from community forestry are closely tied to meet basic demands and serve 
subsistent purposes those are directly extracted from the forests (Nam 2002; Glasmeier 
and Farrigan 2005). At the other point, it was also stated by FAO (2003) that poverty 
alleviation is the uses of saving, accumulation, asset building to increase permanent 
income.  
On the basic of argument given above, poverty alleviation in this research will be 
evaluated relying on the enhancement of human well-being of the forest end users in 
terms of rural livelihoods. This approach points out that livelihoods are closely tied to forest 
resources (Gilmour et al. 2004; Ndoye and Tieguhong 2004). This evaluation provides an 
important basis to assess if community forestry has contributed to poverty alleviation to the 
forest end users. It is strongly argued in the articles that human well-being will be 
enhanced through community forestry in term of economic benefits to society in general 
and individual forest users (Gilmour et al. 2004; Glasmeier and Farrigan 2005; Sunderlin 
2006). However, Gilmour et al. (2004) and Schusser (2012) argue that there exist many 
distributional issues of benefits flowing to local elites, and very poor people being made 
worse off in some cases. Moreover, external powerful influences those are not directly 
connected to community forestry might be interested in economic benefits, it is a 
disadvantage to the direct forest users (To et al. 2014). This issue is also emphasized by 
Bourguignon (2005) that economic benefits should be contributed to the poor people in the 
community. This research also points out that changing in poverty is a function of growth, 
distribution and change in distribution (Bourguignon 2005). This all proves that it might be 
inappropriate to evaluate the contributions of community forestry in the efforts of poverty 
alleviation. This study therefore approaches the evaluation of individual forest users. 
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In additional, economic outcomes of community forestry are defined as income, products 
and services gained from community forestry activities. It is strongly argued poverty is a 
multi-dimension, thus focusing on pure financial income might not evaluate the 
contributions of community forestry to poverty alleviation comprehensively (Mahanty et al. 
2009). Economic outcomes therefore should be qualitatively analyzed and partly evaluated 
in natural units, partly in capital. The outcomes consist of forest products, including agro-
forestry products; services produced from community forestry such as community house of 
culture, wooden bridge. These outcomes must benefit the forest end users. They are not 
taken into evaluation in case benefits are not to the direct forest end users.  
3.4.3. Ecological outcomes 
Defining the ecological health has attracted plenty scientific studies, with the concentration 
on developing a set of criteria, indicators, and even indexes as measurement for 
ecological sustainability (Hooper et al. 2000; Muñoz-Erickson et al. 2010). The various 
sets of indicators can challenge the process of monitoring and measurement (Dale and 
Beyeler 2001; Turnhout et al. 2007). This, due to complexity of indicators, might be not 
useful to policy making processes. Also due to the complexity of ecological indicators, the 
managers might not see the importance to measure potential interest within the forest 
ecosystem (Niemi and McDonal 2004), at times this diversity of indicators makes the 
selection of critical and relevant indicators more complicated (Noss 1990; Spangenberg 
2002; Duelli and Obrist 2003). Many studies pointed out the selection of critical and 
relevant indicators for the goal of assessment (Failing and Gregory 2003). Also further 
argued if the fundamental objective is to maintain ecological services and resilience, then 
appropriate indicators might be closed to primary productivity, to ecosystem biodiversity, or 
to landscape, and so on.  
As mentioned previously, community forestry implementation is to promote forest 
conservation in order to improve the forest conditions comprising condition for forest 
growth and biodiversity of the forest (Andrea and Nightingale 2002; Charnley and Poe 
2007). So it is necessary to clarify what we mean with ecological outcomes, which are 
natural conditions of community forest before evaluating if community forestry improves 
forest condition or not. Natural conditions mentioned here refer to the natural requirements 
for the growth of forest and biodiversity. It is recommended that changes of forest 
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conditions can be observed by means of forest growth (Rutters et al. 1992). Similarly, 
biodiversity is an important indicator used in managing forests (Lindenmayer et al. 2000; 
Failing and Gregory 2003). However, both indicators depending on different actors 
accordingly to their respective social and political preferences are interpreted in different 
ways. Due to general meaning of biodiversity that makes difficulty to pin down a precise 
sense for policy-making (Sarkar and Margules 2002). Therefore, we in this evaluation are 
interested in different interpretations on forest growth and biodiversity of community 
forests. The evaluation of biodiversity is based on existing knowledge on biodiversity 
directly or indirectly measured by different actors, instead of direct evaluation and 
measurement of indicators. This means the knowledge of the powerful actors is the most 
important based on the reliance of the existing studies implemented by any actors within 
the respective selected community forests. Since community forestry is conducted in 
particular forests, the assessment in this research was done at stand level and population-
species level. Composition, structure and function are considered as indices for the 
assessment procedure. Therefore, ecological outcomes in this research are assessed 
based on: 1) changes in vegetation coverage, and 2) changes in forest species 
composition, both in fauna and flora.  
Tools for assessing the ecological dimension of forest comprise: aerial photos or remote 
sensing, physical habitat measures and resource inventories, observations and censuses 
(Noss 1990). This study uses and compiles those as a checklist to identify any ecological 
assessments being implemented, especially any power actors within the respective 
selected community forests (See Appendix 2). 
3.4.4. Social outcomes 
Community forestry itself shows the closed linkage between “forest communities” and 
surrounding forests, not only for their daily livelihood but also for cultural and even 
customs and religious lives. Hence, the meaningful involvement of local community is the 
basis to produce effective forest activities, from which local people can benefit more from 
forests as well as forestry activities. More importantly, direct forest users are expected 
participate in common decision-making process and directly implement the forest 
activities. To do so, genuine empowerment of direct forest user needs to be seen as the 
key for successful involvement in decision making procedures and benefit sharing 
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(Lachapelle et al. 2004). In fact, empowerment is one of the cores of community forestry 
objectives (Timsina 2002; Lachapelle et al. 2004; Charnley and Poe 2007). 
Agarwal (2001) pointed out that participation and empowerment in a development 
intervention mean involvement of poor and excluded people in decision-making. The 
importance of empowerment has concluded by scholars in their studies (Agrawal and 
Ribot 1999; Agarwal 2001; Andrea and Nightingale 2002; Timsina 2002), but their 
understanding on empowerment diverges spectrally. Participation is a concept which has 
been misused by development professionals, government agencies by top-down 
approach. As a result, local people’s participation is just a screen for the program designed 
by outsiders and to fulfill outsiders’ objectives rather than communities’ objectives (Timsina 
2002). Even if rural people are participating in forestry activities, such does not necessarily 
mean that they are empowered. Agrawal (2001) stressed that the participation approach in 
forest management, in fact is modeled for disempowering some forest users. Timsina 
(2002) further emphasized empowerment of the poor must be understood in the context of 
existing socio-political power structure and argued that empowerment of the rural poor 
cannot be archived with imbalance accumulation of power of actors. The idea of forest 
devolution from central government to lower levels in a political-administrative and 
territorial hierarchy can be slated in the context of empowerment of forest users (Agrawal 
and Ribot 1999). Further argued by Timsina (2002), empowerment means the 
disadvantage groups gain some power and it is only be when it is framed outside the 
bureaucratic structures; The control by disadvantage individuals or groups such as 
women, poor and lower caste on the forest resources is minimal, and proposes 
restructuring power relationship among actors with more representation of the 
disadvantage groups in the committee. Moreover, the equity needs to be ensured among 
members in order to benefit to the disadvantage groups economically (Knox and Meinzen-
Dick 2000). 
Empowerment can be understood as giving subordinates to control over access to the 
resources (Conger and Kanungo 1988). Edmunds and Wollenberg (2013) in “Local 
Forest Management: The Impacts of Devolution Policies” noticed the crucial rationale 
for devolution policies such as community forestry is to hand over the poor with “better 
access to forest resources and more self-determination in decisions about local 
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resources”. Looking at conflicts in forest and forest management, which are mostly 
originated from the access to the forest resources (Repetto and Gillis 1988; Shiva 1991; 
Wily 2001; Niemelä et al. 2005) in that less powered groups are limited access to the 
forest resources, thus empowerment of forest users should focus on the rights and 
competence to access the forest resources. Additionally, related to control and access to 
the forest resources, benefits from forests to the forest users also need to take into 
account (Lachapelle et al. 2004; Larson et al. 2007; Mahanty et al. 2009). Changes in 
access to the forest resources by decentralization of forest management at times 
profoundly affect the livelihood of the rural people (Nguyen 2006,  2008). For these 
reasons, to ensure a meaningful and genuine empowerment process, secure access and 
control must be examined as the principle key during the implementation of community 
forestry.  
Depending on the socio-political context, access and control always come with 
prerequisites. It is argued by Larson et al (2007) that accessibility to the forests and the 
security of that access are affected by tenure rights. Further arguing he insists that 
negotiation for access, exploitation is indispensable between owners and the others. Apart 
from decision-making, people need access to resources needed to implement the 
decisions. As stated “Access to land and forest is a key benefit and factor in the ability of 
community forestry to bring benefits to the poor”, therefore, obtaining new access is one of 
the key motivations for benefits of community forestry (McDermott and Schreckenberg 
2009). By doing so, people can acquire the desired benefits. 
In summary, on the basis of indicators and factors of access and control, social outcomes 
in our research are assessed on the empowerment of direct forest users and measured by 
the extend they can: 1) access to information on outcomes of forest and forestry; 2) 
access and participate in decision-making process; 3) access and tenure rights over the 
forest, forest land (See Appendix 2).  
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Table 3.3: Outcome evaluation of Community forestry 
Outcome Definition  Key facts 
Social Outcome: Empowerment of 
direct forest users 
▪ Access to forest information 
▪ Access to decision making 
▪ Access to forest land and resources 
Low No empowerment No access to information’s, decision making and 
access to forest land the resources 
Middle Some 
empowerment 
Limited access to information, decision making and 
forest land and resources 
High Full empowerment Full access to information, decision making and 




of direct forest 
users 
▪ Forest products 
▪ Cash money 
▪ Community development 
Low No improvements 
in livelihood 
No access to forest products and no cash money 
Middle Slightly improved 
on level of 
subsistence 
Access to community development which was 
financed through community forestry and or some 
small financial pay  
High Significantly 
improved livelihood 
Access to community development which was 
financed through community forestry and or financial 





▪ Forest growth 
▪ Biodiversity 
Low No improvements 
on forest growth 
and biodiversity or 
reduced forest 
resources 
No management or uncontrolled management 
activities 
Middle A sustainable 
managed forest or 
increased ground 
forest surface 
Resource assessments, inventories, management 
plans, controlled harvesting activities, protection 
activities, e.g., fire management activities 




acceptable proof, like a monitoring system or report 
(Source: Schusser 2013)




Chapter 4: Model of Community Forestry 
4.1. Concepts and Definitions 
4.1.1. Concepts of community forestry 
Many forms of community forestry exist at the global level; these are considered an 
effective mechanism for forest management, as they mobilize local people’s involvement 
through democratic processes of program formulation and decision-making. The popularity 
of community forestry was boosted in the 1970s by global debates on preventing forest 
degradation and environmental crises while also alleviating poverty in one combined 
approach. The concept of community forestry emerged in response to two main things: 
first, the failure of the forest industries’ development model to lead socio-economic 
development, and second, increasing rates of deforestation and forest land degradation in 
third world countries (Gilmour and Fisher 1991). With the release of the landmark Forestry 
for Local Community Development (FAO) in 1978, community forestry as a concept was 
imagined as “any situation that intimately involves local people in forestry activities” (FAO, 
1978). In the late 70s, when the basic demands and problems of rural development in third 
world countries came into focus, community forestry was recognized as having two 
important roles: 1) to provide forest products and trees to people who no longer had 
access to them; and 2) to find ways of increasing the benefits of forest resources to local 
people, whose lives are closely connected to the forest and forest products (Gilmour and 
Fisher 1991).  
As with the industrial forestry model, the concept of community forestry spread rapidly and 
gained rapid acceptance (Pulhin 1996), in part because policies promoting industrialization 
(e.g., in Indonesia) and privatization (e.g., in Nepal) did not directly benefit rural 
populations and as such were not effectively tackling the issue of rural poverty and forest 
degradation (Kirchhofer et al. 1986). The concept also fitted with political considerations of 
the time, matching political rhetoric on redistributive justice and poverty alleviation that was 
being advanced by development institutions like the World Bank. Furthermore, community 
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forestry supported the people- or community-centered ideologies that became fashionable 
in developing countries in the 1980s (Pulhin 1996).  
Given the integration of community forestry into the forest policy of many developing 
countries (Gilmour and Fisher 1991), in tandem with rapid community growth of 
communities in both developing and developed countries, communities are attempting to 
gain greater control over their forest resources. To address this issue, national policies are 
being developed worldwide to re-engage communities in forest management decision-
making (Roberts and Gautam 2003). One of the most compelling reasons for states to 
foster participatory management approaches is that they have been unable to effectively 
police their own forests (Klooster 2000). Today, this interpretation of community forestry is 
applied in nearly every country around the world (McCarthy 2006). 
The concept of community forestry is founded on the belief in intimate synergies and the 
recognition of interdependency between local people, their forests, and their environment 
(Stevens 1997). The basic premise of community forestry is that by having a meaningful 
role in decision-making processes affecting surrounding forests, people can improve their 
socio-economic well-being and practice ecological sustainability (Shrestha 2006). Since its 
inception, the concept has been participatory and directed towards rural communities in 
general and the demands of the rural poor in particular (Arnold 1991). This participatory 
approach benefits the local community, makes use of indigenous knowledge, encourages 
voluntary compliance with community forestry program triggers innovation, and contributes 
to sustainable forestry with both socio-economic and ecological benefits (Kellert et al. 
2000). Mobilizing the active participation of the locals with external support (rather than by 
strict management) is a distinguishing feature of community forestry (Arnold 1991). In this 
vein, Ostrom et al. note in their work “The Drama of Commons” that the democratic 
process of decision-making gives the local people a sense of ownership over the forest 
protection and utilization (Ostrom et al. 2002a).  
Recent debates on community forestry have made apparent that the subject has 
significantly broadened its agenda. Actors in a community forestry network now focus on 
reforming national and international policy frameworks that constrain or enable community 
forestry’s delivering of ideas, resources, and practical advice to foresters and local 
communities (Colchester and Laforge 2003). 
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4.1.2. Defining Community Forestry 
Community forestry as a term represents different forms and practices in forestry; as such,  
it can be explained and interpreted by using terms like social forestry, joint forest 
management, community-based forest management, participatory forestry, etc. Definitions 
and terms for community forestry are plentiful in the current body of literature, and the 
forms it takes on the ground are similarly varied (Charnley and Poe 2007). Although these 
forms are dictated and approached in numerous ways, there is nothing wrong with 
diversity as a concept; however, a lack of consensus on what we mean by community 
forestry can cause significant confusion and misunderstanding regarding the basic 
elements of community forestry that is community, forests, and forestry (Shrestha 2006).  
Over the years, scholars have reviewed and assessed community forestry for its concepts 
and definitions in both scientific and practical discourses (Shackleton et al. 2002; Wily 
2003; Pagdee et al. 2006; McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009); it has even been related 
to broader discourses of neo-liberalism (McCarthy 2006). Community forestry was initially 
envisioned as “any situation that intimately involves local people in forestry activity” (FAO 
1978). This definition, while mentioning involvement, fails to clarify: 1) how that intimate 
involvement can or should be organized; 2) who the ultimate decision-making authority is; 
3) who local representatives are and how are they selected; and 4) who pays for and 
benefits from community forestry (Duinker et al. 1994). 
Shrestha (2006) has emphasized that definitions of community forestry mainly focus on 
generating benefits through participation; he/she also argues that a focus on partnership 
may reinforce the dominant role of state agencies in community forestry. In a related vein, 
control of the political process by which local forest users are empowered to control the 
use and management of forests continues to be an issue; to this end Gilmour and Fisher 
(1991) shifted the focus of community forestry from participation- to livelihood based 
forestry, an integral part of the rural farming system. For them, community forestry is “… 
the control and management of forest resources by the rural people who use them 
especially for domestic purpose and as an integral part of their farming system” (Gilmour 
and Fisher 1991).  
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The above review of the definition of community forestry can be summarized as follows: 
community forestry involves both some element of community participation in forest 
management and the secure provision of forest products for rural people. Three key 
attributes are shared by most community forestry: 1) access to the land and its resources; 
2) meaningful participation in the decision-making process surrounding local forests; 3) the 
preservation and maintenance of a way of life (Brendler and Carey 1998). Further 
elaborating on community forestry, Brendler and Carey (1998) coined the phrase 
“community forestry as another brand of forestry” which is refers to and benefits local 
communities through participatory forest management (ibid). In 1996, subsequent 
community forestry was once again highlighted as a “partnership” with the government 
(Hobley 1996), i.e., an entity with explicit mandate and legal decision-making authority to 
manage the allocated forest for the benefits of the community (Krogman and Beckley 
2002). 
Box 4. 1: Three key attributes of community forestry 
- Local communities have access to the land and its resources: Community forestry is 
deeply concerned with how communities benefit from forest resources, including timber 
and non-timber products. Jobs and other opportunities for added-value processing are 
distributed. As such, it seeks to ensure that locals have access to a portion of the benefits 
from nearby forests. 
- Local communities participate in the decision-making process: the fact that 
neighboring communities suffer most from forest degradation, community forestry aims to 
provide local people the meaningful role in making the decisions regarding the forests. 
- Local communities protect and restore the forests: Community forestry programs 
have taken place in areas where the balance between the subsistence culture and the 
surrounding forests has been upset by resource depletion and the resulting social decline; 
in such places, conservation and restoration are crucial goals. 
 Source: Brendler and Carey (1996) 
There are two indispensable components in every community forestry initiative: the 
community and the forest. Community forestry is thus the intersection of “community” and 
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“forestry related activities,” where communities become responsible for themselves 
(Nguyen 2006). Advocates of community forestry insist that the stability of communities, 
economies, and ecosystems is tightly linked and mutually reinforcing (McCarthy 2006); 
McDermott and Schrekenberg elaborate this point when they note that community forestry 
refers to local exercises to gain power over or influence decisions regarding forest 
management, including the rules of access and the disposition of forest products (2009:8). 
This definition makes clear that a sharing and shift of power from state to local 
communities is necessary and sufficient to bring out community forestry objectives on the 
ground.  
Relying on the aforementioned definitions and terms, Charnley and Poe (2007:303) 
underline three characteristics of community forestry: first, responsibility and authority for 
forest management is officially devolved to local communities; second, social and 
economic benefits from the forest to local communities are provided; and third, ecologically 
sustainable forest use becomes a main goal, with forest communities taking some 
responsibility for maintaining and restoring forest health. However, in practice, three main 
attributes characterize a community forest and set it apart from others: who makes the 
relevant decisions, who benefits from the forest, and how broad-ranging the management 
objectives are (Duinker et al. 1994).  
Ultimately, the definition provided above is of what community forestry should be, rather 
than what it actually is. There exists a need to define and understand community forestry 
within specific contexts and with the realization that there are gaps between actual and 
ideal community forestry practices (Shrestha 2006). Thus, community forestry is defined in 
this study as “forestry practices which directly involve local forest users in common 
decision-making processes and implementation of forestry activities”. We argue that 
meaningful community forestry practices require the decision-making autonomy of direct 
forest users regarding setting objectives, obtaining local control in forest 
management/utilization, and reaping the benefits of the forest. 
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4.2. Goals of community forestry 
Krott (2005) in “Forest Policy Analysis” has listed elements of the rationale program: i) 
Specific issues needed to be dealt with; ii) Goals which are the objects of the program; iii) 
Intended impact and its realization of the program; and iv) Information about the 
institutions concerned and implementation stage. He also underlined that these specific 
issues are the central points of forestry programs (ibid). 
- Issues of community forestry 
The logical point of departure for community forestry programs can be found in several key 
issues, including livelihood of the local community, empowerment, and forest protection. 
These issues are adequately defined in the current body of literature (Hobley 2007; 
McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009) and broadly used to define both community forestry 
and the problems and goals of designing such programs (Lindayati 2000). 
- Goals of community forestry 
Policy goals for community forestry have been broadened from forest management 
efficiency and sustainability to include equality, social justice, and a decentralized 
decision-making authority. Policy assumptions evolve accordingly, from viewing 
community forestry practices as a threat to an alternative solution to forest sustainability. In 
regards to policy, community forestry aims to preserve a forest ecosystem by sustaining its 
timber production and biodiversity while also including a new dimension of distributional 
benefits to the local community (Lindayati 2000). Additionally, community forestry 
programs have been diversified to produce several forms of land use and legal 
arrangements (ibid). Two types of forest policy strategies mentioned by Poffenberger 
(2006) are emerging in Southeast Asia and more broadly support community involvement 
in forest management. The first is the formulation and implementation of laws and policies 
that articulate community rights/responsibilities on lands previously claimed by the state 
and managed by its agencies or private sector leases; the second involves policies which 
support the devolution and decentralization of power to lower government units (i.e., 
district and commune levels) in order to ensure the authority of local institutions over 
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natural resource management, protection, and production (Poffenberger 2006:63). Both 
strategies refer to a “participatory approach” to forest management.  
Community forestry policy and practice initially focused on the protection and rehabilitation 
of degraded forests, as well as the establishment of new forest resources which  Gilmour 
et al. (2004:1). strongly emphasized “this is still a case for many countries in Asian regions 
where community forestry (under its various guises) has come onto the national agenda 
during the past decade”. In light of the impact of deforestation and forest degradation 
(Arnold 1991), Pulhin (1996) lists three major functions of forestry in rural development in 
addition to its industrial role. These are as follows: 
- The social equity function: to provide other forest products to rural people who no 
longer have access to them (Gilmour and Fisher 1991). 
- The poverty alleviation function: to find ways of increasing forest benefits to local 
people whose livelihoods are closely tied to the forests (Gilmour and Fisher 1991). 
- The resource sustainability function: to address the perceived fuel wood crisis and 
the increasing rate of deforestation and land degradation in developing countries 
(Mayers and Vermeulen 2002). 
Although the central objective of community forestry is to provide socio-economic benefits 
to local communities, goals of forest protection are much more important in developing 
countries, where locals are seen as the main agents of forest degradation and 
deforestation (McDermott and Schreckenberg 2009). Likewise, Charnley and Poe state 
that the central goal of community forestry is the sustainable utilization of forests 
(2007:303). There is, however, a great potential for community forestry to scale up 
approaches to poverty alleviation; there is thus a significant possibility for community 
forestry to contribute to the Millennium Development Goal of halving extreme poverty 
(Nurse and Malla 2005). 
4.3. Actors in community forestry 
On the basis of the diversity of functions and values that forests provide, community 
forestry is characterized by many actors. Beyond the communities themselves, other 
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groups, organizations at different levels (regional, provincial, national and international) 
also have impacts on local people’s access to the forests and forest products (Peluso 
1994). Conceptually, the four main types of actors involved in community forestry are the 
state, the civil society, the private sector and the donors (Dahal 1996; Hobley 2004). All 
four strands are critical for sustaining community forest management. It was argued that 
“the state has a strong, dominant role in forest management all over the region, permitting, 
or not, various forms of use to different groups, at different times, and sometimes without 
due consideration of the impacts on other groups” (Barrow et al. 2002:24). Structural 
adjustment and retrenchment, however, are changing this, as states are no longer able to 
properly manage forests, but rather must enlist the support of both the public and private 
sectors (Barrow, Clarke, Grundy, Jones, & Tessema, 2002:36). 
We define 'stakeholder' as “an individualistic or collective organizations that have 
interests in the community forestry and also have the potential to influence the 
community forestry process. They form the network in community forestry 
processes”. The term ‘stakeholder’ refers to resource users and service providers 
(including educators and researchers) who shape policy and undertake/facilitate 
community forestry processes. 
As Krott (2005:265) has discussed, forest policy is only possible with the cooperation of all 
actors and the implementation of various regulatory instruments. Politicians and 
administrative bodies as well as associations and individual citizens are directly involved in 
the formulation of forest management goals as such, forest policy mandates take on a 
prominent role in forest administration, which in turn focuses on the realization of public 
goals for forest policy, both through managing state forests and enforcing forestry 
programs (ibid). Such enforcement is in practice formulated by politicians, special 
administrations, and relevant associations. Forest users (and in particular primarily forest 
owners) are targeted by regulatory functions, including environmentalists and wood-
processing industries. A whole range of other direct and indirect users play a role, as do 
those people/organizations whose actions influence forests. Both formal state and non-
governmental groups of actors have the potential to influence community forestry 
processes. The classification of these actors is as conceptualized by Schusser et al. 
(2015); their roles in community forestry are described in the following table. 
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Table 4.1: Actors and their role in community forestry 
Actor Code Definition Role Example 
POLITICAL 
Politician State Actors who is selected by the 
people to fulfill a public mandate 
and who can legitimize binding 
decisions 
- Development of policies  
- Provision of information and capital  
- Technical and advisory services 
 
Government and Ministers; 
Representatives of political party 
(District People’s Committee and 
Communal People’s Committee);  
Public 
Administrations 
PA Public actors that make 
decisions concerning specific 
problems on the basis of 
general legal standard, resolving 
these problems by implementing 
special measures (Krott 2005) 
- Coordination and networking  
 




FA Public administrations focusing 
on forest tasks 
- Guide and implement FLA. 
- Support community in building local 
regulations on forest management. 
- Organize the forest protection network 
in the community. 
- Department of Agriculture and 
Rural Development (DARD); 
- District Forest Protection 
Department; 
- Management board of Natural 
Reserved Areas 





TA Actor who is legitimized to fulfill 
a public mandate and who can 
legitimize binding decisions for a 
community 
- Representing the culture 
- Leading the people 
- Advising people 
- Dispute solving 
- Traditional courts 
Traditional authority such as 




I_Dnr Actor that offers funds for 
solving problems 
- Provision of information  
- Source of funding  
- Support for legal and technical reforms  
- Capacity building  
- Research and education 
KfW (German Development Bank); 
SIDA (Swedish International 
Development Cooperation agency) 
Association Asc Actor that articulates interests of 
the group he represents and 
attempts to implement them by 
lobbying politicians and public 
administrations (Krott 2005) 
- Service provider  
- Negotiation with actors 
- Public relations, advisory and 
extension services  
- Capacity building  
Association of foresters 
Support 
associations 
NGOs Actor that can be characterized 
as an association but also offers 
funds for solving problems 
- Provision of information  
- Actors capacity building 
- Legal and political advocacy for 
communities  
- Source of funding  
- Advocacy for institutional reforms  
- Research and education  
All kinds of NGOs 







FUGR Actor that articulates the 
interests of local forest users 
and attempts to implement them 
- Participation and labour providers  
- Holders of ‘local knowledge’ Land and 
forest management Community 
development  
Community forest committee; 
Board of village forest management 
Forest 
entrepreneur 
Fb Actor using forests for 
production or consumption of 
products and services 
- Markets for timber products  
- Provision of information  
- Employment  
Forest companies 
Consultant Con Actor providing information, 
capacity building, funds and 
management for another actor 
based on a contract 
- Publication and documentations  





Rc Actors providing science-based 
knowledge 
- Analysis of programs  
- Provision of information of programs 
through research  
- Capacity building; production of trained 
manpower  
- Transfer knowledge, technique;  
Forest Inventory and Planning 
Institute; Forestry Science Institute 
of Vietnam; Forestry University of 
Vietnam 
Media Med Actor distributing and generating 
information 
- Public attention and awareness  Radio, TV, Newspaper 
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4.3.1. Political actors 
State institutions are involved in forestry development and policy formation, with 
government actors comprising institutions at different levels within the state. The state is 
the highest authority and as such presides over society and the business sector; it is 
responsible for making binding decisions in order to define and implement common 
welfare (Grimble and Wellard 1997). Migdal (1988:19) defines the state as “an 
organization with the ability or authority to make binding rules for society and ability to 
enforce its rules”. This definition is clearly linked to the concept of capabilities which define 
state strength; capabilities are here defined as “the ability of state leaders to use the 
agencies of the State to get people in the society to do what they want them to do” (Migdal 
1988, 1994). For Migdal, four main capacities make up state strength: i) the capacity to 
penetrate society; ii) the capacity to regulate social relationships; iii) the capacity to extract 
resources; and iv) the capacity to appropriate or use resources in determined ways. States 
with these four capacities are strong states; others are weak states. 
Drawing on Max Weber, many consider the characteristics of the modern state to include 
territorial integrity and rule-making regarding individual behavior and claims of legitimacy in 
coercive exercise (Migdal 1988, 1994; Barber 1990). The state is comprised of many 
institutions, such as the government, civil service, judiciary, parliament, and local 
government (Smith 1993). ‘State’ in this research refers to formal government agencies 
which deal with forest policy tasks and manage state forests and forested lands in the form 
of community forestry.  
a. Politicians 
Political parties are organizations which have evolved on a voluntary basis by 
independently accumulating votes in competition with other parties and whose goal it is to 
have their representatives elected to political office (Krott 2005:111). Their interests in 
community forestry can be seen through their practice of lobbying their positions in policy-
making: often they trade off forestry issues in order to get votes, recruit political elites, and 
represent people’s interests in community forestry programs (Krott 2005:114-115). 
Politicians (e.g., government officials, ministers, parliament members, representatives of 
political parties at all levels) are those who are involved in influencing public policy and 
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decision making; this includes people who hold decision-making positions in government. 
Krott (2005:122) stresses that although the constitution gives the parliament the right of 
legislation, only ‘politicians’ can legitimize political decisions (e.g., the ministers have 
decision-making abilities in their own departments). 
Most developing countries have been implementing decentralization in order to effectively 
coordinate and manage local development. Local governments and district/communal 
people’s committees are thus considered decentralized agents of the central government 
(that is, in a smaller area as compared to the national one) by locally elected politicians. 
They provide a legislative platform from which they can strengthen decentralized forest 
governance in the country, allow local self-determination, and facilitate local knowledge 
when dealing with local problems and issues.  
Political parties are the key players and decision makers in local government entities. 
According to assigned authorities and responsibilities (LA – 03), the politicians with 
decision-making powers in the realm of (community) forestry are found in the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) at the state level and the Provincial, District 
and Communal People’s Committees at lower levels. 
b. Forest Administration (FA) 
State forest administrations remain a powerful governmental stakeholder in community 
forestry. The main forest administration bodies are the Central Ministry of Forestry and 
whatever administrations exist at the regional and local levels. According to Krott 
(2005:125), “Forest Administration takes on the executive tasks in the state, i.e. it 
implements political programs in the form of concrete measures”. In practice, these 
administrations develop a large number of diverse institutions which span everything in the 
forest sector from special forestry offices to general forest administration (Krott 2005). He 
distinguished between two dimensions of Forest Administration machinery: ‘tasks’ and 
‘structure’. The former, in the form of legal stipulations, defines the framework in which 
forest administration takes action and is oriented. Advisory and extension services as well 
as the country’s overall forest management are the discrete tasks of the Forest 
Administration. To conduct these tasks, the Forest Administration has a built-up, distinct 
structure with expert staff and procedures across local, district, provincial, and state 
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offices. Depending on the general public administration, forestry administration follows the 
theory of bureaucracy but is supplemented by several elements of private business 
management (Krott 2005).  
c. Traditional authority 
The traditional authority is an individual elected by the local people through a village 
meeting. Usually an elite among the locals, this person is fully trusted by the others in the 
community. Traditional authority might be traditional leader of a traditional area, traditional 
leader at village level, or village patriarch.  
d. International donor organization (Dnr) 
Donor agencies are a heterogeneous group to other players. In many countries, external 
assistance is still a major source of financial support for state and civil activities, meaning 
that the objectives and political agendas of donor agencies play a fundamental role in 
shaping the evolution of the sector. Hobley thus (2004:34) defines donors as “international 
agencies of government or multilateral organizations, who, by reason of their nature or 
funding, are able to influence government policy”. Donors are distinguished as follows: 
- International financial institutions 
- Bilateral donors 
According to Hobley (2004), both sets of donor institutions have sustainable development 
goals linked to poverty alleviation, as established through the Millennium Development 
Goals. The approaches and tools they use to affect change in the forestry sector are 
diverse and vary from the use of conditionality to a more engaged, supportive role in 
building capacity and understanding changes within the public sector and civil society. 
Local funds or institutions are also considered effective bodies due to advantages such as: 
i) the reduced time and cost they require to access resources; ii) their creation of demand-
driven and effective systems of absorption for external funds; iii) their constant support and 
anti-poverty engagement with local processes that more distant agencies cannot achieve; 
iv) their flexibility and support for different methods of reducing poverty; and v) their 
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avoidance of the tendency to swamp or overfund promising local initiatives, as is often the 
case with donor agencies (Satterthwaite 2002). 
e. Associations (Asc) 
Associations represent the direct interests of the forest while also helping forest users to 
establish policies. Krott (2005:69) defines associations as “organizations which articulate 
the interests of the groups they represent, and attempt to implement them by lobbying 
politicians”. Generally speaking, associations are geared towards three major tasks: i) 
representing the interests of the forest sector, ii) representing the employer’s interests, and 
iii) representing the employee’s interests (Krott, 2005:70). Although associations do not 
represent the entire range of interests regarding forest management, they exert significant 
influence over forest management policy by lobbying, initiating lawsuits, and other means 
(Kearney and Bradley 1998). Krott (2005:77) notes that the structure of an association is 
determined by the formal and informal rules and regulations that adhere the association to 
a democratic structure; in turn, this structure enables members to influence the 
association’s activities.  
f. Support associations (NGOs) 
Although support associations have become recognized as national and international 
actors, it has not been clearly defined yet what the term ‘NGO’ encompasses. Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) are defined as “formal (professionalized) independent 
societal organizations, whose primary aim is to promote common goals at the national or 
international level” (Martens 2002:12). The term ‘NGO’ refers to non-state, independent, 
and formal not-for-profit organizations which deliver services in the field of forestry. In 
many cases, NGOs play a crucial role as project facilitators and in capacity building, where 
they help to manage conflict within/between communities and bridge divergent views 
between the local people and governmental agencies. In some countries, NGOs are seen 
as power brokers between governments and communities and are such used to implement 
projects (Shackleton et al. 2002). Along with government actors, they are significant in 
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shaping community forestry policies. Based on their level of operation, NGOs can be either 
local, national, or international. 
- Local NGOs function at district and commune levels. Being local, they are small and 
have well-defined objectives. The role of local NGOs is to help the target community make 
changes for itself (Lainie Thomas 2005). 
- National NGOs have the capacity to operate at the national level. They will lobby 
politicians or execute tasks on behalf of their government.  
- International NGOs are lobby groups for countries or international organizations that 
exercise their activities in more than one country. Their policy mandates and budgetary 
allocations are defined by foreigners, and they may act as project implementing agencies, 
funding agencies, or both. In most countries, international NGOs together with national 
and local NGOs have been instrumental in putting community forestry into practice. The 
main interests of these NGOs is the sustainable management of forests, alleviation of 
poverty, and research. 
4.3.2. Economic actors 
a. Forest user group representatives (FUGR) 
As the name implies, forest users are the immediate users of a forest; in community 
forestry, the term may refer to individual direct forest users with partial legal rights to forest 
access and the decision-making process. They are a heterogeneous group with varied 
interests in forests, including fuel wood, non-wood products, hunters, encroachers, and 
livestock herders. When a group of direct forest users has mutually recognized rights to 
use a particular forest, they become known as a forest user group (FUG). Such groups 
can be either formal or informal organizations that have been authorized to manage local 
forests in a sustainable manner (e.g., traditional authorities). Conservation, management, 
and forest utilization are the major concerns of forest user groups. A users’ committee is 
the executive body of the user group; this committee coordinates and negotiates with the 
government/other relevant actors and over sees forestry and organizational duties. 
b. Forest entrepreneurs (Fb) 
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Motivated by profit, the private sector plays a crucial role in forestry businesses. Private 
operators in forestry have the capacity to greatly assist forest communities by providing 
technical expertise, capital, and market access. Big concessionaires, timber industries, 
furniture industries, saw mills, contractors/loggers, and small scale fellers are examples of 
private sector actors in forestry. It is the role of the state’s Forest Administration to facilitate 
linkages between groups of forest users and timber operators. However, these powerful 
actors in most cases tend to ignore local regulations and controls, undermining the 
authority of community institutions and appropriating resources at the expense of local 
community members (Shackleton et al. 2002). 
c. Consultants (Con) 
Consultants are individuals or private organizations in forestry that provide forest advisory 
services; as such, they can influence forest policy with their high competency in and 
knowledge of the subject. By providing information on improved methods with which to 
utilize and protect the forest, their clients are able to make improvements without 
additional political pressure. Krott (2005:153) defines it as follows: “consulting provides 
information to support the client in resolving his own problems”. Most consulting refers to 
research, technical procedures (e.g., equipment use), capacity development (training), 
marketing, and financial promotion (entrepreneurship development). A consultant’s 
interests in forestry are thus service delivery, employment, and profit making. 
4.3.3. Societal actors 
a. Research institutions (RI) 
Research institutions help generate knowledge in community forestry; as such, their role 
has primarily been to train professionals in community forestry practices, provide technical 
support to actors, carry out field-based research on different modalities of participatory 
forestry, and act as advocates for the development of community forestry. Forestry 
research institutions are established by governments at different levels with the goal of 
sustainably conserving forest ecosystems and contributing to local community 
development via things like national parks or protected areas. Their interests mostly focus 
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on natural conservation and assisting local communities in socio-economic development 
(Nelson 1987). 
Along with research institutions, forestry related subjects can be studied and researched to 
degree level at universities, where education and research is the primary focus. Through 
formal forestry education, forestry professionals could acquire the basic competencies 
(knowledge, attitudes, values, and skills) required for forest management (Rebugio and 
Camacho 2005). Universities have the potential to play three roles in promoting community 
forest management: advocacy, information, knowledge generation; capacity building; and 
human source development. 
b. Media (Med) 
‘Media’ refers to the various means of communication required to disseminate community 
forestry information, including television, radio, and newspapers. With public attention and 
awareness of forests, the media is simultaneously regarded as representing the common 
thinking and existing as a product of either state-owned or private enterprises. The media 
as a product must be oriented towards markets by fulfilling the demands of recipients and 
advertising to customers (Kleinschmit and Krott 2008). 




Chapter 5: Powerful Actors and Power Networks in Community Forestry 
5.1. Community forestry in the context of Vietnam  
Community forest management is not a new topic in Vietnam. Since the 1950s, studies 
have examined the existence of local traditional forest management models in various 
regions (Tran and Nguyen 2000; Dang 2001; Phuong 2008). There is a range of 
contributing factors behind the implementation of and changes in community forestry and 
forest policy. The development of forest resource management practices influencing 
community forestry is best tracked as follows below. 
Table 5.1: The development process of community forestry policies in Vietnam 
Time frame Explanation of the policy 
By 1954 The existence of traditional community forests is recognized. The 
management of these forests is based on local regulations and 
traditional customs.  
1954 - 1975 Regardless of community forests but respect the communities’ 
management of forests according to tradition. 
Policies of land reform and cooperation are implemented, and state 
forest enterprises and collective forestry is developed (e.g., the 
Agriculture and Forestry Cooperative). Although the state disregards 
forestry at the household and community levels, they accept and 
respect highland communities’ managing of forests according to local 
customs. 
1976 - 1985 The focus shifts towards central management and intensive planning of 
state and collective forestry, while the amount of forests under the 
management of communities is decreased. 
After the liberation of South Vietnam, the government consolidates 
forestry into two economic components: state-owned and collective 
(cooperative) enterprises. State-owned and collective forestry develops 
at a large scale via various concentrated planning mechanisms.  
Community and household forestry are not encouraged to develop. 
Many forested areas are recognized and managed by local 
communities (many of which are ethnic minorities) in the highland 
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regions, but their self-governance goes ignored in the face of state 
inattention.  
Decision No.184 by the Cabinet Council (1982) and Instruction No. 29 
by the Secretariat (1983) move away from allocating forested land to 
state-owned and cooperative enterprises and start focusing on forest 
agreements with households.  
1986 - 1992 For the first time, the State refers to communes and villages as the 
legal owners of traditional community forests.  
In 1988 and 1991, with the first enactment of the Land Law and Law of 
Forest Protection and Development, forest land is allocated to 
organizations, individuals, and households. Community forestry as a 
concept is thus recognized. 
On January 17th 1992, the chairman of the cabinet council (now the 
prime minister) passes Decision No. 17/HĐBT to implement the Forest 
Protection and Development Law which confirms that communes and 
villages are the legal owners of those forests existing when the law 
comes into effect. 
1993 - 2002 This period is marked by an enhanced process of decentralization in 
forest management and increased interest in forestry socialization; 
however the policy of community forestry is not particularly detailed or 
clear. Various models of community forest management are (on some 
occasions, spontaneously) established in many regions but only at the 
level of a pilot project. 
Many international programs and projects take interest in community 
forestry but the field as a whole has not completely coalesced. 
Several important laws are passed, including the (amended) Land Law 
in 1993 and Decrees No. 02/CP and 163/CP on “Forestry Land 
Allocation,” neither of which defined community forestry clearly. The 
Civil Law passed in 1995 does not recognize communities as economic 
entities with legal standing; however, some state documents are 
applied to community forestry during this period, including: Decree No. 
01/CP (1995) on “Forest Land Allocation”; Decree No. 29/CP (1998) on 
“Regulations of democratic implementation at communal level”; 
Decision No. 245/1998/QĐ-TTg on “executing the state responsibility 
on forest and forestry land”; Circular No. 56/TT (1999), a “guide to 
design the regulation of community forest protection and development” 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD); 
Decision No. 08/2001/QĐ-TTg on “regulations on managing three 
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types of forest”; and Decision No. 178/2001/QĐ-TTg on “rights and 
duties while participating in forest management.” 
2003 - present This period is marked by the establishment of a fundamental legal 
framework for community forestry. 
According to the amended Land Law (2003), a local commune is either 
allocated land or recognized as a land user under the State with all the 
agricultural-land use rights that entails. The Forest Protection and 
Development Law (2004) specifically stipulate the allocation of forests 
to communes and villages, as well as the rights and duties of those 
communes. 
A civil law amended in July 2005 recognizes the concept of “common 
property” in communities, where communes and villages have the right 
to own customary assets contributed, co-managed, and used by 
community forest members according to agreements on community 
interests.  
Source: (Ngai 2009; Tình and Nghị 2012) 
The concentration of state rights through forest nationalization and other supporting 
forestry legislation led to massive forest degradation from the 1970s to 1990s (Sikor 1998; 
To et al. 2014). State forestry practices in this period attached special importance to forest 
exploitation and disregarded the protection of forest resources; predictably, this led to the 
exhaustion of those resources (Sikor 1998; Meyfroidt and Lambin 2008a). Sikor (2011) 
emphasized that changes in the policies and mechanisms of the forestry sector have 
provided the dynamics for the development of the highland regions. With the approval of 
the Land Law (1993)5, the legal position of local communities has been improved, 
especially in terms of land use rights and ownership. The Forest Protection and 
Development Law (1991) stipulated rules for the management of three types of forests 
(special use forests, protection forests, and production forests)6. These legal regulations 
handed over most of the protection and special use forest areas to state organizations; 
state forest enterprises (now known as state forest companies) managed most of the 
natural forest areas rich production forests. The remaining poor forests and bare lands 
were allocated to households and communities (To and Tran 2014).  
                                                          
5
 Approved on  July 14
th
, 1993 by the National Assembly.  To date, it has been amended a few times 
6
 Approved on  August 12
th
, 1991 by the National Assembly. To date, it has been amended a few times 
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Although households become more and more important in forest establishment and 
poverty alleviation in the highlands, state forestry -represented by management boards 
and state forest companies- still plays a decisive role in forest practices. However, clear 
weaknesses are evident in terms of state’s forest management and land use (Bộ 
NN&PTNT and UNREDD 2010; To 2012). 
Community forestry practices in recent years have shifted to practices of forest land 
allocation to communities. These practices are described below. 
Box 5. 1: Main activities of forest land allocation 
1) Land-use planning based on community; 
2) Forest allocation and land allocation to community; 
3) Schedule community forest protection and development; 
4) Setting up regulations for community forest protection; 
5) Implementing the forest protection and development plan; 
6) Exploitation procedures of forest products from community forests; 
7) Logging procedures from community forests for housing purpose; 
8) Building manpower for community in community forest management; 
9) Establishing funds for forest protection and development; 
10) Monitoring and evaluating the community forest management process; 
Source: (Tình and Nghị 2012) 
The ‘Đổi mới’ policy of 1986 was a turning point for the institutional devolution from state-
centered control to participatory management for local components (households, 
communes, groups of household). Decree Nos. 02 (LA – 35) and 163 (LA – 40) are the 
first definitive legal documents regarding forest land allocation to individuals, households, 
and organizations for their protection, management, and development (Ngai 2009; Sang 
2009). As Phuong (2008) points out, the transition from state-centered to decentralized 
management via mechanisms of forestry socialization is the legal basis for implementing 
community forestry in Vietnam.  
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Box 5. 2: Foundations for community forestry 
To deal with the rapid declination of forest cover, Vietnamese Government has initially 
tested reform of tenure rights over the resources on the forestland. Land Law (1993) and 
Forest Protection and Development Law (1991) are the two legally important basis for 
community forestry implementation. In which, the Land Law authorizes for a long-term 
forest allocation (up to 50 years or longer) and ‘SổĐỏ’ (Red Book)7 (See Appendix 1, LA – 
44, 45). ‘So Do’ owner has rights to dispose, assign, inherit, mortgage, and rent allocated 
forest. These two Acts and related decrees have facilitated the forest management 
through forestland allocation and forest protection agreement.  
Source: (IUCN and RECOFTC 2011) 
 
Although Vietnam has built the legal and policy framework necessary for community 
forestry development, there are many difficulties and challenges associated with 
community forestry practices. These can be summarized as follows. 
Box 5. 3: Challenges for the development of community forestry 
 Community forestry is implemented in undeveloped regions, remote areas with 
high poverty rate, low literacy level, low infrastructures, and lack of funds, which 
are the barriers for the development of community forestry. 
 Income from forests is low, while forests allocated to local community are the poor 
forests. This reduces the interests and attractiveness of local people to participate 
in community forest practices. 
 The legal scopes of community forestry have not been fully completed to promote 
available potentials of local communities as well as external supports to 
communities. 
 Weak co-ordination among actors in community forestry practices 
Source: (Tran and Nguyen 2000; Tình and Nghị 2012) 
In spite of the difficulties in community forestry implementation, forest land allocation in 
Vietnam has achieved some results, summarized in the table below. 
                                                          
7
 ‘Sổ Đỏ’ is an abbreviation of “Land-use right certificate” which is granted to the rural areas and stipulated 
in Decree No. 64-CP and Circular No. 346/1998/TT-TCDC 
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 9,999,892 2,291,904 3.981.858  228,512 2,806,357 620,531 
Northwest   1,330,721   33,643   127,659   10,219   740,688   418,512  
Northeast   2,211,304   298,435   593,196   12,833   1,175,425   131,415  
Hong river delta   84,844   4,012   62,194   2,272   10,425   5,941  
North central   2,292,997   431,262   1,126,918   46,596   658,096   30,127  
South central   824,271   238,078   406,567   4,209   97,910  77,506  
Tay Nguyen   2,158,582   1,018,777   950,417   126,561   38,996   23,832  
 Southeast  801,296   208,331   571,482   12,933   5,819   2,730  
Mekong delta  295,876   59,367   143,424   12,889   78,997   1,199  
Source: (Cục Kiểm Lâm 2009) 
 
                                                          
8
Cục Kiểm Lâm (Forest Protection Department – FPD): 
http://www.kiemlam.org.vn/Download.aspx/8EB785CE5B8F4617B6D62BFA79C6A0E2/1/BC_GD_GR_NR_3-20091.doc 
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As seen in the table given above, forest land allocations have been strongly implemented 
in the northern, middle, and Tay Nguyen regions of Vietnam where one-third of the 
country’s total forested area is located. Economic organizations, forest management 
boards, and households hold the largest allocations of forest area. Although the 
Communal People’s Committee is not recognized as a forest-owning entity by the Forest 
Protection and Development Law, it still manages approximately 2.1 Million hectares which 
have not yet been allocated to forest owners. The distribution of forest area by forest 
owner is given in Figure 5.1. 
Figure 5.1: Forested area managed by different forest owners 
Source: (MARD 2012)9 
 
                                                          
9
Quyếtđịnhsố 2089/QĐ-BNN-TCLN của Bộ Nông nghiệp và Phát triển Nông thôn ngày 30 tháng 8 năm 2012 
về “Công bố hiện trạng rừng toàn quốc năm 2011” 
Decision No. 2089/QD-BNN-TCLN on “Promulgating the nationwide forest area 2011”, issued on 30th Aug 
2012 by Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) 
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The important milestones in the legal framework of forest land allocation in Vietnam over 
the past two decades are described below. 
Box 5. 4: Milestones in forest land allocation over two decades 
Aug. 1991: Forest Protection and Development Law approved by National Assembly, 
making an effort to involve local people and different economic sectors in 
forest protection and development. 
Jul. 1993: Land Law approved by the 9th National Assembly, stipulating the rights of title 
holders to lease, exchange, inherit, mortgage, and transfer land-use titles. 
Jan. 1994: Government Decree No. 02/CP on allocation of forestland to local 
organizations, households and individuals. 
Jan. 1995: Government Decree No. 01/CP on contracting of land for agriculture, forestry, 
and aquaculture purposes. 
Nov. 1999: Government Decree No. 163/1999/ND-CP on leasing of land for forestry 
purposes. 
Nov. 2003: Land Law passed by the 11th National Assembly, recognizing the legal status 
of communities in land tenure.  
Dec. 2004: Forest Protection and Development Law passed by the 11th National 
Assembly, recognizing common property as a legal forest management 
arrangement. 
Source: (Tan and Sikor 2011) 
 
5.2. The formal process of transferring community forests 
To clarify how forest management rights are transferred to local communities, it is 
necessary to understand the basic steps of the community forestry formalization process.  
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 Principles:  
- The jurisdiction and time limits of a forest’s allocation, lease, and withdrawal must 
comply with the regulations of Article 22 of the Forest Protection and Development 
Law; 
- The forest areas under dispute may not be allocated or leased; 
- The allocation, lease, and withdrawal must be accompanied by community 
participation and a public announcement.  
 Conditions of forest allocation, lease, and withdrawal: 
- Article 19 under Decree No. 23/2006/NĐ-CP (See Appendix 1, LA – 41) stipulates 
that the allocation and lease of forests must be based on: i) plans of forest 
protection and development which are approved by state-authorized agencies; ii) 
forest status (production forest, protection forest, special use forest); iii) application 
forms by organizations, households, individuals, and communities approved by 
state-authorized agencies at relative levels; and iv) plans for forest and forest land 
allocation and lease designed by a communal authority with local people’s 
participation, a requirement for approval by the district people’s committee. 
- Organizations, households, individuals, and communities must be able to protect, 
manage, and develop allocated forests. 
 Limits of forest allocation: 
Limits of forest allocation are proposed to a provincial people‘s committee by the 
district people’s committee based on the local forest fund. These limits may not be 
over the maximum level stipulated in Article 22 of Decree No. 23/2006/NĐ-CP (See 
Appendix 1, LA – 41). 
 Procedures of forest allocation: 
- Step 1: Preparation. The steering committee and forest allocation council at 
relative levels (district and commune) are established along with the mission team 
at district level. 
- 2nd: Step 2: Checking applications. Households, individuals, and communities 
living in the vicinity of the forests initiate the process by submitting an application 
for forest allocation to the communal people’s council. In this application, they must 
express their interests in managing a particular forest. The communal people’s 
committee then directs the communal forest allocation council to check the forests 
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for handover to the households, individuals, and communities in question. The 
approved applications will be sent to district forestry agencies. This step takes 15 
working days after the initial application is received.  
- Step 3: Documents are assessed and improved by district agencies. The verified 
documents (with statement report) are submitted to the district people’s committee. 
Fifteen working days are required to make a decision.  
- Step 4: The district people’s committee’s approved decisions for forest allocation 
are delivered to the communal people’s committee to allocate forests to 
households, individuals, and communities. 
Source: (Self collection, see Appendix 1, LA – 42) 
5.3. Network patterns of powerful actors 
5.3.1. A brief introduction to the research sites 
Located in Northwest Vietnam, the mountainous provinces of Hoa Binh and Son La are 
mainly inhabited by various ethnic minorities including Thai, H’Mong, Muong, and Kinh. 
These provinces are part of Song Da (Da River) watershed where two hydropower plants 
currently under construction will make the watershed a major source of electricity for 
Vietnam.  
The forest areas of Hoa Binh and Son La provinces are approximately 0.4 million hectares 
and 1.4 million hectares respectively. The research area contains a significant range of 
natural forest stands, as well as degraded forests and forests that have experienced clear 
cutting and shifting cultivation. In the 1990s, the forests in Hoa Binh and Son La drastically 
declined in both quantity and quality due to various subjective and objective factors, 
including illegal logging, hydropower plant construction, land-use changes, and shifting 
cultivation (slash and burn) (Lam 2012) (LA – 24). In order to tackle deforestation and 
confront the decline of their forests, Hoa Binh and Son La have implemented policies of 
forest land allocation to households, individuals, organizations, and communities based on 
Decree 02/CP, “Promulgating the regulation of  forestry land allocation to organizations, 
households, and individuals for forestry purposes” (LA – 35). 
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Although living conditions have steadily improved in the region’s socio-economic 
development over the past 10 – 15 years, this area is still one of the poorest in Vietnam. 
While forest cover has considerably increased from 29% to 36% in the last decade through 
national and international efforts, the over-exploitation of natural forest resources (e.g., 
construction timber, fuel wood, and other forest products); and the hunting of endangered 
species still continues in natural, special use, and watershed protection forests. 
At the national level, the prime minister issued Instruction No. 12/2003/CT-TTg on “Urgent 
strengthening of methods for Forest Protection and Development” on May 16th, 2003 (LA – 
43). This Instruction provides an array of solutions to various sectorial problems and urges 
the provinces to enforce existing regulations and decisions while also restricting the 
utilization of all types of natural forest to the lowest possible level.  
5.3.1.1. Son La province 
a. Natural conditions and forest resources 
Located 320km away from Ha Noi in the center of Northwestern Vietnam, Son La is one of 
the three largest provinces in Vietnam with a total area of 14,174.44 km2. In Son La, 
agricultural land makes up 927,515 ha (65.4%), of which the majority (926,989.8 ha) is 
forestland area. Data for land use in Son La province is given in the following table. 
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 Province 1,417,444 100 927,515 100 69,628 100 420,301 100 
1 Son La City 32,493 2.29 23,989 2.59 2.226 3.20 6.279 1.49 
2 Thuan Chau 153,873 10.86 117,053 12.62 4.779 6.86 32.041 7.62 
3 Muong La 142,924 10.08 85.391 9.21 9,794 14.07 47,740 11.36 
4 QuynhNhai 106,090 7.48 60,760 6.55 17,359 24.93 27,971 6.65 
5 Mai Son 143,247 10.11 102,054 11.00 5,464 7.85 35,730 8.50 
6 Yen Chau 85,937 6.06 68,508 7.39 3,328 4.78 14,101 3.36 
7 Moc Chau 108,166 7.63 84,021 9.06 4,758 6.83 19,387 4.61 
8 Van Ho 97,985 6.91 71,092 7.66 3,429 4.93 23,463 5.58 
9 Phu Yen 123,655 8.72 80,156 8.64 7,062 10.14 36,437 8.67 
10 Bac Yen 110,371 7.79 61,606 6.64 5,296 7.61 43,470 10.34 
11 Song Ma 164,616 11.61 103,044 11.11 4,258 6.11 57,314 13.64 
12 Soc Cop 148,080 10.45 69,842 7.53 1,877 2.70 76,369 18.17 
Source: Forest Protection Planning and Forest Development of Son La to 2020)10 
Most of the forested land in Son La is made up of natural forests, including broadleaf, 
mixture, bamboo, and planted forests. Until now, forestry land areas in Son La have mostly 
been allocated to various entities, including communities, which manage a significant area 
(443,141.6 ha, equal to 47.8% of the total area of forestry land). Other forestry lands are 
managed by organizations (17.6%), households (17.2%), forest management boards (8%), 
groups of households (6.8%), local people’s committees (1.4%), and state-owned 
companies (1.2%). 
                                                          
10
 Report on supplementing, checking and adjusting for Forest Protection Planning and Forest Development 
in Son La Province to 2020. 




Table 5.4: State of forestry land and forest in 2013 (Unit: ha) 








Forestry land area 926,989.8 68,597.8 415,722.0 442,670.0 
I. Forested Land 635,935.0 53,424.5 302,236.5 280,274.0 
1. Natural forests 602,372.6 52,340.1 289,424.9 260,607.5 
2. Planted forests 33,562.5 1,084.4 12,811.6 19,666.5 
II. Non-forested Land 291,054.7 15,173.3 113,485.5 162,396.0 
Source: Forest Protection Planning and Forest Development of Son La to 2020) 
From the 2013 forest inventory report, it is clear that Son La’s forest reserves are not very 
high; of these limited reserves, rich and medium forests make up an even smaller 12.2%, 
the remaining 87.8% is made up of restored and poor forests (the result of harvesting or 
slash and burn agriculture)11. Together with poor plant structure, the low quality forests 
affect forest biodiversity and the protection role of forests in the research area.  
In spite of the limitations on forest quality, forest development in Son La has obtained 
certain results. The forest area has increased from 583,494 ha in 2008 to 635,935 ha in 
2013, the result of state investments, projects, and programs as well as people’s 
participation in forest protection and development.  
Table 5.5: The forest movement of Son La 
(Area in hectare) 
Category Period of 2008–2013 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Forest area 583,494 586,969 625,786 633,687 635,344 635,935 
(Source: Forest Protection Planning and Forest Development of Son La to 2020) 
                                                          
11
Report on supplementing, checking, and adjusting for Forest Protection Planning and Forest Development 
in Son La Province to 2020. 
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b. Socio-economic conditions 
There are twelve ethnic groups in Son La province; of these, most are ethnic minorities 
living in the mountainous regions. These people have low levels of education and depend 
on agricultural activities as their main source of income. Although incomes from forestry 
activities increased from 2008 to 2010, forestry production held a low proportion in the 
structure of agriculture and forestry, and aquaculture. Moreover, cash income from forest 
products decreased from 78.96% to 57.59% due to forest degradation and changes in 
forestry policies. This decline in revenue is mostly the result of economic crisis and the 
conclusion of various projects (e.g., the Five Million Hectare project) and forestry policies 
(e.g., forest-closed policy12). This demonstrates that the revenue generated from forests 
often does not come directly from forest products, but rather from forestry activities (such 
as forest protection) and financial investment in projects. The products extracted from 
forests primarily meet the demands of the local inhabitants and are used in everything 
from subsistence (e.g., fuel wood, bamboo shoots, mushrooms, and medicinal plants) to 
ornamentation to building houses. 
5.3.1.2. Hoa Binh province 
a. Natural conditions and forest resources 
Located in Northwest Vietnam, Hoa Binh is a mountainous province 76km away from Ha 
Noi that shares a western border with Son La. Of the total natural area of 460,869 ha, 
352,922 ha (76.58%) is agricultural land, most (62%) of which is forests and forestry land, 
as seen in the table below.  
                                                          
12
 To deal with weaknesses in forest management, forest protection, forest exploitation, transportation, and 
wood exportation, the prime minister of Vietnam has enforced Instruction No. 462 which addressed to 
“immediately close the forest applied to the following forests: protective forest, special-used forest, rocky-
mountainous forest, poor forests needed to be restoration-oriented protection and regeneration” (See LA – 
46). 




Table 5.6: Land-use situation of Hoa Binh province 
No. Land types Area (ha) Percent (%) 
 
Total natural area 460,869 100.00 
 Forestry land 332,813 72.2 
1 Protective forest 139,997 30.3 
1.1 Forested land 102,872  
1.2 Un-forested land 32,125  
2 Special-use forest 41,987 9.1 
2.1 Forested land 33,954  
2.2 Un-forested land 8,033  
3 Production forest 155,827 33.8 
3.1 Forested land 84,714  
3.2 Un-forested land 71,113  
(Source: Planning for forest protection and development of Hoa Binh province in the period 
of 2010 - 2020)13 
Similar to Son La province, forestry land in Hoa Binh makes up the majority of the natural 
area, with 332,813 ha out of a total of 460,869 ha. Of this land, 39% is natural forest area, 
which includes protective forest and special-use forest; planted forest follows with 34 
percent. By January 20th 2014, most forest areas in Hoa Binh province had been allocated 
to organizations (202,660 ha), individuals (38,784 ha), and households (163,875 ha). 
Smaller sections are currently under the management of local authorities (Communal 
People’s Committee) (IE – 69, 70, 71, see Appendix 3). Under efforts to improve forest 
conditions, natural protected forest areas and newly planted forests have increased from 
38% in 1998 to 49% in 2013. However, the contribution of the forestry sector in the 
structure of agriculture and the forest economy is still limited due to the end of the Five 
Million Hectare project and forest-closed policy. This caused a reduction of income from 
the forests for the local people and direct forest users. 
                                                          
13
Presented in the Resolution No. 36/2012/NQ-HDND of Provincial People’s Council on “Land-use planning 
to 2020, land-use schedule for the first five years 2011 – 2015”, issued on July 18
th
 2012. 
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b. Socio-economic conditions 
According to recent census data from Hoa Binh, 30 ethnic groups live in the province; the 
six largest minorities, Muong, Kinh, Thai, Tay, Dao, and H’Mong, live primarily in the 
remote, mountainous parts of the region14. Population distribution, geographical 
remoteness, and other relevant factors have led to difficulties in the socio-economic 
development of the region; investment for infrastructural/production development and 
investment are higher, riskier, and less effective here than in other areas.  
Due to shortages in arable land, forest resources play a crucial role in the lives of the local 
inhabitants, especially in the highlands. Household revenue from forests is mostly from 
external investments through programs/projects, as well as forestry activities like forest 
protection and plantation.  
Although forestry activity has required participation at various levels (particularly the local 
level), forest protection, development, and activities in Hoa Binh and Son La have not 
achieved the expected results due to the following reasons:   
- Passive participation of the locals in forestry activities which mobilized by authorities and 
functional agencies at different levels. As a result, forest encroachment and illegal field 
cultivation are on the increase in the region, often at the expense of forest fire prevention 
regulations.  
- Illegal logging and slash and burn happening throughout the remote areas of the 
province make protective function of the forests, especially watershed protective forests, 
declined in the region.  
- Poor plant structure and dispersedly planted forests. These lead to low forest 
productivity, do not meet the demands for economic development, and only contribute to 
poverty alleviation and household economic improvement in a limited fashion.  
- Weak coordination between departments, professions, administrations at all levels, and 
organizations at the local level. This considerably affects the executive process of 
planning, implementation, forest protection, and development.  
                                                          
14
 The Muong group makes up 60 percent of whole provincial population and can mainly be in Lac Son, Kim 
Boi, Tan Lac, and Cao Phong districts.   
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- Lack of consolidation in the organization of the state management of forestry from the 
provincial to the grassroots level. Unfortunately, this means that the role of the local 
government, especially at the communal level, has not been promoted in forest 
management, protection, and development.  
5.3.2. Network patterns and powerful actors 
This research has identified a general pattern of community forestry networks as shown in 
Figure 5.2. The Forest Administration (FA) and Forest User Group Committees (FUGR) 
are undeniably the core players in community forestry networks; as Krott (2005:126) 
stressed, the former holds the authority and takes on the executive tasks of forest 
management, while the latter represents forest users in accordance with the concepts of 
community forestry. The village authority (VA) also gets involved in community forestry 
cases; committees are established by commune administrations and are generally chaired 
by the commune administrator.  
Figure 5.2: Community forestry network in the research sites 
Across our 15 case studies, 13 relevant actors were identified, of which political actors 
(e.g., forest administrations, donor organizations, traditional authorities) and economic 
actors (e.g., community forest committees, consultants) were the most frequent relevant 
actors (see Figure 5.3). The presence of these actors has been confirmed by studies from 
the Community Forestry Working Group where a total of 427 relevant actors were 
identified across 57 community forests (Devkota 2010; Maryudi 2011; Mbolo C. Y. M. 
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committees are relevant actors since they represent local forest users and, through their 
normative claim, are involved in forest management decisions. Public administrations, 
donor organizations, and traditional authorities are also relevant actors. The figure below 
also shows the political actors appearing in all cases, which can help to explain how they 
influence community forestry programs. These results are in line with Schusser et al.’s 
(2015). 
Figure 5.3: Frequency of the relevant actors in community forestry in Vietnam 
(Source: Field survey 2012, 2013, own description) 
As discussed in the methodology section, the group of powerful actors involved in 
community forestry networks is identified via the quantitative calculation of ‘individual 
relative power – Xi’ and ‘dominant degree – Di’. By doing a power diagnosis in the case 
studies, we can observe and identify the most powerful actors (See Table 5.6 for a 
summary, Appendix 7 for a detailed calculation). This is the crucial foundation for the 
analysis needed to qualitatively determine how powerful actors build and accumulate their 
power.  
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Table 5.7: Power diagnosis summary of case studies 
No. Forest user group No. 
Cases 
involved 
No. Cases identified as powerful 




1 Forest Administration 15 15 15 15 
2 District Department of Agriculture 15 0 0 15 
3 District Department of Environment 
and Resources 
15 0 0 15 
4 State Forest Company 1 0 1 1 
5 Management board of Natural 
reserved area 
2 0 2 2 
6 Agro-forestry extension 1 0 0 0 
7 International donor 6 6 6 5 
8 Local donor 7 3 7 4 
9 Consultant 5 5 0 0 
10 Communal authority 15 8 1 15 
11 Forest User Group Committee 11 11 10 9 
12 Forest patrol team 15 0 0 0 
13 Traditional authority 15 15 6 5 
The data in Table 5.7 indicate why the forest administration remains one of the most 
powerful actors in forestry. In addition to the coercive strategies documented across all 15 
cases studies (where they are considered a ‘necessary actor’ for the implementation of 
community forests), they provide the actors with incentives and the network with very good 
information regarding community forestry. Moreover, as shown in Figure 5.3, additional 
actors include the central government (i.e., public administration and local governments), 
district agencies (on behalf of the district government), and donor organizations (Schusser 
et al. 2015).  
This research also has observed the involvement of political actors such as district 
agencies and local governments. Although there was no obvious evidence of these actors’ 
role in community forestry processes, they as representatives of state and local 
governments certainly are involved in making decisions over the issues related to 
community forestry implementation. Resting on the legal rights granted to them by 
legislation, political actors at local levels can influence community forestry activities to be 
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in line with state goals through land-use planning and forest land allocation. It has also 
been proven that local government units often represent state governments at the local 
levels (Clement and Amezaga 2009; Ngai 2009; Tan and Sikor 2011; To and Tran 2014); 
indeed, Tan (2006) has strongly argued that land allocation in Vietnam did not go along 
with the forest entitlements accessed by local forest users.  
The influence of consultants and donors was also investigated during field survey. 
Although not involved in all cases, they appear able to influence the social processes of 
community forestry if and when they get involved. Their power is built upon the dominant 
information provided to other actors in the network as well as the powerful incentives they 
offer to sway other actors, particularly local authorities and communities, to follow their 
forestry-oriented goals. Traditional authorities and forest user group committees also have 
a certain degree of power based on the trust placed on them by other actors in the 
community forestry network (Shackleton et al. 2002; Andersson and Agrawal 2011), (LAs 
– 06, 25, 26, 35, 47, see Appendix 1). 
“The village leader or patriarch is nominated to be leader of a forest user group committee. 
The FUGR’s members are selected from the hamlet party cell, farmer’s association, 
women’s organization, veterans’ organization, youth union, etc. The leader of the FUGR is 
accountable for the inspection and operation of forestry practices in the hamlet.” 
Traditional authorities and FUGR are mentioned by almost all actors in each of the 
community forestry networks; it therefore comes as no surprise that they appear to be 
linked. They also represent villagers in community forestry practices, particularly in 
motivating local villagers to comply with forest protection regulations and decrees issued 
by the forest administration. The rest of the actors in the networks seem to play second 
fiddle to the powerful ones according to in Table 5.7. The rest of this chapter will focus on 
explaining the power features on which powerful actors shape community forestry.  
5.4. Coercion as a top-down form of power 
On the basis of the asymmetric social relationships in community forestry presented in 
Chapter 2, this section will examine the modes and methods that powerful actors employ 
to shape community forestry, ensure tasks are completed by subordinates, wield of 
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authority, and influence or manipulate subordinates’ expectations. The uses of coercion 
vary depending on the actors and their coercive strategies, but they include both 
regulatory instruments involving punishments and planning instruments to gain the 
obedience of the power subjects.  
5.4.1. Coercion by the forest administration 
Forest policy documents such as the Forest Protection Law (1991, amended in 2004), 
Decree No. 163 on Forestry Land Allocation (1999), and Decree No. 119 on Structure and 
Activities of Forest Ranger (Las - 02, 05, 40, Appendix 1) define distinct territories in which 
the forest administration penetrates to the community level on forest-related issues. On the 
basis of these legal documents, the forest administration not only claims territory but also 
prescribes and intensifies its legal authority by enacting/enforcing regulations and 
expanding its bureaucratic apparatus (Barber 1990; Vandergeest and Peluso 1995; Morris 
2000). 
The first legal foundation for forest administration, the Ordinance on Stipulating Forest 
Protection, was issued in 1972 by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly. This 
ordinance entrusts the forest administration with forest protection/development and 
encourages continuity in the formulation and prescription of forest laws and regulations. 
The stated objectives of the enacted policy concentrate on improving forest management 
under state management agencies. The Forest Protection Law of 1991 is recognized as 
the first official document regarding forest protection and development; with this law, forest 
protection and development were assigned to the forest ranger force and state forestry 
management agencies, e.g., state forest enterprises (now called state forest companies), 
national parks, and natural reserve areas (To et al. 2014). Local communities in the vicinity 
of forests were therefore either isolated from forestry activities or only allowed to passively 
participate in them. Mismanagement of state forest enterprises and forest management 
boards, along with inconsistencies in laws/regulations and weaknesses in the forest ranger 
force were all technical problems requiring the forest administration’s attention and 
engagement. Acts and ordinances passed in 1972 and 1991 lend authority to forest 
administration officials, enabling them to control and facilitate forest activities in general 
and community forestry processes in particular. Authority is thus the possession of 
expected and legitimate power (Lasswell and Kaplan 2013). 
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Intimidation via actual or threatened use of physical violence is often wielded to force 
others to act or keep another from acting. The state forest apparatus uses various 
strategies to ensure control over the uses of forests and other actors. The ordinance 
passed in 1972, along with the Forest Protection Law in 1991 and LA – 05 in 2006, enable 
the forest administration to control forest resources and prevent unauthorized activity with 
the support of the police and military. This strategy remains a crucial means of ensuring 
order in the implementation of community forestry. To this end, the actor using physical 
threats must be able to convince the target actors to use force against themselves with the 
display of instruments and means of force of control.  
“The forest ranger, established at village level, coordinates with the other volunteer forest 
protection forces (e.g., the forest patrol team) in the areas of forest protection and forest 
fire prevention. He also implements forest investigations as scheduled twice a month, 
investigates illegal activities in the forest, and assists the chairman of the communal 
people’s committee in dealing with administrative infringement in the field of forest 
management and protection.” (IS - 41), (LA – 05). 
Many studies in community forestry have noted that there were some reasons for the 
forest administration’s control over the formation of user groups as well as their 
development of the forest management work plan (Gilmour and Fisher 1991; Ribot 2003; 
Larson 2005; Shrestha 2006). These reasons included: (1) controlling the process is a 
pragmatic necessity of forest administration; (2) the complexity of forest management 
(including silvicultural techniques, biodiversity, and sustainable forest management) is not 
understandable to the very low educated level or illiterate; and (3) control originates from 
the structure of a forest bureaucracy, as changes in forest policies have not resulted in 
changes in trained, upwardly accountable, and target-oriented forestry staff with an 
institutional priority of forest protection. 
The implementation of community forestry programs requires decision-making at various 
levels, ranging from the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) to 
decisions by senior bureaucrats in the Vietnam Administration of Forestry, as well as 
provincial and district decisions. In addition, these agencies collaborate with other actors, 
including donors, forest user group committees, local authorities, and institutions in the 
private sector to secure community forestry processes. The coercive potential of the 
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Forest Administration chiefly comes from its regulatory instruments, technical 
requirements, assistance of donors and consultants in community forest management, and 
coalition with other actors.  
5.4.1.1. Regulatory instruments as coercion 
Legal documents such as LA – 02, 35, 48 and Land Law 2003 (amended in 2014) serve 
as binding rules that enable community forestry in Vietnam. Other documents, such as 
Decisions, Circulars, Guidelines, and Official Dispatches issued by MARD and the 
Vietnam Administration of Forestry, are strong regulatory instruments used by the Forest 
Administration as well as multi-level governments implementing community forestry.  
a. Forest Management Plans as a legally binding form of coercion: 
Land-use plans or plans for forest protection/development at the village level should be 
approved by the district people’s committee, as they are crucial to the formal handover of 
forestland to a community. A forest protection project and the development of a communal 
people’s committee can be used as an alternative plan with the approval of the people’s 
council at the village level. In addition to these plans, the traditional authority (e.g., hamlet 
head or patriarch) must complete an application form for the allocation of forestland to a 
community or forest user group committee; this document must be signed by all local 
forest users, creating a legally binding document between the forest user group committee 
and functional forestry agencies at the district level. The handling processes are 
formalized when a land-use certificate is granted to the head of forest user group 
committee based on the decision of the district people’s committee. A forest management 
plan normally expires after five years at which point it must be renewed and/or amended. 
This forest management plan is the basis for implementing forestry activities in the 
allocated forests, including planting, harvesting, exploiting, etc. All interviewed foresters 
shared an understanding that sustainable forest management and utilization are the two 
most important objectives in a forest management plan (LA – 48).  
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Table 5.8: General of forestland allocation policy to community15 
Items By Land Law By Forest Protection Law 
Allocation types The State allocates protection 
forests without land-use tax 
- The State allocates production and 
protection forest without land-use taxes 
Requirements: 
- Allocated area is presented in the project 
of forestland allocation of communal 
people’s committee that has been approved 
by people’s council. 
- Forest handed over to community must be 
in the communal scale.  
Limit Unstipulated Unstipulated  
Duration Long-term, stable - Production forest: 50 years, extendable 
Forest condition  Unstipulated 
Rights  - General rights 
- Not allow to share the forest to the other 
members; Not allow to change, dispose, 
hire, pledge, and make business 
contribution. 
Source: (Phuong 2008) 
The forest management plan is not imposed by the forest administration; rather, it is a 
negotiated agreement that relies on dialogue between community members as well as 
between a community and forest administration officials. Indeed, the contents of a forest 
management plan are designed to effectively implement community forestry and 
strengthen the control of the forest administration over forest resources. An analysis of the 
15 case studies proves that all the forest management plans were nearly identical because 
their applications were provided by the Vietnam Administration of Forestry and 
comprehensively applied to all community forests. The obligatory principles for harvesting 
trees applied to community forest can be summarized as follows: 
                                                          
15
Pham Xuan Phuong – General of forestland allocation policy in Vietnam, real situation and orientation in 
the future – Summary record of forestland allocation in Vietnam, Hanoi May 29
th
 2008 
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Box 5. 5: Obligatory standards applied to community forests - cases of Hoa Binh 
province 
 Strictly prohibited harvesting tree species of Group IA based on Decree 
No.32/2006/ND-CP, issued on 30th of March 2006; 
 Applying the structure of forest-desired model to the appropriate forest conditions 
as in the following table. 
 Comparing number of trees by diameter groups with number of trees defined in the 
structure of forest-desired model to decide number of tree cuts. 
Source: self-description from field survey 2012, 2013 
Table 5.9: Number of trees in the forest-desired model by diameter groups applied 




8 - 16 16 - 24 24 - 32 32  - 40 40 - 48 48 - 56 56 - 64 
70 - 100 280 110 40 30 5   
100 - 140 330 180 55 25 10 5 1 
140 - 200 440 175 70 30 15 7 2 
Note: number of trees in each diameter group is calculated per hectare.  
Source: self-description from field survey 2012, 2013 
In the forest management plan, the number of fellable trees is determined based on the 
current volume of the forest and the real demands of the local people for such things as 
fuel wood, housing, fences, cages, and coffins. In practice, however, local forest users are 
only allowed to harvest fuel wood and small trees for fencing and breeding facilities. 
Higher tree diameter grades (i.e., 32 cm and over) are strictly controlled by the forest 
administration and district people’s committee, even though the real number of trees is 
higher than that of the forest-desired model. 
b. Issuing threats: suspending forest activities and withdrawing allocated community 
forests 
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The forest administration can threaten to impose its interests on community forestry by 
using regulatory instruments as the legal authority. Threats can be either soft (e.g., 
suspending activities or issuing warnings) or hard (e.g., withdrawing the forest allocation 
contract). They are often used with the intention of forcing another to act or keeping one 
from acting; use of threats are thus considered “either the last resort or the easiest means 
of establishing control over people and forest resources” in cases where the forest 
administration is unable to retain control over the forests (Peluso 1993:3). 
According to the provisions stipulated in the Forest Protection Law of 2004 (section 26) 
and Decree No.23/2006/ND-CP, withdrawal of forest allocation can happen in the following 
cases (Las - 02, 41: 
 After 12 months from the date of forest allocation, in cases where the 
forest user has not carried out forest protection and development 
activities; 
 In cases where the forest user utilizes the allocated forest for improper 
purposes, does not do duty to the state, or seriously breaks forest 
protection and development regulations; 
 After 24 months from the date of forest allocation, in cases where the 
forest user has not carried out forest protection and development as 
provisioned in the Forest Management Plan. 
The District People’s Committee is the state entity authorized to hand over and withdraw 
forests (LA – 48). The forest management plan therefore imprints the purposes of state 
control on the forests. Through written agreement on the forest management plan, the 
forest agency provides the forest users with a set of obligations and a tighter control over 
forest use rather than an independent decision-making authority.  
c. Limitation used as coercion: 
On the basis of the forest management plan and local regulations approved by the local 
community, penalties are prescribed for various activities in the community forest, 
including extracting forest products without the approval of the forest user group 
committee or forest ranger. Even after handing over the community forest, forest rangers 
impose control on tree harvesting, even though the forest management plan allows for it 
and no laws forbid it. Other types of forest product collection are also limited in community 
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forests, including grazing and the harvesting of non-timber forest products. Thus, the forest 
administration keeps control over a forest user’s activities by imposing limitations.  
d. Forbiddance as a type of coercion 
Legislative documents regarding forestry and provisions that regulate community forestry 
protection and develop select forests have clear specifications on what activities are or are 
not allowed. By forcing the regulatory compliance of the locals, communities are entrusted 
with the management of their allocated forests in ways that meet local subsistence efforts.  
Box 5. 6: Prohibited provisions of the regulation on community forest protection 
and development 
 Use of fire in the forest for the personal purposes such as: beehives burning; 
 Illegal exploitations, trades, and transportations of forest products; 
 Exploitation or use of forest products without approval of authorized agencies 
(FUGR, Forest Administration, Communal People’s Committee, and District 
People’s Committee) 
 Non-timber forest product exploitation that exceeds the quantity given in the Forest 
Management Plan and Local Regulation; 
 Grazing of livestock that brings about bad effects to the planted forests, assisted-
regenerate forests, and natural forest; 
 Strict prohibition of hunting and catching wild animals in the community forests, 
except mice; 
 Shall not implement harvest activities in the rain season, except dry season from 
October to December annually); 
 Shall not cut down trees for fruits; 
 Shall not sell non-timber forest products for the trade purposes; 
 Shall not cut down trees for fire-wood; only cutting down dead trees, branches by 
manual tools. 
 Shall not do farming in the community forests, and slash and burn. 
Source: LA – 21, 29, and 32, field survey, Vietnam 2012, 2013 




d. Coercion by requiring confirmation: 
In 2005 and 2006, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) passed two 
decisions which strengthen the forest ranger’s authority in controlling and inspecting forest 
products, including the origins of timber (LAs – 49, 50)16.  
Box 5. 7: Requirements of Decision No.59 on “Regulation of forest product 
inspection and control” 
 The transportation of Fauna and Flora must have special license granted by District 
Department of Forest Protection; 
 
 For the timber extracted from natural forests -allocated to organizations by the 
State- must be comprised sale invoice and origin of products with the ranger’s 
hammer mark; 
 
 For the timber extracted from natural forests -allocated to communities, 
households, and individuals by the State- must be comprised the origin of timbers -
made by communities, households, and individuals under the instruction of the 
forest ranger-, verification of local people’s committee, and hammer mark of the 
forest ranger based on the regulations of MARD; 
Source: LA – 49, IS – 70, field survey, 2013 
 
                                                          
16
 Two decisions has strengthened and improved the authorities of the forest administration (forest ranger 
force) in controlling and inspecting forest products over the entities concerned with the use thereof.   
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Box 5. 8: Decision No.44 on “Management regulations of the forest ranger’s hammer 
mark for tree elimination” 
This regulation stipulates for managing and sealing hammer mark of tree elimination; 
forest ranger hammer over the timber extracted from natural forests inland; Timber 
belongs to the category of endangered, valuable and rare species extracted from 
intensively planted forests, gardens, or scattered plantation; Timber is the evidence of 
violation of the Forest Protection Law; and the regulation is applied to organizations, 
communities, households, individuals concerning the use of forest products. 
 Civil forest ranger is responsibility of hammering timbers extracted domestically, 
imported, or confiscated with the witness of timber’s owner 
 To the timber extracted from natural forest, hammer mark is implemented at the 
transfer yard addressed in the exploitation record, or timber-gathering yard of the 
harvest area. 
 To the timber -belonging to the category of endangered, valuable, and rare 
species- extracted from intensively-planted forest, garden, or scattered plantation; 
hammering is done at the gathering yard of the forest owner. 
 To the round woods -marked by forest ranger, but divided into small pieces to 
transport-; hammering is done at the shortened place.  
Source: LA – 50, field survey, 2013 
 
e. Coercion by imposing a “forest-closed policy”: 
On September 11th 1993, the prime minister passed Instruction No. 462 on the “Stringent 
control of the exportation, transportation and exploitation of wood” to challenge 
weaknesses in forest management activity. This Instruction asked the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development to “issue an instruction closing the following forest 
types: protection forests, special-use forests, rocky mountain forests, and poor forest 
requiring assisted regeneration. These should be closed immediately to create regulations 
for the protection and management of specific forest types” (LA – 36). Prime Minister 
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Nguyen Tan Dung insisted in a government meeting that the state retains the right to close 
natural forests in order to restore them 17. 
f. Informal use of authority as an example of coercion: 
The existing authority systems provide the forest administration staff (e.g., forest rangers) 
with power and permit the substitution of staff preferences for that of forest users. Abuse of 
their authority positions and power abound. In many studies, it was found that the forest 
administration staff entrusted with licensing and controlling roles are corrupt (Stone 1989; 
Gilmour and Fisher 1991). Unequal decision-making capabilities give the forest 
administration staff opportunity to exploit forest users’ potentials by accepting the 
decisions made by foresters even if they go beyond existing legal documents.  
The alliance between forest rangers and the elite of a community -usually the chairman of 
the communal people’s committee and the hamlet patriarch- is mostly observed to control 
the main sources of income from forest resources. These alliances and personal ties are 
maintained, as forest rangers enable committee members to retain their position and 
benefits (Malla 2001; Bimala Rai Paudyal 2008).  
5.4.1.2. Technical rationale as a coercive instrument 
a. Silvicultural operations: 
In addition to the Forest Protection Law, silvicultural operations must be regulated in the 
forest management plan under the technical operational guidelines of the forest 
administration. Forest officials and rangers at the communal level are responsible for 
helping local forest users and the forest user group committee to implement silvicultural 
practices in accordance with the approved forest management plan.  
Box 5. 9: Technical instruction applied to community forest management 
Silvicultural operations in community forests are implemented by local forest users under 
the instruction and supervision of the forest ranger. The procedures for silvicultural 
operations must comply with Decision No.40/2005/QD-BNN, “Regulations on 
exploitation of timber and other forest products,” and Circular letter No. 35/2011/TT-
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http://canthotv.vn/tin-tuc/thu-tuong-yeu-cau-dong-cua-rung-tu-nhien-trong-nam-2014/ 
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BNNPTNT, “Guiding the implementation of logging, salvaging wood and NTFPs” (Las 
– 12, 51).  
 Forest user group committees make the natural forest’s exploitation plan in the 
natural forest with the validation and instruction of the forest ranger force; 
 This plan is then submitted to the communal people’s committee so they can 
summarize the tree exploitation plan; 
 The district people’s committee makes the final decision for tree exploitation by the 
local community.  
 The village forest ranger force and forest user group committee are granted 
authority to supervise forest exploitation.  
 
The technical specifications mentioned in Box 5.8 show that only the forest user group 
committee is permitted to undertake silvicultural practices—and even then, only with the 
approval of the forest management plan and by official decision of the district people’s 
committee. It is thus clear that the forest administration has the coercive capacity to give 
permission for forestry operations in a community forest, even when the forest is formally 
allocated to a forest user group. The director of the forest protection section of Yen Chau 
district (ISs – 41, 70, and 95) suggests that forest rangers would not want to lose control 
over community forestry activities. Thus, although forests are allocated to a community, 
forest administration in general and forest rangers in particular still continuously search for 
ways of gaining more power in community forestry. The technical rationale linked to 
decision rights could as a result be considered coercion in community forestry in Vietnam. 
b. Forest inventory: 
According to Decision No.106/2006/QD-BNN on “Guidelines for Community Forest 
Management at hamlet level” (LA – 48), the purpose of a forest inventory is: 1) to 
thoroughly understand the current conditions of forest resources and forestland as the 
basis for the application of beneficial rights and community duties; 2) to specify the goals 
for using each forest and plot of land; and 3) to propose interventional methods which can 
be applied to the allocated forests in terms of exploitation, protection, plantation, 
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generation, etc. The forest inventory process is formally based on the participatory 
principle of local forest user groups with the forest ranger’s assistance; however, in 
practice the forest inventory process is implemented by a third party (normally a forest 
inventory association) employed by the forest administration (ISs - 4, 5, 67, 68, 69). Local 
forest user and forest user group committee participation in the forest inventory process is 
informally superficial. It has also been emphasized in legal documents that forest inventory 
is a prerequisite for the implementation of community forest management at the village 
level (LA – 48).   
5.4.2. District government and coercion in the network: 
In the studied community forests, the district Department of Rural Development and 
Department of Environment and Resources are the representative agencies of the district 
government over agricultural and forestry activities in the area (LA – 03). These two 
agencies act as advisors to the chairman of the district people’s committee in decisions 
concerning forest utilization and land-use practices. In forestry activities in general and 
community forestry activities in particular, these agencies coordinate with the forest 
administration and communal people’s committee to control and manage the area’s 
agricultural and forestry activities through their issued decisions. Corresponding with the 
empowered authorities clause stipulated in legal documents (LAs – 03, 14, 17), the district 
people’s committee has rights of approval, license, and ratification over socio-economic 
development activities happening at the district level.  
“…The communal people’s committee, after ratifying and collecting the timber cutting 
plans of the local community, submits these to the district people’s committee for approval” 
(LA – 60). 
“… The district people’s committee has the right to approve forest and forestland allocation 
to a community; license timber extraction from the natural forest by local forest users; and 
decide on the forest management plan…” (LAs – 40, and 51). 
“… The district people’s committee makes decisions and approves documents concerning 
community forest management, including decision of forest allocation to a community and 
the regulation of community forest protection and development” (LA – 48, Chapter 8, 
Article 33.) 
Community Forestry in Vietnam: Actors and Political Process 
 
 93 
Box 5. 10: Procedure for approving tree cuts in Yen Chau cases 
“… We must get an exploitation permit granted by the District Department of Agriculture 
and Rural Development if we want to extract timber from the forest. The procedure of 
petitioning for logging is very complicated. The application for logging must be approved 
by the FUGR, then the FA, and afterward the Local Po. The final decision is made by 
L_Pol1.  
In the past 2 years, L_Pol1 has not granted forest owners any licenses for wood 
exploitation without reason”. 
Source: IS – 11, 19, 41, 42  
5.4.2.1. District Department of Rural Development - Local_Pol1 
As mentioned above, the District Department of Rural Development is a specialized 
agency under the direct management of the district people’s committee; it is responsible 
for implementing the state management functions in the region on agriculture, forestry, 
irrigation, aquaculture, and rural development18 (LA – 14, Part II, Item I). The authorities 
and responsibilities of the district people’s committee have been assigned by Legal Act 14 
(See Appendix 1), by which L_Pol1 is responsible for: 1) organizing, implementing, and 
promulgating the normative documents and plans; 2) providing guidance on techniques 
and professions to the communal people’s committee in forestry and rural development 
activities such as afforestation; and 3) exploiting forest products (LA – 14, part II, item II, 
point 6). According to the assigned functions and tasks, L_Pol1 is in charge of ratifying and 
licensing permissions within the limits of the empowered authority and as such can 
approve the exploitation applications of forest users. Local_Pol1 certainly has coercive 
capacity over other actors, such as the village people’s committee, forest user group 
committee, and even local forest rangers in the community forest network. 
                                                          
18
“Joint circular” of MARD – Ministry of the Interior, No. 61/2008/TTLT-BNN-BNV 
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5.4.2.2. District Department of Environment and Resources - L_Pol2 
L_Pol2, a professional agency directly under the management of the district people’s 
committee, functions to advise and assist the committee at the district level on such topics 
as the environment and resource issues19, including land use and natural resources (LA – 
17). L_Pol2’s authorities and tasks related to community forest activity have been defined 
in detail in legal act 17 (See Appendix 1), by which L_Pol2 has been empowered to license 
land-use certificates and land ownership (LA – 17, part II, section II, point 3). Therefore, 
after being checked by the communal people’s committee and forest administration, all 
Forest and Land Allocation (FLA) documents will be sent to L_Pol2, who can then issue 
the user license. L_Pol2 is as a result estimated to have specific coercive capacities in 
community forestry even though its involvement therein is limited to the issuing of land-
uses certificate and land ownership.  
5.4.3. Local authority (Local-Pol) and coercion in the community forest network 
The commune people's committee under the direct management of the district people’s 
committee manages state activities for socio-economic development at the regional level. 
The formal interests of the local authority are: a) setting up an annual socio-economic 
development plan; b) setting up the state budget, collecting revenue, and carrying out 
expenditures in the region; c) managing land use and building infrastructure according to 
legislation; and d) building communal infrastructural works; (LA – 03, Article 111). 
5.4.3.1. Legally approved authorities as a kind of coercion: 
The local government unit is publicly elected by the local community, and functions as the 
state administrative management at the local level20 (LA – 03). Because of 
decentralization, the local authority is responsible for the district people’s committee when 
implementing and deploying development activities, including activities in community 
forestry 21. The Local-Pol chairman has the authority to make decisions within the limits of 
                                                          
19
 Part II, Section I, Point 1, “Joint circular” of Ministry of Environment and Resource – Ministry of Interior 
20
 Chapter IV, Item 3, law on “organization of people’s council and people’s committee” 
21
 Article 112, law on “organization of people’s council and people’s committee” 
Community Forestry in Vietnam: Actors and Political Process 
 
 95 
his power as set down in law 22; as stated by Krott (2005:122) “Politicians can refer to the 
mandate which have been given in the process of their election. The politicians can 
considerably strengthen this mandate by mobilizing the public and mass media for them, 
to achieve more power in the face of administration”. This power is shaped in harmony 
with the interests of the political party the chairman stands for. 
In community forest management, the chairman receives and settles procedures for 
logging and salvaging wood/NTFP in his own area (LA – 12). Based on the circular letter, 
the Local-Pol possesses coercive rights in verifying the validity of formalities; it also has 
the right to suspend activities and decline to manage procedures for logging and salvaging 
NTFPs in cases where forest owners are being investigated23. The Local-Pol chairman 
authorizes the decision to establish a forest user group committee (FUGR); it also 
regulates the operation of the FUGR and Forest Patrol Team (FPtr) –even it is established 
voluntarily- (LAs – 19, 20). By relying on devolved power, the Local Pol chairman has the 
power to make decisions regarding FUGR establishment, including which potential 
members should be approved or rejected.  
"... We have the right to suspend activities when we detect a breach by forest owners. 
Moreover, the chairman of the local government also holds veto rights over the 
establishment of a community forest management committee, operation regulation of the 
FUGR, as well as the forest patrol team..." (ISs - 9, 22, 26, and 35). 
5.4.3.2. Requirement of regular report as coercive capacity: 
Because the Local-Pol is a civil authority agency working on behalf of the district 
government at the communal level, it is accountable to the district government for socio-
economic activities happening in the managed region. The Local-Pol thus asks local 
institutions to report the main issues in a weekly meeting and inform the local authority on 
the unusual issues occurring in the commune, particularly those related to illegal forest 
product collection or infringements on forest regulations. This regular reporting is seen as 
a coercive element that the Local-Pol has over local institutions in community forestry.  
                                                          
22
 Article 127, item 7 , Law on “organization of people’s council and people’s committee” 
23
 Circular letter No. 35, article 27, “Guiding the implementation of logging, salvaging wood and NTFPs” 
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5.4.4. Forest user group committee and coercion in the network 
FUGR, normally the village chief or patriarch, takes responsibility for executing forestry 
activities in the area (Las – 09, 48). FUGR members—usually representatives of social 
organizations like youth unions or veterans’ organizations—are elected in a local poll held 
every two years (LA – 20). It is very important for there to be effective collaboration among 
forest users in implementing CF activities; in practice, the FUGR coordinates with the 
forest ranger and local authority in the community forest process. Through the approved 
five-year forest management plan, the committee designs local regulations with the 
assistance of the forest rangers and local authority; these regulations are the basis for the 
FUGR’s action against forest users’ or non-forest users’ infringements.   
Along with planning and conducting CF activities, the FUGR has the right to decide and 
approve requests for households’ forest product exploitation as based on annual and 
approved five-year operating plans (LA – 20, Chapter III, Point 2). Although the FUGR 
does not possess legal powers as a governmental institution, it may decide the financial 
penalty and confiscate illegally collected forest products as regulated by local standards of 
forest protection and development (IS – 11). This information helps us to identify the 
FUGR as a powerful coercive element in the final qualitative results. 
Box 5. 11: Structure of Forest User Group Committee 
… The FUGR is comprised of seven members: Three official members (one head of the 
committee, one accountant in charge of the village fund for forest development, one 
controller holding cashier) and four unofficial members of the forest patrol team.  
Each of the local people has to contribute two kilos of rough rice (worth 40 cents) to the 
forest protection fund per year. In addition, a portion of the fines received from cases 
where forest protection convention and local regulation were violated are put into the 
village forest protection fund to pay for the FUGR’s activities (e.g., forest patrol, rewards 
for detecting breaches under forest operating and local regulations).  
To avoid negative impacts on the community forest on Sundays to collect fuel woods, 
NTFPs, and bamboo shoots; they are prohibited from harvesting medicinal plants 
medicinal plants.  
Source: IS – 11 (See Appendix 2) 




Although a FUGR’s formal power is not very strong, most of the locals conform to the 
terms of the local regulations and obey the FUGR’s decisions on everything from forest 
product sharing to punishments. In the cases of Bac Hung and San community forests 
(cases No. 4 and 5), the traditional authority may allow the local people to access NTFPs 
and collect timber in the community forest.  
In 1997, the natural forests of Bac Hung hamlet were handed over to households and 
household groups under Decree No.02/CP by the Government (LA - 35). However, 
because of topographical problems like rocky mountains and steep slopes, forest 
management and protection were met with many difficulties. In 2004, the local government 
decided to hand over the whole natural forest to the community forest committee to 
manage and protect. 
Although a community forest committee has not yet been established in the San 
community, the traditional authority and forest patrol team have been in charge of 
community forest management for ten years. These actors have full rights to manage the 
allocated forest in terms of NTFP and fuel wood collection. The local people cannot access 
the community forest without the traditional authorities' permission. 
5.4.5. Donors (Dnr) and coercion in the community network 
In the 15 case studies, international donors (I_Dnr) were found to be involved in six cases. 
As an institution on behalf of MARD, I_Dnr (the German Bank for Reconstruction, KfW7)24 
is an abbreviated name for the Forestry Development Project in Hoa Binh and Son La that 
is co-sponsored by the German and Vietnamese governments (Las - 07, 08, 13). The 
project is organized at the state and local levels. The state project management board is 
under the direct supervision of the Management Board of Forestry Projects founded by the 
minister of MARD (LA – 07, Article 1); the local project management board is located at 
the provincial and district levels. The project focuses on the following objectives: (i) 
                                                          
24
 Decision No. 1528/QĐ-BNN-HTQT by MARD on “Approving the Forestry Development Project in Hoa Binh 
and Son La (KfW7)”; Decision No. 3809/QĐ-BNN-TCCB by MARD on “Establishing the state project 
management board – the Forestry Development Project in Hoa Binh and Son La (KfW7)”. 
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afforestation of the available species in the areas and regeneration of the natural forest; (ii) 
community forest management; (iii) biodiversity conservation (Anonymous-3 2006). 
5.4.5.1. Donor’s funding and coercion: 
As stipulated in the foundation of the KfW7 project management board, this project funds 
local forest users and the community in their community forestry practices, including 
paying wages for forest plantation and protection. Although I_Dnr has no right to force 
local forest users and the community to implement community forestry, it does through its 
funding have certain coercive capacities over local forest users, the FUGR, and even the 
local authority in operating community forestry. To the resource-poor community forests, 
the interests of the donor in projects and forest agencies play a crucial role in handing over 
the forests to local communities. In this case, donor funding through administrative 
mechanisms adds value to the forest administration, who were able to bargain for their 
own benefits. However, donor financing in practice has not brought about expected social 
and economic changes. Therefore, regardless of the success of the project, forestry 
projects have some important effects on the relationship between the forest administration 
and local communities (Shrestha 2000). 
Box 5. 12: Donor’s funding as coercion 
… Each of the forest users opens a bank account through the district KfW7 
management board. The executive director of this board is nominated to be the 
representative account holder. The afforestation salary will be automatically sent to 
their account after opening. If the forest plantation result is verified and accepted by 
KfW7 staff and approved by provincial KfW7 management board, forest users can 
withdraw money from their bank account. If not, the money will be sent back to the 
bank account of the executive director
25
. 
Source: (IS – 06) 
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To facilitate the implementation of a community forestry program,  
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5.4.5.2. Donors and their alliances as coercive capacity: 
Donors are used to construct alliances from the macro- to micro-levels in community 
forestry with, for example project management boards at the state level to coordinate their 
program with government line agencies and provincial management boards to coordinate 
with district government agencies to implement community forestry in the field. This 
coalition aims to facilitate project activities and reduce future risk or conflict. On the basis 
of this closed relationship with participating actors in the alliances, the donor has a certain 
coercive capacity in the community network.  
5.5. Dominant information as a source of power 
The dominant information approach is defined by Krott et al. (2013) as a social relationship 
among actors in which one actor alters another actor’s behavior with unverified 
information. This dominant information is consolidated on two key factors: (1) the 
subordinate’s inability to verify the information; (2) the subordinate deliberately allowing the 
information to go unverified due to trust in the powerful actor (Jones and George 1998; 
Parsons et al. 2012; Simon et al. 1981; Krott et al. 2013). Experts provide dominant 
information in most cases where the end user is unable to check the information. 
Dominant information is a power process but not necessarily one where the information 
hurts the interests of the end user; rather, expert advice often helps them.  
There are many reasons leading actors to be trustworthy in the network, including 
confidence, good experience, information and expertise, and possible future benefits. This 
causes an uneven distribution of trust among actors in the community forestry network.  
5.5.1. The forest administration and dominant information in the community forestry network 
As stipulated in Decree No. 119 on “Organization and Activity of the Forest Ranger”, the 
forest administration is acting on behalf of MARD and under the direction and 
management of the people’s committee at various levels; as such, it takes responsibility 
for managing and controlling the forest and forestry activities. As analyzed in previous 
chapters, Vietnamese forests drastically declined in the 80s and 90s due to the 
mismanagement of state forest institutions. At that time, forests were under a state-
centralized management mechanism delegated by state forest enterprises (now state 
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forest companies)26, natural reserve areas, and national parks. In addition to 
circumstances like forest fires, land-use changes, and forest exploitation, the main factors 
causing forest degradation in Vietnam from 1975 to 1990 include: i) agricultural 
development policies; ii) infrastructural development policies; and iii) land policy (land law 
and forest protection law) (Thuy et al. 2012).  
Box 5. 13: Mismanagement of the State forest enterprises 
By the time “Đổi mới” task was deployed in the 1990s, state forest enterprises were a key 
state institution; as such, they implemented forestry production activities, including 
exploitation, processing, afforestation, and forest regeneration. These state enterprises 
also undertook the public benefit services to encourage socio-economic development and 
to ensure national security in the mountainous regions. From 1961 – 1990, these agencies 
managed 71.12% of the total plantation forests (de Jong et al. 2006). Similar to state-
owned companies in developing countries, state forest enterprises were criticized for 
mismanagement in the forest sector (de Jong et al. 2006). 
As soon as Vietnam became a market-oriented economy, reforms for state forest 
enterprises initiated. For example, the state forest enterprises must now self-finance their 
activities as opposed to relying on state budgets.  Despite past mismanagement, state 
forest enterprises continue to undertake forest exploitation, protection, and trade even if 
there were once implemented in unsustainable ways (Ogle et al. 1999; de Jong et al. 
2006) 
On the basis of the Forest Protection Law and related legislations, the forest administration 
is obliged to support forest users with their experts and access to forest resources. This 
allows the forest administration to influence the interests of the forest user group; in 
contrast, members of forest user groups are rarely in a position to challenge behaviors or 
observation regarding the forest administration. Forest administration in practice is 
concerned with the following professional knowledge: 
                                                          
26
Decree No.200/2004/ND-CP on “Arrangement, renovation and development of the state forest 
enterprises” aims to strengthen the state effectiveness over the forests. The State directly invests and 
manages only over the special-used forests, important and very important protection forests, the forests far 
from the communal residential area those are unable to hand over to community, and rich natural forests. 
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 Provide technical guidance to forest protection groups and forest fire 
prevention groups; 
 Direct forest owners and the local community in designing plans for 
forest protection and forest fire prevention. 
Source: Article 09, Chapter II, LA – 05 
Such authorities shows their “good faith” to the public through sincere efforts in solving 
problems—this is a core element of motive-based trust (Tyler and Murphy 2001). 
Additionally, Krott (2005:118) concluded “the protection of the forest is traditionally a major 
task of the State, which pertains to forestry”. These clearly prove keys for creating trust in 
the forest administration—trust by local users and communities will support the 
acceptance of the state forest administration’s activities, but the power of the state forest 
administration remains in dominant information independent from trust. 
5.5.1.1. Legitimacy as the basis of dominant information 
The legal framework for forestry activities is grounded in various forestry legislation, 
including the Forest Protection law (the fundamental law for conducting forestry activities), 
Decree No. 59 by the prime minister of Vietnam, Decree No. 119/2006 by the Vietnamese 
government, and assorted related documents which define the functions of the forest 
administration in forest protection, development, and community forestry. As addressed in 
Decree No. 119 (LA – 05), the forest administration units at various levels function as 
advisory agencies for the chairman of the people’s committee over the implementation of 
forestry-related activities occurring in the area.  
“The forest protection agency at the district level has a responsibility to 
promulgate regulations and policies on forest protection and management, as 
well as supervise forest product exploitation/utilization, mobilize local people’s 
participation in forest protection/development, encourage forest owners and 
local communities in the design and implementation of a forest management 
plan, and push for forest fire prevention and forest protection regulations”  
Source: Field work summary, LA – 05 
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This demonstrates that the forest administration has legal authority over activities related 
to forests, forestland and forestry. To implement the assigned tasks effectively, 
negotiations between the forest administration (represented by the forest ranger force at 
the respective level) and forest users (via the forest user group committee) facilitate the 
implementation of a community forestry program. Close ties between forest rangers, forest 
users, and the local community is established through technical support and other 
assistance in forest practices. The processes of negotiation to carry out forestry practices 
allow for a reciprocal discussion that lays a foundation of trustworthiness among actors, 
especially forest rangers and the forest user group committee. “Compliance can be said to 
occur when an individual accepts influence from another person or from a group” (Kelman 
1961:6), so recognizing each actor’s role in a community forestry network is a key to 
implementing community forestry.  
It could be therefore concluded that: (1) the formal task of the responsible management of 
a forest provides the forest administration with a role and the ability to dominate 
information and (2) this dominance can be limited by the open exchange of information. It 
provides other actors with information they can use to judge by themselves. In this case, 
power is given up by the forest administration in favor of an open exchange of information.  
Across the studied cases, there is no officially documented evidence of an open exchange 
of information handed over by the forest administration to the forest user group committee; 
however, observations in the field and interviews with forest user committees confirm that 
forest users and forest user group committees can manage community forestry operations 
by themselves. This may be done through a knowledge transfer process by the forest 
administration, which would include such things such as silvicultural techniques applied in 
community forest management and setting up a forest fire line (LAs – 31, 41, 70). 
5.5.1.2. Technical guidance as dominant information:  
In accordance with the assigned tasks, the local forest administration assists its 
community during the community forestry process, including in such tasks as forest 
inventory, forest mapping, and setting up a five-year forest management plan. Although 
local forest users are theoretically the main bodies carrying out these tasks as stipulated in 
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several legal acts (LAs – 47, 48), they are unable to complete such complicated tasks as 
they lack the specialized knowledge and ability to comply with currently legal documents. 
The forest management plan of the local community is therefore set up under the technical 
assistance of local forest administration staff at the local level. Such staffs include forest 
rangers, who instruct local forest users in calculating the community forest volume 
according to Circular No. 38 on Forest Sustainable Management (Las - 58, 59). This 
includes sample plot formation like data collection and forest volume calculation.  
Box 5. 14: Calculating community forest volume in Hoa Binh and Son La 
As the forests allocated to communities are evergreen broadleaf and semi-
deciduous forests, the area of each rectangular (20 x 25m) or round (diameter 
12.6 meters) sample plot is 500 square meters. In the sample plots, 
calculations of diameter at breast height (Dbh) and top height (Hvn) are 
applied to whole trees; this is the foundation for the forest volume calculation. 
(Source: Field survey 2013, LA – 59) 
Relying on the calculated results, the “model of desired forest structure” according to 
Dispatch No. 815 will be applied to community forests as the basis of a forest adjustment 
structure that ensures sustainable forest development in both quantity and quality. 
Depending on the forest types and conditions, the model of desired forest structure is 
designed as follows:  
Box 5. 15: Applying of forest-desired structures 
Forest types: 1) Evergreen forests; 2) Semi-deciduous forests; 3) Deciduous 
forests; and 4) Forests mixed of tree and bamboo. 
Forest conditions: 1) Forests influenced by timber exploitation; and 2) young 
restored forests; 
(Source: Field survey 2013, LA –57) 
A forest condition map is established by the forest administration on the basis of forest 
types and the calculated forest volume. A map of the forest conditions also aids in 
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determining the appropriate management objectives of each forest plot corresponding to 
the real conditions of the region (see below). 


















- Far from residential 
area that makes 
difficulties for control 
and protection;  
- Bordering with other  
villages that causes 
the forest to be illegal 
cutting  
- Lack of capital and 
technique.  
- Less impact of local people 
to the forest due to far from 
residential area. 
- Less impact of cattle due to 
unsafe terrain.  
- Only one path to the forest 
that makes forest 
management and protection 
easier. 
- Fairly good volume that can 
meet local people’s demand.  
- Richness of non-timber forest 
products. 





(Source: Field survey 2013) 
Diameter at breast height is used to classify trees by different diameter groups. By 
examining the number of trees in each diameter group together with five-year projections 
for local demand, this amount of trees can compare against a model of the desired forest 
structure to calculate the number of fellable trees (LAs – 57, 60). 
5.5.1.3. Facilitation: 
“We the forest ranger force are the main forest administration agency 
accountable for activities related to the forest in the administrated area; This 
includes: collecting data on forest conditions such as forest state, type, and 
volume; reporting to the higher Forest Administration agency and district 
government; and guiding and mobilizing local forest users to participate in 
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forest protection and development activities such as signing the forest 
protection commitment and designing local regulation. In addition, we take part 
in forestland allocation to communities and periodically accompany the forest 
patrol team on their patrols.  
For conflicts over the use of forest resources or infringement to the allocated 
forests, the forest ranger mediates between parties before reporting it to a 
higher authority. We however stand apart from forestry projects in general, and 
this community forestry project (KfW7) in particular…”  
(ISs – 41, 44, 47)  
The above anecdote from the head of Yen Chau District’s forest protection and forest 
rangers illustrates the role of a forest administration facilitator in community forestry. In 
practice, this facilitation process is normally provided by state agencies in order to involve 
actors in community forestry practices (Finger and Finger-Stich 2004). Indigenous 
communities, with their cultural and customary systems concerning forest resource 
utilization, are entities that should not be outside community forestry practices (McNeely 
1995). Facilitating local participation in this way, particularly in forest management and 
protection, is a key factor contributing to the success of forestry programs (Wells and 
Brandon 1993). 
From the 15 observed cases where allocated community forests are far from the village, 
the forest ranger force is considered the closest stakeholder to the local community and 
institutions with a thorough understanding of forests in the region. To fulfill the difficult task 
of forest protection and development, forest rangers prompt local citizens and institutions 
(e.g., youth unions, women’s associations, veterans’ unions, and village party cells) to get 
involved in forest protection and development through activities like fighting and preventing 
forest fires, building forest fire lines, planting forests, and undertaking silvicultural 
operations (LA – 11; ISs – 11, 28, 73, 98). Forest rangers carry out this work on the basis 
of their assigned tasks, functions, and responsibilities (LAs - 05, 11). This form of practical 
education accordingly enhances the local community’s awareness of forest protection and 
management; likewise, it assures their active and long-term participation in forest resource 
management (Tomićević 2005). Here, local communities and forest administrations come 
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together to define issues and seek solutions for community forests. The forest 
administration is therefore trusted by the local community, as it facilitates local 
participation. 
5.5.2. Donor and dominant information in the community forestry network 
The mismanagement of forest resources during the 80s and 90s has diminished trust in 
the concept of sustainable forest management as well as the centralized forest 
management approach. As concluded by Sikor and Apel, “recent forest policies of Vietnam 
changed in ways that expands community forestry is likely to receive the support of foreign 
donors” (1998:21). Foreign donors have thus played an important role in making 
community forestry a reality in Vietnam, a process aided by new forest policies. 
International funding agencies have strongly influenced Vietnam’s forest policies to 
contribute to natural protection and the improvement of livelihoods (Clement and Amezaga 
2009). These donor-aided programs range from bilateral projects (piloted in some districts) 
to projects at the provincial level, including KfW projects which provide technical and 
financial support to the local community in order to improve forest conditions and the local 
inhabitants’ lives.  
This study has chosen 15 case studies, of which six have international donor involvement. 
By relying on the diverse functions of the Forestry Development Project in Hoa Binh and 
Son La, donors gain the trust of actors in community forestry networks, especially in local 
institutions. KfW’s members are the officials appointed by the forest administration at the 
provincial level under a labor contract; they are in charge of guiding silvicultural practices 
among forest users in forest plantation activities. KfW’s staffs are thus trusted by local 
forest users and community forest committees.  
5.5.2.1. Building alliances as a source of dominant information: 
The Forestry Development Project in Hoa Binh and Son La is deployed via a top-down 
mechanism and structured from the state level (the Forestry Project Management Board 
under direct management of MARD) to the local level (district project management boards 
under the management of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development [DARD]. 
Hence, temporary coalitions and partnerships are formed to achieve a specific purpose or 
work towards a given goal. A coalition can bring people from various segments of a 
Community Forestry in Vietnam: Actors and Political Process 
 
 107 
community together to achieve a common goal or to engage in joint activity (Spangler 
2003). 
“The deputy of the district people’s committee is normally selected to be the 
KfW7 executive director of at the district level and bank account holder in order 
to facilitate deployment and decision-making community forestry processes. 
The deputy of district people’s committee with his political authority and caste 
will exert a strong influence on the other actors involved in the community 
forestry network…” 
Source: Field survey 2012, 2013 (ISs – 5, 6, 67, 68, and 69) 
Through alliances, communication, and the sway of powerful actors over other actors in 
community forestry, much may be accomplished. Similarity, the chairman or vice chairman 
of the village people’s committee, as KfW7 group leader at the village level, deploys 
community forestry practices at the local level. The aim of project management boards at 
different levels is to ensure the coordination of the project and government activities at the 
respective levels. By building coalitions, the success of the community forestry project is 
ensured and future risks are minimized based on the involvement of actors in the project 
process.  
5.5.2.2. Policy support as a source of trust: 
As confirmed in various studies, donors have strongly influenced policies in general and 
forest policies in particular in Vietnam (Nam 2002; Sunderlin and Huynh 2005; 
Poffenberger 2006; Pham et al. 2010). With the goal of enhancing the effectiveness of 
forestry activities and improving the lives of local inhabitants, policies are formulated in 
such way as to prioritize and facilitate donor projects over the forestry sector and 
community development (de Jong et al. 2006). Donors and their representatives therefore 
have full oversight of the draft formulation for projects in terms of both consultation and 
input. Donors’ policies, strategies, and approaches therefore complicate forest policy 
formulation further, which leads community forestry programs to expand the results once 
donors withdraw their financial and technical support (Springate-Baginski et al. 2007). As a 
result, existing policies produced through negotiations between the forest administration 
and donors are seen as trustworthy. 
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5.5.2.3. Capacity development programs as sources of trust: 
Through community forestry programs, donors offer various capacity development 
initiatives to the local communities and other involved actors; these may take the form of a 
training course, further education, or technical support aiming to improve actors’ 
knowledge and sustainable management of forest resources. This capacity building 
process helps actors be more self-motivated in implementing community forestry 
practices. It is thus considered a power-diminishing process via a combination of trust and 
incentives; "trust” when actors alter their behavior by accepting the donor’s unverified 
information and “incentives” when they motivate actors’ actions.  
"... We instruct local forest users to implement silvicultural operations as 
stipulated in Decision No.38/QD-BNN, including: holes sized 40x40x40 
centimeters and plantation density 1600 to 2000 trees per hectare...". 
Statement by KfW7 staff in Thuan Chau district (ISs - 5, 6) (LA - 10). 
During the community forestry process, workshops and training courses are organized for 
foresters, local people, and the involved actors. Such activities improve local capacity and 
build up the capacity of the forest institutions; they also strengthen the alliance between 
the forest administration and FUGR through workshops, training sessions, and field 
practices.  
5.5.3. Traditional authority (TA) and trust in community forestry 
The traditional leader, normally an elite person among the locals who has the full trust of 
the community, is openly elected by the local people through a village meeting. This is a 
process manipulated and influenced by either the central government or donors to affect 
local forest users and development decisions (Larson 2005). Local elites thus use their 
status to connect with the project management board and position themselves as the entry 
point for community forestry at the local level (Devkota 2010). A traditional leader is seen 
to both link and represent forest users in the community forestry process.  
To ensure that the implementation of community forest activities is fruitful as expected, 
traditional leaders are also chosen to be the leader of the forest user group committee. 
Because of the prestige associated with the role, the traditional leader and communal 
patriarch are crucial bodies for mobilizing and encouraging local forest users to participate 
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in community forest management and comply with community forest operation and local 
regulations (LA – 21). 
5.6. Incentives as a power element 
As presented in the theoretical foundation, incentives are a power element and are as 
such recognized as an important determinant of participatory forest management. 
Incentives may be seen as preconditions for local communities’ participation, although 
mainly for those groups living in the remote highland areas. They may also be a 
requirement for forest resource management and development, especially in the context of 
developing countries (Davies and Johnson 1995; McCarthy 2005). Ostrom et al. have 
confirmed that donor funding is a dominant type of incentive that motivates actors’ 
participation in forest management via technical assistance, further education, and 
additional training (2002b). Incentives are thus financial and non-financial offers by 
providers to obtain expected goals or objectives (Maryudi 2011). 
Incentives may be broken down into direct and indirect incentives, where the former 
involves input into community forestry (e.g., cash payments for labor, grants, subsidies, 
loans, and in kind payments like vehicles, equipment, fertilizers, and seedlings) and the 
latter focuses on the provision of technical assistance or services which help improve 
actors’ capacity to implement community forestry practices (Hellin and Schrader 2003; 
Krott 2005). Women also play a determining role in the success of community forestry 
programs (Gupte 2004; Poffenberger 2006; Charnley and Poe 2007; Pokharel et al. 2007). 
Many community forestry programs (including pilot projects) have been running throughout 
Vietnam, but their achieved results were not extended and maintained after the projects’ 
completion (Nam 2002; Lam 2012).  
Although communities have been involved in the community forestry process, their 
superficial participation is only for the benefit of a project’s approval. Forest income has 
not yet made tangible economic sense to local forest users because they have not 
organized themselves into well-defined community forestry groups (Ascher 1995). Local 
people are thus manipulated by the forest administration and donors through direct and 
indirect incentives to actively participate in community forestry practices. “[A lack] of 
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financial planning results in a low efficiency of projects” (Weiss 2000:7), meaning that in 
the course of forest management, economic incentives would promote the interests of the 
beneficiaries in sustainable forest management.  
The following sections examine incentives provided by the forest administration to a 
community forest user group, as well as through a donor to the forest administration and a 
forest user group.  
5.6.1. Forest administration and incentives in community forestry 
As discussed earlier, the forest ranger force undertakes forest management and protection 
at the communal level. The forest administration thus plays a significant role in local 
communities’ initiatives in forest management and protection. In Vietnam, funding for 
community forestry is raised as follows: 1) through the state budget, which mostly pays for 
forest protection and tending; 2) through donors’ support in the project areas; 3) through 
contributions by forest users and local inhabitants; and 4) through income generated from 
the selling of confiscated forest products by the forest user group committee.  
As stipulated in the current forestry related legislation (LAs – 02, 05, 11, 36, 40, see 
Appendix 1), the forest administration assists the local authority in the promulgation and 
execution of legal documents on forests and forestry; likewise, it supports local forest 
users in terms of silvicultural and technical assistance and training, e.g., in thinning, 
cutting, and forest fire prevention. In addition to the aforementioned incentives, an 
unofficial cash incentive was observed during the field survey in some community forests 
located next to or within natural reserved areas. This pays for the forest patrolmen and 
village staff directly contracted with district forest protection.  
- The forest administration determines the number of trees to be cut in a community forest; 
tree cutting must comply with the desired forest structure model and forest volume 
conditions (LAs – 57, 59, 60). Moreover, this number is also estimated by the timber 
demands of the local community as in the example given below. 
Based on the local community’s demands as compared with the real amount of trees in the 
forest, the forest administration uses diameter groups to suggest the number of trees that 
may be felled per year and in five years. For instance, if the number of trees in a diameter 
group of 8 – 16 cm is less than the defined amount in the desired forest model, these trees 
could not be extracted.  
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- For fuel wood, it was discovered in the fieldwork that the monthly average demand of fuel 
wood per household is approximately one cubic meter. This amount considerably impacts 
the forests. The forest administration thus advises the locals to only collect dry and broken 
trees from the garden or the planted forest.  
- Bamboo shoots and NTFPs are a popular product for ethnic minorities in the highland 
areas of Vietnam. However, to secure the forest protection and development tasks, the 
forest administration advises a correlated cutting rate to the local community that is clearly 
defined in the local regulations. 
For example, a “community can collect bamboo shoot at the end of crop and 
chop down the old trees for other purposes. Cutting rate should not be over 30 
percent in total of trees per clump. To the other sub-forest products such as 
leaf, mushroom, fruit, and medicinal plant, local people are allowed to collect, 
but not chop down mother trees.” (LA – 59, 60). 
- In addition to technical incentives by the forest administration, local forest users also get 
paid for other forestry activities such as tending them, protecting them, and fighting forest 
fires as addressed in legislative documents (LA – 10, 16, 53). 
“… A contracted salary rate of forest protection and natural forest-assisted 
regeneration is Vnd 200,000 (approx. 8 Euros) per hectare per year. The 
details of this contracted rate are decided by Ministry and the provincial 
people’s committee under their respective managements…” 
Source: Field survey 2013, (LAs – 16, 53) 
However, forest administration at the local level in specific cases can make the local 
community illegally tolerant of incentives, which allow local carpenters to collect and 
process broken trees in the natural forest without the express permission of the district 
people’s committee (ISs – 101, 104, and 105). “…As legal procedure, local carpenters who 
want to run their joiner’s workshop must submit the application form to the forest 
administration and district people’s committee and get the approval to use wood collected 
from the natural forest. However, local carpenters just draw up an application to the local 
authority and forest administration at the local level. This process is a negotiation among 
local forest users, the forest administration, and the local authority,” said one forest 
administration officer in the Bo community forest.  
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Table 5.11: Calculation of tree cuts in community forest of Hoa Binh province 
(Source: field survey 2013, 5-year management plans in Hoa Binh province) 
Table 5.12: Incentives of Forest Administration to forest user group committee 
Forms of incentives No. of observed 
cases 
1. Financial support 
- Small cash payment for members of forest patrol team while 
doing forest patrol, and contracted staff at village level* 
3 
2. Technical support 
- Silvicultural operation and harvesting 
- Forest plantation 
- Setting up forest management plan (annual and 5 years) 
- Fire line construction 







3. Material support 
- Legal documents of forest and forestry; brochures 
 
15 
*The payment is withdrawn from the district forest protection’s fund 


































in 5 year 
Note 
A B C D E   
Housing 
8 – 16 60 120   120 600 
2 new houses per year 24 – 32 45 90   90 450 
32 – 40 63 126   126 630 
Cage 
8 – 16 0 0 80 80 400 
Only repair 
16 – 24 0 0 40 40 200 
Fuel wood  0 0 0 0 0 
Collected from broken 
down trees, garden, and 
planted forest 
Fencing   0 0 0 0 0 Using bamboo  
Wood 
products 
  0 0 0 0 0 Planted forest  
Coffin >48 1 1   1 5 3 coffins per year 
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The above table shows the financial, technical, and material incentives used by the forest 
administration to sway forest users. This information was collected through observation, 
secondary documents, and formal and informal interviews with actors. In three of the 
observed cases, the Forest Administration offered financial support to the forest patrol 
team and a salary to forest ranger staff without the involvement of international donors (IS 
– 95). This payment originated from the operational capital of the district forest protection 
and natural reserved area. 
“… The forest patrol team is established at hamlet level and under the direction 
of the leader of the forest user group committee. Forest patrol operations are 
executed monthly with the participation of the local forest ranger. We pay 
‘20,000 Vietnamese dong’ (approx. 80 Cents) for attendance in each forest 
patrol. To ensure the success of forest protection, we sign a contract with a 
local inhabitant (called as local contracted forest ranger*) to detect 
infringement on the community forest. The contracted staff gets paid directly by 
the district forest protection…” 
Source: Field survey 2013, ISs – 95, 104, 105, and 109 
* Note: the nominee often has family ties with the traditional authority and is the secretary of the 
youth union. 
The above anecdote illustrates how the forest administration mostly provides incentives in 
terms of technical assistance and materials to the local forest users on the basis of 
approved functions and responsibilities as stipulated in law (LAs - 05, 41). Therefore, a 
forest ranger has insignificant financial incentive to offer the actors in a community forestry 
network. However, even a very small payment promotes the effectiveness of forest 
management and protection at the local level by motivating local forest users’ participation 
in community forest practices. Moreover, local forest users are also paid from forest 
tending, protection, and fire-fighting activities as addressed in the legislative documents 
(LAs  – 10, 16, 53). 
For the above analyses, technical services in forms of training and support are the most 
common kinds of incentives offered by Forest Administration to local forest users and 
forest user group committee. Through field observations, documents, and interviews, For 
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the above analysis, technical services in the form of training and support are the most 
common kinds of incentives offered by a forest administration to local forest users and the 
forest user group committee. Through field observations, documents, and interviews, the 
forest administration’s technical services are often required to determine the number of 
fellable trees, mark trees, make forest fire lines, and implement silvicultural operations. As 
discussed in the previous section, the nature of technical support is to reduce the impact of 
local forest users by limiting usage rights and controlling resource access through local 
regulations and forest management plans. The expected objectives of the forest 
administration are to protect the forest and improve forest conditions in accordance with 
the 5-Million-Hectare program by the Vietnamese Government (LA – 39). 
5.6.2. Donors and forms of incentives in community forestry 
Over the years, foreign aid has contributed to the socio-economic development of 
Vietnam. Although investment in the forestry sector makes up only a small portion in 
comparison with the total investment, the forestry sector has remained one of the priority 
fields for foreign development aid27. Over the years, foreign aid has contributed to the 
socio-economic development of Vietnam. Although investment in the forestry sector 
makes up only a small portion in comparison with the total investment, the forestry sector 
has remained one of the priority fields for foreign development aid28. Funds from Official 
Development Assistants (ODA) are a significant source of capital for forest rehabilitation 
through afforestation and community forestry (de Jong et al. 2006); such ODAs include the 
WFP (World Food Program), SIDA (Swedish International Development Assistance), KfW 
(German Development Bank), and JBIC (Japanese Bank for International Cooperation) 
among others. Foreign investment contributed a considerable portion of the total 
investment in the Vietnamese forestry sector from 1998 - 2005 (de Jong et al. 2006). 
International aid agencies undeniably play an increasing role in forest rehabilitation in 
Vietnam, even though the achieved results do not match the amount of donor support 
(Lang 2002). Vietnam’s Forestry Action Plan has also clearly stated the role of foreign aid 
                                                          
27
 Annually, agriculture and rural development attract about 37 foreign investment projects with a total 
investment of 179 million USD, of which investment into forestry sector makes up 3% (MARD 2012). 
28
 Annually, agriculture and rural development attract about 37 foreign investment projects with a total 
investment of 179 million USD, of which investment in the forestry sector makes up 3% (MARD 2012). 
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agencies in fulfilling its forestry programs (e.g., the 5 Million Hectare Reforestation 
Program) (de Jong et al. 2006; Ngai 2009).  
Table 5.13: Five Million Hectare Reforestation Program (MHRP) investments 
(Unit: Million VND) 
Capital Source Total  
Total 5,473,290  
State budget 3,317,848  
Local budget 593,952  
Investment credit 1,190,483  
ODA 371,077  
Source: (de Jong et al. 2006) 
By looking at international support to the forestry sector in Vietnam, and in particular KfW7 
support during our field survey in 2012 and 2013, the various types of incentives 
supporting actors through forestry programs are organized in the following table. 
Table 5.14: Donors’ incentives to actors in the forestry programs 
Actors Incentives 
Forest Administration * Financial support for:  
- Organizing workshops and conferences 
- Salary to the staffs of project management board; 
- Office equipment (computer, printer) 
- Study scholarships 
- Travel grant and allowances for within and abroad study 
tour, training, and visits 
- Vehicles (motor) 
Forest User Group 
Committee 
* Financial support for: 
- Plantation: seedling purchasing, transportation 
- Remuneration of forest plantation and tend 
- Study tour, workshops, and training fees 
* Technical support and training: 
- Silvicultural operations 
- Forest inventory 
- Account keeping 
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- Designing working plan 
- Boundary mapping 
* Material support: 
- Equipment for FUGR’s office: communication devices; 
chairs; and tables for working and meeting 
- Peeling machine 
-  Extension materials: brochures, calendar, and others.  
Source: Field survey 2012, 2013; (Lang 2002; Anonymous-2 2006) 
Along with the offered facilitation offered, donors represented by project management 
boards at respective levels provided forest user groups with various technical assistance 
and material support to improve the local people’s capacity regarding community forest 
practices. Technical assistance is an effective means of knowledge transfer and capacity 
development to the local community (Byron 1997). Some of the studied cases with 
international donor involvement have provided technical support through private 
consultants, governmental foresters, or their own experts. Such incentives actively 
encourage local people’s participation through the dissemination of significant information 
supporting their respective community forestry activities.  
Box 5. 16: Equipment supports of KfW project 
… We are equipped with a shell-corn and pluck-rice machine by KfW7. They are very 
important and necessary, because maize and paddy are the main food crops which are 
closely connected to our life. We appoint a person who understands machinery to be in 
charge of taking care and managing them. All villagers who want to use these machines 
have to bring their own fuel and pay to warden an amount of money as a compensation 
fee. A part of that money is used for periodically repairing and maintaining machines.  
(Source: IS – 15) 
Technical assistance, including extension and training materials, is often seen as a 
“change agent” that enhances the institutional capacity of the forest user groups and 
involved actors in managing forests and community forestry. In addition to machinery, 
products necessary to the operation of a community forest committee are provided, 
including chairs, tables, and loudspeakers as shown in the picture. 
Community Forestry in Vietnam: Actors and Political Process 
 
 117 
Photo 5.1: Supports of KfW project in Hon CF, Son La province 
 
Moreover, training courses and workshops on the implementation of community forestry 
practices are held by donors on subjects such as: participatory forest inventory, timber 
assessment, fuel wood/the NTFP demands of a community, designing beneficial 
mechanisms, etc.  
Objectives: enhance and improve knowledge of forest resource management for every 
actor and local community. Through training and working in the field, trainees are taught 
technical skills in resource analysis and assessment, as well as the silvicultural  methods 
they'll need to apply to community forests in five years. 
Subject: Community forest committee, forest patrol team, forest users 
Source: field survey 201229 
To ensure the operation of the community forest committee, members and the forest patrol 
team are paid by the donor as summarized in the table below.  
                                                          
29
 Training handbook on ''designing the forest management plan'' by KfW7, July 2012 
Community Forestry in Vietnam: Actors and Political Process 
 
 118 
Table 5.15: Salary paid for community forest committee’s members 
Community forest committee Number 
  
Salary per month 
 Vnd Euro 
 - Head of committee 1 Vnd250,000 10 
 - Accountant 1 Vnd150,000 6 
 - Cashier 1 Vnd170,000 7 
Forest patrol team      
 - Team leader 1 Vnd270,000 11 
 - Members 7 Vnd1,750,000 72 
Source: field survey 2012 
5.7. Power and the power elements of powerful actors 
As previously analyzed in the “Research Methodology” chapter, further quantitative and 
qualitative analysis to identify the powerful relevant actors in community forestry practices 
and their power elements was completed (see Appendix 7). In order to test whether the 
powerful relevant actors drive the outcomes of community forestry, this research focuses 
only on the relevant actors identified as part of a group of powerful actors presented in 
Appendix 7 and Figure 5.4. There, the results of the power analysis of the relevant actors 
across all 15 cases can be found.  
In Figure 5.4, we see that “forest administrations,” “district governments,” and “local 
authorities” appear as part of the group of powerful relevant actors to an extent of 100%. 
International donors also appear in this group in those cases where international donors 
were involved. Other relevant actors, such as forest-based enterprises and associations, 
only appear in one case; these are sorted into the group of less powerful relevant actors. 
Appearing in more than 11 cases, “forest user group representatives” are classified as 
powerful relevant actors.  
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Figure 5.4: Powerful relevant actors’ power status in Vietnam 
 
The results of the quantitative calculation of the power elements of relevant actors are 
summarized in Figure 5.5. Here, we see the elements on which the relevant actors build 
their power in order to influence the community forestry process according to their own 
interests. Across all cases, it is clear that forest administrations build their power on a 
mixture of all three power elements (dominant information, incentives, and coercion). This 
is in keeping with the analysis of forest administrations’ power features in the previous 
chapter, as these are state agencies reporting to the state government over forestry 
activities at the local level. Interestingly, traditional authorities, in company with community 
forest committees, gain their power through dominant information in most cases. Since 
traditional authorities are the elites and are as such respected by local forest users, the 
communities’ forest users accept their information and advice without verifying it. 
Nonetheless, in half the cases, community forest committees based their power on 
coercion and incentives. The community forest committees in these cases wield these 
effectively in community forestry activities. For example, the head of community forest 
committees (who is also a traditional authority) has the right to arrest offenders over 
community forests; this right is not defined in legal documents, but rather approved by the 
local community through local regulation.  
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 Furthermore, political actors achieve their power status through coercive power elements. 
Although these actors are not involved in community forestry activities, they hold veto 
rights over and make final decisions regarding the issues concerning community forestry 
at respective levels as stipulated in legal documents (LAs – 03, 09, 26, 30).  
Figure 5.5: Power elements of the powerful relevant actors 
 
The results in Figure 5.4 and 5.5 show that the powerful relevant actors in community 
forestry could be identified through applying the theoretical concept introduced by the 
Community Forestry Working Group (Devkota 2010; Maryudi et al. 2012; Krott et al. 2013; 
Schusser 2013; Yufanyi Movuh 2013; Schusser et al. 2015). Schusser et al. (2013) 
additionally confirmed that the results support similar findings by Jones and Mosimane 
(2000) presented in "Empowering communities to manage natural resources: Case studies 
from Southern Africa" (Steenkamp and Urh 2000), in which a public administration (e.g., 
the local government), traditional authority, community user group representative, and 
forest enterprise were also identified. The presence of such political actors (e.g., forest 
administrations, district government, local government unit, and donor) is evidence of the 
role state orientation plays over the forestry sector and community forestry programs.  
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Chapter 6: Evaluation of Community Forestry Outcome 
6.1. Social outcome of community forestry 
 As discussed in Chapter 5, the social outcomes of community forestry in this research are 
assessed on the empowerment of direct forest users (or individual forest users) and 
measured by their ability to: 1) access information on forests and forestry; 2) access and 
participate in the decision-making process; and 3) access and tenure rights over forests 
and forestland. Social outcomes are classified based on whether users have low-, mid-, or 
high-level access.  
6.1.1. Forest use and access to tenure rights 
As previously mentioned, securing tenure rights to the forest and forested land is a  
foundation for forest protection and development, with the goal of genuine empowerment 
of direct forest users. In community forestry in Vietnam, state-centered policies allowed the 
state to control forestland and forest resources, giving only limited access to forest users, 
households, and communities (Ngai 2009; Tình and Nghị 2012) (LA – 54). From 1976 
to1992, forest cover in Vietnam was reduced to 28% due to the mismanagement of state 
forest enterprises (Sikor 1998,  2001; To et al. 2014). The passing of two acts—the Land 
Law and the Forest Protection and Development Law (LAs - 02, 38)—was the cornerstone 
of the devolution of authority over forest management to individuals, families, households, 
and communities (Sikor 2001), as opposed to state forest enterprises at the central and 
provincial levels. This validates how access to tenure rights over forests and forest 
resources is of fundamental significance in any community forestry program. The passing 
of these laws marks the inception of community forestry in the context of state control over 
forested land and forest resources in Vietnam.  
However, the Land Law and subsequent legal documents limited rights at the local level. 
The state handed over rights of land classification and approval over land-use planning to 
the district, provincial, and central governments, but these could only be used for forestry 
purposes if the land was classified as forestry land. 
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Box 6. 1: Jurisdiction of making decision and approval of land-use planning 
- National Assembly decides on land-use planning of the whole country; 
- Government ratifies the land-use planning of provinces and cities under the central 
government; 
-  People’s Committee of provinces and cities under the central government approve the 
land-use planning of the directly lower administrative units; 
- People’s Committee at district, town, and city under the province levels approve the land-
use planning of commune 
(Source: Field survey 2012, 2013; LA – 38) 
Subsequent decrees and instructions mandated that natural forests and forested land in 
important watersheds not be allocated to households, but rather to communities, districts, 
state forest enterprises, or forest management boards. These entities in turn would sign 
protection contracts with individuals and households with small payments for protection 
activities and articles restricting their utilization of the forests.  
Table 6.1: Access matrix of forest users over the forest and forest resources 
Forest uses Prior 
practice 
Community forest practices Change 
of access Free access Limited permit Ban 
* Agro-Forestry Practices 









* None Timber Forest 
products 
- Wild fodders 
- Fuel wood 
- Bamboo shoot 



























* Hunting Widespread   * - 
* Grazing Free  * (*) +/- 
* Logging 
- Timber 












Notes: (-) means decrease; (0) means no change; (+/-) means insignificant change 
(Source: field survey 2012, 2013; LA – 20, 21) 
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In the community forests, forest users must comply with local regulations regarding forest 
protection and development that restrict the use of forest resources. Any minor uses of or 
access to community forests by forest users must be approved by the traditional authority 
and forest user group committee.  
Table 6.2: Restricted activities in community forest 
Activities Restrictions Cases 
Slash and burn Only cultivating in the planned areas, but 
must follow technical instruction of forest 
administration.  
15 
Fire use Prohibit using fire in the community forest to 
collect honey, and individual purposes 
15 
Forest products Individual must apply and get approval of 
community forest committee 
15 
Timber Timber exploitation is only allowed in dry 
season and ensured the correctness of 
species and quantity as approved plan 
9 
Non Timber Forest Products Only harvest for household demand and 
comply with approved quantity and 
schedules  
15 
Hunting Stringently prohibit wildlife hunting in 
community forests, except mice 
15 
(Source: field survey 2012, 2013; LA – 21) 
To ensure the further legal use of forests, various ties through commitments and 
regulations are signed between the forest administration and households/the forest user 
group committee (see Table 6.2). These documents are the guidelines that drive the 
utilization of the forest by local forest users and ensure forest protection and development 
tasks. To involve local forest users in the process of participation, strategies are adapted 
to fit the local communities’ conditions. The adaptations are mostly in the daily activities of 
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Sang + + + + 
- 
2  Hon + + + + 
3  Chen + + + + 
4  Cao Da + + + + 
5  A Ma + + + + 
6  San + + + + 
7  
NO 




8  Cang + + 
9  Ngoang + + 
10  Na Pan + + 
11  Mu + + 
12  Vo Khang + + 
13  Mo + + 
14  Bac Hung + + + 
15  Bo + + + + 
(Source: field survey 2012, 2013) 
Notes: (+) existed; (0) not existed; (-) not observed 
* Commitments are mainly signed between forest ranger force and local people and local 
institutions which focus on forest fire prevention, wildlife hunting, and timber logging. 
From the 15 case studies, we have found that commitments and local regulations are 
available in all cases with and without international donor involvement. These rules and 
regulations are seen as binding documents driving local people’s activities according to the 
forest protection strategy. In addition to these commitments and local regulations, the 
regulations of community forest protection and development are made by the joint 
involvement of the community forest committee, forest users under the assistance of the 
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forest administration, and donors (in cases of international donor involvement). Both group 
and local regulations stipulate that “the forest patrol team receives 30% of the fines 
received from forest users caught violating these regulations” (ISs – 15, 24, 28, 56, see 
Appendix 3).  
“By engaging the local people in rules and regulations, a number of infringements of forest 
protection regulations have been reduced in the region” said by the head of Yen Chau 
district forest protection section (IS – 41). However, infringements of the forest still occur, 
often by relevant agents or local forest users. The main transgressions are in illegal timber 
harvesting, slash and burn, and hunting as shown in the photos and Table 6.4. 
Photo 6.1: Illegal timber cuts in the community forests 
(Source: field survey 2012) 










1  Mu CF +  
0 
0 
Direct forest users 
2  Vo Khang CF 
0 
 
3  Mo CF + Direct forest users 
4  San CF 
0 
+  
5  Bac Hung CF 
0 
 
6  Bo CF + +  
7  Sang CF + +  + Direct forest users 




External forest users 
9  Chen CF + 0  












10  Cao Da CF +  
11  A Ma CF + + Direct forest users 
12  Coc Lac CF 
0 0 
 
13  Cang CF  
14  Ngoang CF + + Direct and external users 
15  Na Pan CF + + External forest users 
(Source: field survey 2012, 2013) 
Notes: (+) happened; (0) not happened 
Illegal timber harvesting is the common infringement happening in most observed cases. 
The forest administrations of Son La province has stated that “The forest ranger force itself 
is unable to fulfill the assigned tasks due to limitations of human resources. A Forest patrol 
is carried out by forest rangers at the commune level in coordination with the community 
forest patrol team twice per month” (LAs – 7, 8, 39, 40, 41). However, community forest 
committees together with an unarmed forest patrol team are unable to prevent external 
infringements, and especially illegal external loggers.  
“Members of the community forest committee are paid from the fines for infringements and 
the community fund paid into by all local citizens. The forest patrol team only gets paid for 
those working days in which they patrol the forest” (IS – 36). 
However, the incentives to the community forest committee and forest patrol team are 
limited, especially when compared to their responsibilities. Moreover, even though local 
regulations are set to prevent both local and external forest users’ infringement of the 
community forest, the committee and forest patrol team confess that the rules are less 
effective when applied to external users.  
In addition to illegal timber cuts, local forest users sporadically carry out non-timber forest 
collection, slash-and-burn agriculture, and cultivation in the allocated forests. “Although 
slash and burn is not allowed in the allocated forests, it still occur due to the traditional 
customs of the local community. Thus we must allow this activity as a concession to the 
local people to reduce impacts to the community forest and encourage local communities’ 
participation in forest protection task” (ISs – 39, 65, and 66). Evidence observed in the field 
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once again suggests that the forest administration will be unable to control the entire 
community forest.  
The studied cases strongly indicate that although formal access has slightly improved as 
compared with the previous stage, actual access by direct forest users has declined 
considerably. Instead of directly controlling forest users’ activities, the forest administration 
and other relevant actors pass responsibility for controlling access to the community forest 
committee, led by the village patriarch. This empowerment of the community forest 
committee means that forest users are not allowed access to the community forest without 
the committees’ express permission.  
6.1.2. Access to the decision-making process 
As the definition of community forestry itself points out, the field involves a participatory 
approach of local forest users in forest protection and management. This participation is 
referred to not only as a forest activity, but also as a decision-making process regarding 
the forests. It in theory aims to promote initiative and control among forest users regarding 
their community forests by negotiating their interests and needs, from which they expect to 
improve their living conditions. Legally, the role of direct forest users participating in the 
decision-making process of community forestry can be described as follows. 
Table 6.5: The formal role of forest users in the decision-making process of 
community forestry 
 Community forest management is a type of forest management in which the local 
community participates as forest owner in activities like: forest land allocation, 
forest management planning, and implementation; (Article 3, Decision No. 
106/2006/QD-BNN on “Guidelines for Community Forest Management at 
hamlet level”, issued on Nov 27th 2006 by MARD). 
 The local community may benefit from forest products including timber and non-
timber products extracted from the allocated forests. However, this exploitation 
must comply with the regulations of the five-year forest management plan as 
clearly stipulated in Items 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Article 14 and Item 3 of Article 15 of the 
guidelines (Article 19, Decision No. 106/2006/QD-BNN on “Guidelines for 
Community Forest Management at hamlet level”, issued on Nov 27th 2006 by 
MARD). 
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The above terms provide and strengthen legal forest users’ role concerning the decision-
making process of the community forest; however, this process is still impossible to local 
forest users. The challenge here is how direct forest users make decisions regarding the 
community forest. To implement community forestry, particularly in under-developed 
countries like Vietnam, there is a large difference between what is expected in the formal 
context and what things look like in practice. Through the 15 case studies, the extent to 
which forest users have access to decision-making over the forests does not significantly 
diverge from the observed models. Indeed, their participation is a means of supporting the 
pre-defined forestry tasks of the forest administration and relevant actors. 





Forest planning Forest protection Forest uses 
Mu CF 
Inaccessible 
by forest users 
Forest users involved 
in preparing necessary 
data; plans set up by 





activities of improving 
forest conditions 
(assisted regeneration) 
and forest security 
- Timber defined 
by forest 
administration; 








Bo CF Inaccessible by forest 
users 






forest border  
Forest users involved 
in giving needs from 
forest; plans prepared 





activities of forest 
protection and guided 
to select trees for 
specific purposes 
- Timber defined 
by forest 
administration; 




Cao Da CF 
A Ma CF 
Coc Lac CF 
Inaccessible 
by forest users 
Inaccessible by forest 
users 
Forest users 




Na Pan CF 
(Source: Field survey 2012, 2013; own description) 
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forest management plans. However, in practice, such participation does not occur, as the 
activities of forest users are manipulated by forest administration to ensure the success of 
forest management tasks. During this process, the forest administration defines the main 
activities in the community forests; these may include thinning, harvesting, collecting 
species, and choosing which species to plant. In the four cases in Yen Chau district, forest 
users’ participation in community forestry was very limited; here, the district government 
does not allow local users to cut down trees, even in the planted forests. “We have not 
approved any applications to fell trees in the last three years,” said the head of the district 
agriculture department of Yen Chau district without giving any further explanation (ISs – 
42, 43).  
In the five community forests in Sang, Hon, Chen, Cao Da, and A Ma, forest users are 
allowed to cultivate agricultural crops under young, planted (unclosed) forests to supply 
their short-term food demands. During the fieldwork, the forest administration staff and 
committees coordinated to execute plans that would allow forest users to help choose 
which tree species would be planted, although of course the final decision was at the 
discretion of the forest administration and international donor. In these project areas, forest 
users sign an afforestation contract with the management board of the Forest 
Development Project in Hoa Binh and Son La (KfW7). Through the terms of the contract, 
forest users could select their preferred species of economic value on the suggestion of 
the project’s experts and forest administration. Nonetheless, KfW7 staff at the district level 
still decides on silvicultural operations and harvest timelines. 
Overall, forest users in the 15 cases have insignificant access to the decision-making 
procedures for their respective community forests. Their access to this process is limited to 
merely participating in forest protection and management activities to ensure the forest 
administration’s tasks are completed at the local level. This limits the benefits to forest 
users, as will be evaluated later.  
6.1.3. Access to important information on the forest 
As previously discussed, an important feature of empowerment is the forest users’ 
possession of important information regarding the forests (Maryudi 2011); too often they 
are kept uninformed about major topics in forestry and forest resources. Evidence 
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observed across the 15 case studies clearly proves that much of important knowledge on 
forests is inaccessible to forest users.  
In regards to the planted and community forests that forest users manage and utilize, the 
forest administration strongly controls information regarding silvicultural operations and the 
number of trees extracted from forests as calculated in the annual and five-year forest 
management plans. “Forest users are unable to make annual or five-year forest 
management plans, including silvicultural operations and technical standards applied to 
the forests. Therefore, in practice, forest rangers at the local level or forest administration 
staff help them design these” (IS – 96). Due to the lack of information on the price of 
timber and non-timber forest products, forest users sell their products to dealers at lower 
prices than they could fetch in the market.  
Across all 15 case studies, local forest users have no idea how community forestry works 
and why they need to do it. “…We do not know what community forestry is. Simply, we just 
comply with what the local authority and forest administration ask. Moreover, we get extra 
income through participating in community forest practices,” said the traditional authority of 
Hon village (IS – 15). In other words, local forest users passively acquire information and 
knowledge concerning forestry and the value of forest products.  
6.2. Economic outcomes of community forestry 
Community forestry is seen as a key to alleviating poverty and improving the lives of the 
rural poor (Gilmour et al. 2004; Hobley 2007; Larson and Ribot 2007), especially for ethnic 
minorities living in the highland and mountainous regions of Vietnam (Nam 2002; 
Sunderlin and Huynh 2005; Sunderlin 2006). Studies on the subject have shown that 
economic goals are the key outcomes of community forestry in order to involve local forest 
users in forest management and protection.  
6.2.1. Forest products and food crops from forestry land 
The evaluation and analysis of the outcomes of community forestry have demonstrated 
that forest end users directly benefit from the forests, forest activities, and activities on 
forested land. In 15 cases across two provinces, the cultivation of food crops (maize, dry-
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rice, and cassava) mainly occurs on forestry land because of the lack of agricultural land. 
This cultivation might be either under the forest canopy or between forest compartments 
(i.e., an agro-forestry model). These models have de facto existed and been closely 
connected to the local people’s lives for a long time. Studies make clear that local forest 
users can earn more profit by using agro-forestry models, which in turn can provide them 
more opportunity to access the forests (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 2004). Agro-forestry 
models applied in the highlands can reduce deforestation on the one hand and also meet 
the basic needs of local forest users on the other (Angelsen and Kaimowitz 2004; Maryudi 
2011). In the 15 case studies, local forest users are permitted to cultivate agricultural crops 
under planted forests while the canopy remains open.  
Table 6.7: Access on forestry land for agricultural cultivation 
Province Duration Right of access Note 
Hoa Binh During forest 
establishment 
Access provided only on 
planted forests allocated to 
forest users 
Cultivated duration 
depends on the term of 
forestland allocation 
Son La During forest 
establishment 
Access provided only on 
planted forests allocated to 
forest users 
(Source: field survey 2012, 2013) 
In many cases, it was observed that the forests and forestland allocated to forest users 
were mostly poor forests, or else forests restored after clear cutting or slash and burn. To 
foster the process of greening the forest, the forest administration and agencies pay 
reforestation, protection, and tending wages to forest users who participate in forest 
protection activities through a binding contract. By signing the contract, forest users have 
the legal right to extract sub-forest products from the natural forest for subsistence, such 
as bamboo shoots, mushrooms, fuel wood, etc. Across these cases, the interest of forest 
users in their forests and forested land varied depending on the factors closely associated 
with forest conditions, forest soil, and the distance to the forest. 
We also found that there has been some competition between forest users with forested 
land vs. those with agricultural land, especially for wet-rice land. Forest users expect 
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higher yields of agricultural crops, particularly corn, which produces higher profits as 
compared with forest products.  
“…We expect to be allowed to plant maize on the forestland, the cash income of which is 
much higher than that of forest products. It is estimated that the net income from one 
hectare of maize is about Vnd 21 million per year (approx. 800 Euros). This year, we are 
processing a case of clearing land in the community forest done by local forest users. The 
offender is fined Vnd 18 million…” (IS – 55) 
Photo 6.2: Corn cultivated on forestry land next to community forest 
(Source: field survey 2012, 2013) 




Table 6.8: Deforestation for farming in Na Pan Community forest 
(Area in hectare) 
Forests Total 2010 2011 2012 
No. Area No. Area No. Area No. Area 
309 15.61 132 5.74 57 3.16 120 6.71 
Community forest 90 4.92 31 1.51 15 0.81 44 2.60 
Allocated forest 219 10.69 101 4.23 42 2.35 76 4.11 
(Source: field survey 2012, 2013) 
In a total of 309 cases of infringement, most offenders were from poor families seeking to  
clear forests for agricultural land; many cases indicated a high demand for crops, 
especially corn. In nine cases without international donor involvement (five in Hoa Binh 
and four in Son La), local forest users and even community forest committees were 
unconcerned about community forestry, as their allocated forests are poor and located 
very far away. These forests are on limestone soil and planned as protection forests, 
which is why agricultural activities are limited or prohibited by the forest administration. 
Users may, however collect forest products (with the exception of tinder) for subsistence. 
In the six cases where an international donor was invested, forest users were enthusiastic 
about participating in community forestry practices. However, this was not for the activities 
themselves, but rather for the economic and technological gains they made from the 
project. Moreover, forest users participating in community forestry projects (e.g., KfW7) 
can get paid from afforestation as a component of the project, as will be presented later.  




Table 6.9: Productivity of main crops and rate of poverty household 
No. Community forest Productivity (ton/ha) Poverty 
rate (%) Corn Cassava Dry-rice 
1 Sang 6.5 11.2 - 43 
2 Hon 3.6 9 - 56.6 
3 Chen 4.5 9.7 0.7 17.2 
4 Cao Da   - 8.4 
5 A Ma 4.5 9 1.2 41.8 
6 San 4 - - 33 
7 Coc Lac 5.7 12 2.5 36 
8 Cang 4.8 - - 31 
9 Mu 4.1 8.2 - 41 
10 Vo Khang 4.6 - - 17.7 
11 Mo 4 7.5 - 22.8 
12 Bac Hung 4.7 10.6 - 28.8 
13 Bo 4.7 30 - 47 
(Source: interviews, annual reports on socio-economic development of studied sites) 
From the cases in Table 6.9, we can see that the distributions of agricultural land varies 
depending on the circumstances. The average productivity of the food crops given in the 
table also make clear that they are not enough to satisfy the daily needs of local forest 
users. This is proven by the number of households in poverty across the case studies. In 
addition to the three main crops, the locals also cultivate sweet potato and soy beans for 
extra income. However, corn is still the main crop, bringing in significant income to local 
forest users.  
Non-timber forest products such as bamboo shoots and fuel wood may normally be freely 
accessed by forest users under the allocated forests. For cases with international donor 
involvement, the collection of fuel wood and bamboo shoots is under the supervision of the 
community forest committee and must therefore comply with local regulations for forest 
protection and development.  




Box 6. 2: Example of NTFPs collected in the cases with international donor 
involvement 
- Free collection of dry fuel wood for household needs, but not for sale, to maximum 
amount of one cubic meter per month; 
- Free collection of medicinal plants; 
- Free collection of “Neohouzeau” shoots mainly for subsistence, but not for bamboo and 
big-sized bamboo shoots; Local forest users are allowed to collect until August.  
As a result, dead or fallen trees and branches are the main sources of fuel wood for the 
forest users; corncobs are also used for fuel. Efforts to increase forest cover in the two 
provinces by involving local communities in forest management and protection limits 
opportunities for forest users to collect fuel wood from the forests.  
Photo 6.3: Corncob and dead branches are stored for fuel 
6.2.2. Cash income from employment 
Forest users in the case studies expressed their aspirations for food crop cultivation within 
and between the allocated forests. However, forest users are forced to contribute some of 
the agricultural products they’ve harvested to community forest committees and the patrol 
team. This is formally stipulated in local regulations as a fee for community forest 
administration. 








Committees Forest Patrol 
1 Mu CF Members and annual fee Annual fee 
2 Vo Khang CF Members and annual fee Annual fee 
3 Mo CF No information No information 
4 San CF No information No information 
5 Bac Hung CF Members and annual fee Annual fee 
6 Bo CF No information No information 
7 Sang CF Members and annual fee Annual fee 
8 Hon CF Members and annual fee Annual fee 
9 Chen CF Members and annual fee Annual fee 
10 Cao Da CF Members and annual fee Annual fee 
11 A Ma CF Members and annual fee Annual fee 
12 Coc Lac CF Members and annual fee No information 
13 Cang CF Members and annual fee Annual fee 
14 Ngoang CF Members and annual fee No information 
15 Na Pan CF Members and annual fee No information 
(Source: interviews, own description from local regulations) 
Table 6.10 indicates the ways in which community forest committees charge local forest 
users fees. For the San CF, the forest patrol team directly benefits from non-timber forest 
products extracted from the community forest. As opposed to cases without international 
donor involvement, community forest committees and the patrol team are also paid from 
community forestry projects as shown in Table 6.11. 
Across all case studies, interviews with forest committees and patrol teams reveal the 
need to reinforce forest management activities at the local level to prevent any 
infringements on the community forests. These interviewees, however, also claim that 
more compensation is necessary because current wages are meager, especially in the 
cases without international donor involvement. This, along with the analysis of other 
economic benefits that forest users gain, verifies the fact that community forestry is far 
from its objectives of poverty alleviation. 
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Table 6.11: Payment for memberships of committees and forest patrol team 
(Money in Vnd) 
 
No. of Members Monthly fee 
Community forest committee  
 - Head of committee 1 250,000 
 - Accountant 1 150,000 
 - Vice of committee 1 170,000 
Forest patrol team  
 - Leader 1 270,000 
 - Memberships 7 1,750,000 
Control group 
 - Leader 1 150,000 
 - Membership 1 120,000 
(Source: Own description from field survey 2013) 
6.2.3. Community development 
Interviews and observations from the case studies clearly demonstrate that the 
contributions of community forestry to community development are insignificant. 
Community development is comprised of such things as a cultural house, gravel path, 
wooden bridge, and even a water cistern; however, the construction of these public 
facilities is beyond the range of many communities. Public works are constructed by 
capital raised from local forest users with materials coming from the community forests. In 
Ngoang village, some wooden bridges have been constructed from timber extracted in the 
community and allocated forests. This is expected to not only improve access to other 
villages and markets, but also promote local economic development. In villages such as 
Na Pan and Chen, cultural houses have been built to serve as a meeting/working place for 
the local community and community forest committee.  
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Photo 6.4: Public works serving local forest users 
(Source: Field survey 2013) 
In some villages, local traffic is difficult due to bad roads and unfavorable topography. 
Even though some roads have been constructed (or are currently under construction), 
most are pathways built via the financial contributions of forest users. Photos taken during 
the fieldwork show that traffic was unable to drive on these muddy, slippery pathways after 
it had rained (see Photo 6.5).  
Observations recorded during the field survey demonstrated that while community forestry 
has not considerably improved the economic status of local forest users, it has improved 
their general quality of life (IUCN and RECOFTC 2011). However, community has limited 
local forest users’ ability to harvest non-timber forest products, construction materials, and 
other forest products. As previously discussed, community forestry has not yet contributed 
to hunger elimination and poverty alleviation among direct forest users in remote Vietnam. 
Economic incomes obtained directly from forest resources have not helped to lift 
household economic status via accumulation, asset building, and increases in income and 
welfare (Sunderlin and Huynh 2005; Sunderlin 2006) 
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Photo 6.5: Path-ways to community forests 
(Source: Field survey 2013) 
6.3. Ecological outcomes of community forestry 
As previously discussed, community forestry programs arose from the decline in the 
quantity and quality of forests. Community forestry programs thus aim to restore the forest 
quality and area. Across all case study sites, the undeniable degradation of the forest 
conditions—including massive tree loss and the decline of the forest ecosystem—supports 
the ecological goals of such programs. Sunderlin and Huynh (2005) emphasized that 
forest loss and its negative environmental impact is very closely tied to poverty as follows: 
 There are important cause and effect relationships between the 
transformation of rural livelihoods and dramatic changes in forest cover; 
 The poor in remote rural areas tend to have a relatively high level of 
dependence on goods and environmental services from natural forests for 
their sustenance; 
 Some rural people have derived great benefit from the elimination of forest 
cover through increased access to agricultural land and through the 
conversion of timber and other forest products into income and capital.  
Studies on national forest status in general and the research sites in particular have 
emphasized the dramatic decrease in forest area and quality due to both objective and 
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subjective causes from the late of 20th century (Sunderlin and Huynh 2005; de Jong et al. 
2006; To et al. 2014). The high concentration of ethnic minorities and high rate of poverty 
play a role in making Northwest Vietnam the region with the highest rate of forest loss in 
the country (World Bank 2010). 
Table 6.12: Forest condition before allocating to communities 
No. Community 
forests 
Forest conditions Sources 
1 Mu CF Poor forest after clear cutting 1 
2 Vo Khang CF Poor forest restored after clear cutting 1 
3 Mo CF Poor forest restored after clear cutting 1 
4 San CF Poor forest, restored forest after cuts and slash and 
burn 
1,3 
5 Bac Hung CF Restored forest and medium forest but planned to be 
protection forest 
1 
6 Bo CF Medium forest planned to be reserved forest; Medium-
sized bamboo forest 
1 
7 Sang CF Poor forest restored after clear cutting 2,3 
8 Hon CF Poor forest restored after clear cutting 2,3 
9 Chen CF Restored forest after cuts 2,3 
10 Cao Da CF Restored forest after clear cutting  2,3 
11 A Ma CF Restored forest, medium forest planned to be 
reserved forest 
2,3 
12 Coc Lac CF Poor forest, restored forest after clear cutting and 
slash and burn 
2 
13 Cang CF Medium forest 2 
14 Ngoang CF Poor and restored forests after clear cutting 2 
15 Na Pan CF Poor and restored forests after clear cutting 2 
1. Interviews and officially statistic data of district forest protection of Kim Boi and Tan Lac 
2. Interviews and officially statistic data of Forest Protection Department of Son La province 
3. Interviews and forest inventory of the provincial KfW7 project management board in Son La and 
the state KfW7 project management board in Ha Noi. 
6.3.1. Forest growth 
In the case studies, forest rehabilitation has been implementing in two main ways in the 
past: i) planting forests on the forested land allocated to households, organizations, and 
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individuals, with a particular focus on commercial and endemic tree species such as 
Acasia Mangium, Acasia Auriculiformi, and Fuctus Docyniae; and ii) assisted regeneration 
as applied to restored and protection forests allocated to communities. Field observations 
suggest that the promise of ecological outcomes has seen certain achievements in terms 
of artificial monoculture forests, although documents exclusively dedicated to community 
forestry are limited. However, there is no statistical data of the planted forest inventory. 
Assessing the results of forest protection and development merely focuses on the increase 
or decrease of the forest areas, as well as the greening of bare forestry land and hills in 
the region.  
Photo 6.6: Community forest in A MA and 50-year forest in Ngoang CFs 
 
(Source: Field survey 2013) 
The implementation of community forestry programs is applied in the same way to other 
community forests in the two studied regions: namely, via assisted regeneration of the 
natural forests and afforestation on the forested (including allocated and bare) lands. 
Greening and increasing the forest cover are thus seen as priority tasks for improving 
forest conditions with the goal of producing direct economic benefits for forest end users in 
the future.  
6.3.2. Biodiversity 
Across the 15 case studies, no observations regarding biodiversity could be made, except 
in some cases in the natural reserve area. There is therefore limited evidence to suggest 
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whether community forestry has contributed to biodiversity. Intensive cropping and poor 
crop structure (mainly focusing on maize and cassava) led to biodiversity deterioration in 
all cases. Moreover, slash-and-burn farming also negatively impacts biodiversity.  
Summary: 
On the basis of the core objectives of community forestry, CF outcomes are analyzed by 
initial and advanced stages and presented in Figure 6.1. From the figure, we can see that 
community forestry practices influence the outcomes of the forest management. The 
changes in Fig. 6.1 indicate the interests of the powerful actors in community forestry.  
Figure 6.1: Outcomes of the community forestry divided into initial stage (7) and 
advanced stage (8) 
 
Social outcomes were estimated to be middle (2) in most (six out of seven) of the initial 
cases and for all advanced cases. This revealed that forest users had limited access to 
information regarding community forestry, the decision-making process, and forest 
resources. Even when the local community is recognized as a legal entity by the Land Law 
(2003), their power status does not improve, as mentioned in many studies (Nguyen 2006; 
Phuong 2008; Ngai 2009; To 2012; To and Tran 2014). These studies indicate that the 
forest user is not an authoritative actor who makes his own decisions on community 
forestry matters. It is also strongly argued that decentralization policies are rarely followed 
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up with a genuine power devolution to direct forest users (Dahal 1996; Nguyen 2006; 
Larson et al. 2007; Springate-Baginski et al. 2007). Maryudi further concludes that the 
appearances of other actors limits the access forest users have to the forests (2011; 
2012).  
The results have also validated that economic outcomes are limited to satisfying the 
subsistence demands of forest end users as opposed to providing them with opportunities 
to improve their economic status through commercial products. This result—that the 
powerful actors desire middle outcomes for community forestry’s end users—can be 
proven through the interests of the powerful relevant actors in community forestry. These 
meager economic outcomes are considered a consequence of the "careful calculations" of 
the powerful relevant actors (Maryudi 2011). The research doesn’t argue that these actors 
do not want to see positive economic outcomes for forest users; rather, the powerful actors 
are aware that the maximization of economic outcomes might put their interests at risk. 
The economic outcomes for forest users are to the extent of their subsistence demands.  
On the evaluations given above, the outcomes of community forestry in Hoa Binh and Son 
La are summarized in Table 6.13; the outcomes of community forestry are estimated to be 
medium (2) in most cases.  












Social Economic Ecological 
1 
YES 
Sang Muoi Noi 2 2 2 
2 Hon Chieng Bom 2 2 2 
3 Chen Phieng Ban 2 2 2 
4 Cao Da Muong Khoa 2 2 2 
5 A Ma Long Sap 2 2 2 
6 San Hop Dong 1 2 2 
7 
NO 
Coc Lac Tu Nang 2 2 2 
8 Cang Chieng Hac 2 2 2 
9 Ngoang Chieng Khoi 2 2 2 
10 Na Pan Chieng Dong 2 2 2 
11 Mu Cuoi Ha 2 2 2 
12 Vo Khang Kim Tien 2 2 2 
13 Mo Kim Son 2 2 2 
14 Bac Hung QuyetChien 2 2 2 
15 Bo Ngo Luong 1 2 3 
(Source: Field survey 2013) 
Notes: (1) means outcome is evaluated as low; (2) means outcome is evaluated as medium; (3) 
means outcome is evaluated as high. 
 




Chapter 7: Interests of Powerful Actors in Community Forestry (PIDOs) 
As Schusser (2012:5) described “PIDOs is an indicator which shows the degree to which 
the powerful actor’s interests can be related to the outcomes of community forestry”.  
Each actor participating in CF has its own specific interests which vary according to the 
actor’s position, responsibilities, designated tasks, and functions. “Interests are based on 
action orientation, adhered to by individuals or groups, and they designated the benefits 
the individuals or group can receive from a certain object, such as a forest” (Krott 
2005:19). By arguing about interests, he noted that it is hard for interests to be observed 
directly; however, they can be determined through the observation of an actor’s behavior. 
An actor rarely veils his interests, but the ways in which he behaves and what he does are 
reliable indicators for identifying his interests. The table below provides a summary of the 
interests of each powerful actor. 
Through the 15 studied cases in Hoa Binh and Son La provinces, the interests of the 
powerful actors can be summarized in the following table. 
Table 7.1: Summary of interests of powerful actors in Vietnam cases 
Name of powerful actor Main interest 
Forest administration - Control over the forest and forest resources 
- Sustainably management of  the remaining forest areas 
- Preserve and improve biodiversity as well as increase forest 
area 
- Strengthen self-control by end users through capacity building 
for FUGR in forest management 
Local government - Improve local infrastructure as well as living condition 
- Strengthen self-control by end users  
- Poverty alleviation 
Community forest 
committee 
- Decide on forest management  
- Get higher economic income from forest products 
- Hygienic water source by green forest  
Donors - Increase forest coverage and biodiversity 
- Improve local’s life through CF activities 
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Traditional authority - Control of local forest users  
- Higher income for end users from forest for people 
District government -Control of local people 
- Improve the local people’s life 
- Supporting Empowerment to local community in forest 
management 
Consultant -Getting and keeping its contract 
- Sustainable forest management 
(Source: field survey 2012, 2013) 
7.1. Forest administration 
The structural system of forest administration in Vietnam is divided into four levels as 
follows: 
1. State level. The Ministry Department of Forest Protection (MDFP) is under the 
management of MARD.  
2. Provincial level. The Forest Protection Department (FPD) is under the 
management of the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD).  
3. District level. The Forest Protection Section (FPS) is under the management of the 
Forest Protection Department.  
4. The Special-Use Forest Protection Section is under the management of the board 
of special-use forests like national parks and natural reserve areas (LA – 03, 
Chapter II, Article 3).  
The forest protection agencies at different levels implement assigned tasks within their 
authority and competence.  
The mission of the forest administration at the state level is to draft/improve specific 
normative documents and design annual, five-year, and long-term plans on forest 
protection and forest product management. The tasks of the MDFP include the following: 
a) implement national programs and policies on forestry issues; b) delineate the forest 
product controlling network in the whole country; c) direct, inspect, and handle the 
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implementation of illegal anti-felling measures, and other orders against further unlawful 
actions which encroach upon the forest and forested land; d) study and apply 
technological and scientific progress in the field of forest resource management; and e) 
coordinate nationally and internationally in forest protection and forest product 
management.  
This wide spectrum of forestry tasks being in charge by FA approves Krott’s judgment  
“administration is that public institution which makes decisions concerning specific 
problems on the basis of general legal standards, resolving those problems by 
implementing special measure” (Krott 2005:137). This form of forest management is fit to 
the theory of bureaucracy, especially its structure, demonstrating that “The superior 
administrative rationality of purposes and means lies in its capacity to fulfill its political 
mandate using the respectively stipulated means without being diverted by other political 
influences” (Krott 2005:128). As a result, bureaucratic organizations are based in a few 
major aspects: 1) a predetermined hierarchy of authority; 2) fixed competencies; 3) an 
adherence to binding regulation; 4) fulltime expert officials; 5) substantial objectives; 6) 
uniform tasks and solutions; and 7) a stable general context. 
In addition to the main tasks at the macro-level, the respective forest protection sectors at 
district level established within DARD effectuate specific tasks as follows: 1) inspect forest 
protection and management activities as prescribed by law; 2) prevent and handle cases 
of deforestation, illegal harvesting of forest products, and wildlife trade and transport; 3) 
guide and motivate the local community to draft and wield local regulation for forest 
development and protection; 4) inventory forests and forestry land in the assigned region; 
and 5) accompany the local government when carrying out forest land allocation (FLA). 
As a state management institution effectuating defined tasks and functions, the interests of 
the FA are consolidated into a formal role as addressed in legal Acts 5 and 16 (See 
Appendix 1); in addition, FA staff at the regional level participate in other forestry activities 
as designated by the head of the FDS and chairman of the local government, including: 
guiding and mobilizing local communities to draft and implement forest protection 
regulation; forest development and forestry extension; and other forestry activities (LA – 
11). It is clearly stipulated in Decision No.119/2006/ND-CP that “each of the forest rangers 
is responsible for controlling 1,000 hectares of forest" (LA - 05; IS - 41). These formal 
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tasks mean that the FA has a strong interest in controlling forests and forest users. This 
formal interest is supported by the informal interest of each forestry administration in 
strengthening its position (Krott 2005:126). 
However, in practice, the forest ranger has to manage a forest area larger than what is 
defined in the legal document. By encouraging community participation in CF 
management, the forest administration therefore seeks to empower the local community in 
forest protection and development to fulfill its tasks. As provisioned in LAs – 02 and 11, the 
FA has the right to prevent the encroachment and sabotage of forest resources and 
forestry land; however, it cannot arrest offenders. In such cases, the forest administration 
must coordinate with the police agency to arrest offenders who act against regulations for 
forest protection and development (IS – 41). 
Specific wishes for end users can be derived from these general interests. On the one 
hand, the high formal and informal interest in control means that the end user has little 
space in which to make his own decisions; on the other hand, the desire that the final end 
users control themselves demands a minimum of self-determined decision potential for 
each final end user. We therefore estimate social PIDOs to be a medium, meaning that the 
final end user gets limited space but at least some empowerment. 
Forest administration is formally driven by the task of sustainable management and 
enhancing biodiversity. Sustainable growth and yield is strongly supported by foresters’ 
informal beliefs in classic sustainability which are clearly shown in the Son La People’s 
Committee’s decision on Planning for Forest Protection and Development. Here, the main 
tasks officially focus on greening bare land/hills and maintaining/protecting current forests 
(LA – 24) (ISs – 07, 41). Due to these empirical findings, we consider ecological PIDOs to 
be a medium, as there is no evidence of biodiversity improvement recorded or 
documented in the research area. As a consequence, the FA prioritizes the ecological part 
of sustainable management and does not promote any kind of profit for the final end user, 
as clearly manifested in the legal document as follows: Decision No.119/ND-CP on 
"Structure and activity of the forest ranger" (LA - 05),  commitments to prevent forest fires 
and forest management between the forest protection section and other actors (e.g., direct 
forest users, the FUGR, and the District Military Command (LAs – 22, 23). The economic 
PIDOs is therefore estimated to be low. 
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Box 7. 1: Difficulties in forest management for the forest ranger force in Yen Chau 
cases 
… Due to the lack of forest ranger staff and weakness in the state management 
competency of the local authority, the forest protection and development tasks are met 
with many difficulties. In addition, problematic stipulations which define the functions, 
tasks, and responsibilities of actors like L_Pol1 and L_Pol2 bring about complexities in 
forest protection and management for the forest ranger force. L_Pol1 clearly lacks the 
manpower and professional competency to solve problems related to forestry; however 
they have the right to decide on forestry activities like forest exploitation. It could be said 
that the forest ranger force's power is unequal to its duties. Based on Decision No. 83 (LA 
– 11), a regional forest ranger has to act as both an advisor and assistant to the chairman 
of the local government in forestry tasks, as subject to chairman's will. 
(Source: IS – 41, Rec – 28th Nov 2012) 
7.2. Local government 
The commune people's committee under the management of the district people’s 
committee functions as the state management of socio-economic development activities at 
the regional level. The formal interests of the local authority are related to: a) setting up the 
annual socio-economic development plan; b) setting up the state budget, collecting 
revenue and carrying out expenditures in the region; c) managing land use and building 
infrastructure according to legislation; and d) building communal infrastructural works (LA 
– 03, Article 111).  
The commune people’s committee consists of a chairman and a vice chairman working 
under the supervision of the people’s council. They also hold political positions and are 
elected by the local people every five years. The election process is divided into two steps: 
first, members of the people’s council are elected by the locals through the people’s 
council election; second, members of the people’s council vote for the communal 
chairman, whose political power is thus officially gained. As stated by Krott, “Politicians 
can refer to the mandate which have been given in the process of their election. The 
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politicians can considerably strengthen this mandate by mobilizing the public and mass 
media for them to achieve more power in the face of administration” (2005:122). This 
power is shaped in line with the interests of the chairman’s political party. 
Based on their assigned authorities and responsibilities, the local government is 
accountable to the higher authorities for all development activities happening in the 
managed region, e.g., regarding natural resources and other socio-economic development 
activities. Therefore, to ensure all activities are implemented in accordance with the 
regulation, the local government requires a middle social outcome for the local forest 
users.  
As a political institution implementing socio-economic development tasks, the local 
authority is interested in greening the forest and maintaining forest end users’ subsistence. 
Therefore, middle outcomes for all ecological and economic aspects are estimated (IS – 
16). The local government is aware of the forest’s role in agricultural cultivation and the 
lives of the locals. However, observation shows that the local government’s interests are 
not specified as just keeping the forest stand intact. The local government’s 
implementation of forestry tasks in the region depends on the action and orientation of the 
forest ranger force—the result of weaknesses among local leaders in both professional 
ability and competence.  
7.3. Community forest committees 
As a representative body of forest users, the FUGR’s members (the elites among the 
locals) are elected by forest users to organize and manage the allocated community forest 
and deploy CF activities such as community forest protection and collecting non-timber 
forest products in the interest of the forest users. A community forest committee is an 
official organization approved by the chairman of the local government. The FUGR’s 
interests thus involve the formal role the group plays and, more informally, the 
strengthening of its resources and influence. In addition, the community forest committee 
is strongly influenced by the forest administration and donors, both of which were crucial in 
its foundation.  
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Empirical evidence shows that the forest administration and donors shape the members of 
the community forest committee in the direction of their ecological goals, as stipulated in 
Circular No. 70 that “Traditional authority is chosen to be the head of the FUGR. The 
members of the FUGR are elected from social organizations such as the Women’s 
Association, Veteran’s Union, Youth Union, etc. The head of the FUGR takes responsibility 
for managing and controlling forestry activities” (LA - 09). 
Although the FUGR is a formal organization established by the local government, its 
foundation is often informally initiated and mobilized by the forest administration and 
donors. The purpose for this is to enhance the effectiveness of forest protection by 
mobilizing the participation of the local people. As a result, the FUGR’s interests are 
partially driven by forest administration and donor objectives—this is clearly evident in the 
FUGR’s tasks, which mostly concentrate on maintaining and protecting the community 
forests. 
The FUGR does not prioritize the ecology but rather, as the representative body elected by 
the locals to undertake community forest tasks, aims to produce economic outcomes for 
the final end user. Moreover, due to unfavorable natural conditions (three-fourths of the 
area are covered with hills and mountains, resulting in a shortage of agricultural land), 
villagers’ lives greatly depends on forest resources and the forested land. This 
dependence makes clear that forest protection and livelihood insurance are two issues 
that cannot be separated from each other. By participating in community forestry activities 
and facilitating forest products and services to the benefit of the locals, the FUGR expects 
higher and more diversified economic outcomes from the community forestry programs. 
Correspondingly, the FUGR has an interest in a middle economic outcome for forest end 
users, e.g., by supporting local grazing in the community forests and collecting NTFPs (IS 
– 15).  
Summing up the PIDO, we can estimate ecological 1 and economic 1; the social PIDO is 
estimated at -1, as the FUGR wants to control the final end user as much as possible (LA 
– 20).  




As previously stated (see Cases 4, 7-15), KfW7, a project cooperated on and piloted in 
Hoa Binh and Son La provinces, is co-sponsored by the Vietnamese and German 
governments via MARD. Although the past decade has seen forest coverage increase 
from 12% to 32% in Son La and 28% to 39% in Hoa Binh, it has not yet reached the 
objective proposed by the government (60 - 65%). Forest quality in the regional 
watersheds continues to decline due to population growth and overuse of the forest for 
construction wood, fuel wood, and other forest products. 
The long-term objectives of the project are to restore the watershed forest ecosystems; 
protect irrigation systems; sustainably utilize forest resources; conserve biodiversity; and 
contribute to hunger elimination and poverty alleviation. To do so, KfW7 has implemented 
the following specific objectives: (i) afforest available species in the areas to regenerate 
the natural forest; (ii) community forest management; and (iii) biodiversity conservation. 
This project also aims to diversify the incomes of the local people through project and CF 
activity outcomes (Anonymous-3 2006).  
Because district KfW7 staff are under the management of the Department of Forestry 
Development, their priority objective is to maintain and protect the remaining forest areas; 
afforest bare lands and hills corresponding to the priority policy of the state government; 
and contribute to poverty alleviation and hunger elimination in these two provinces. We 
thus estimate the PIDOs by donor as high ecological and economic outcomes for forest 
end users. This should be done by involving forest users in community forestry activities, 
supporting production materials, and paying a forest protection salary. The benefits for end 
users are produced from forest management activities guided and decided by the donor; 
as a result, the donor does not aim for the independent decisions of end users, meaning 
that social PIDOs is estimated to be low. 
7.5. Traditional Authority 
Generally speaking, the oldest or most respected person in a community is elected by the 
villagers to be the traditional authority. A traditional authority links the local government 
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and community; he informs the locals of plans, instructions, and decisions by the local 
government and mobilizes them to participate in socio-economic development activities 
such as afforestation organized by the forest administration, donor, and/or local 
government. Although the traditional authority is not a powerful actor in community forest 
activities, he is indispensable in community forestry tasks, especially in mobilizing and 
encouraging communities’ participation and following community forestry operation 
regulations/local regulations on forest management and protection.  
The traditional authority is an informal body and all his activities are guided by the forest 
administration, consultants, and donors. He seeks control over the end user, which is why 
the value of the social PIDOs is estimated to be low. He would like to see green forests 
and a higher income for the final end users. Thus, economic and ecological PIDOs are 
estimated to be high and medium, respectively.  
7.6. District Department of Agriculture and Rural Development 
The district agricultural department is a formal agency under the management and 
representation of the district people’s committee; as such, it functions as a counselor for 
the chairman of the district people’s committee regarding agricultural, forestry, and aquatic 
activities taking place within the managed area. Its main tasks are (1) the annual plan for 
agricultural and forestry development; (2) reckoning up the change of agricultural and 
forestry land and the others; and (3) implementing and being accountable for the 
evaluation, registration, and granting of permits under professional bodies. The district 
agricultural department is a politically strong body pushing its implementation. The social 
PIDOs is therefore evaluated as low (LA – 14). 
Box 7. 2: Procedure for approving tree harvesting in Yen Chau cases 
“…We must get an exploitation permit granted by the District Department of Agriculture 
and Rural Development if we want to extract timber from the forest. The procedure of 
petitioning for logging is very complicated. The application for logging must be approved 
by the FUGR, then the FA, and afterward the Local Pol. The final decision is made by 
L_Pol1.”  
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In the past two years, L_Pol1 has not granted forest owners any licenses for wood 
exploitation without reason. 
Source: ISs - 11, 19, 41, 42 
 
However, as a functional agency of the district people’s committee, the district agricultural 
department also attaches special importance to improving the socio-economic status of 
the local people. For this reason, this actor is expected to have middle ecological and 
economic outcomes over the CF program. There is no regulation forbidding the locals from 
collecting NTFPs or fuel wood from the allocated forests issued by the district agricultural 
department.  
7.7. District Department of Environment and Resource – L_Pol2 
Like the district agricultural department, the district department of environment and 
resource is an official agency under the management of the district people’s committee. It 
functions as a counselor and assists the district people’s committee in state management 
over environmental issues and natural resources such as land, mineral resources, water 
resources, etc. The primary missions undertaken by this actor mainly focus on managing 
environmental and resource issues, and in particular planning land use at the district level 
and implementing those plans after their approval. Likewise, this department: evaluates 
land use planning at the communal level; evaluates documents of land allocation, lease, 
revocation, and transfer of land use rights; and grants land use certificate and land 
ownership (LA – 17, Part II, Item II).  
This actor is not particularly involved in community forestry, with the exception the 
handling of forestland allocation applications and land use certificates granted to the 
community, organizations, social unions, households, and individuals. They have no desire 
for a specific economic or ecological outcome, but they do control forest users; as a result, 
the social PIDOs is evaluated as low. 




Because a consultant is an independent body working under a signed contract with the 
State Project Management Board, his tasks are to advise the Board on organizing and 
executing the project. Likewise, he helps the local community in designing local regulation 
(IS – 68). During project implementation, the consultant is primarily in direct contact with 
local forest users, in particular the community forest committee and the Project 
Management Board at the local level.  
However, the consultant is also an informal member of staff under MARD; tasks 
undertaken by the consultant thus support the donor project by mobilizing local community 
participation in community forestry activities. As a result, the social outcome is estimated 
to be medium for the forest end users. This actor also expects to build the local 
community’s capacity for improving their socio-economic status; he therefore expects 
middle outcomes in economic and ecological terms for local forest end users. 
Summary:  
On the basis of the given analysis, the interests of the powerful relevant actors over 
community forestry across all 15 cases are described in Figure 7.1. Here, it is apparent 
that no powerful actor expects high social outcomes for direct forest users. Remarkably, 
40% want low social outcomes and 15% do not care about the outcomes for forest users. 
The results are a bit different for the economic outcomes of the direct forest users. Nearly 
50% of the powerful actors expect middle outcomes for forest users, 30% would like to see 
low outcomes, and over 20% expect high outcomes. This validates the notion that none of 
the powerful relevant actors expect meaningful empowerment for the forest users, and few 
expect high outcomes for them. These results are in contradiction with the goals of 
community forestry, which aim to genuinely empower and economically contribute to direct 
forest users. 
The results of the ecological PIDOs are different from social and economic PIDOs. Here, 
approximately 40% of the powerful actors (mainly forest administrations) expect high 
ecological outcomes from community forestry. The majority (60%) desire middle outcomes 
in terms of sustainable forest management and greening forests. Most of the powerful 
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relevant actors interested in the natural environment expect middle outcomes for the local 
people. The results of these social, economic, and ecological PIDOs correspond to the 
results of the Community Forestry Working Group (Schusser et al. 2015). However, the 
PIDOs results for donors in Vietnam are different from the case studies done by the 
Community Forestry Working Group. Across all cases, findings reveal that donors are 
under the management of MARD but were also funding community development 
empowerment with the goal of meeting forest protection and management objectives, as 
defined in the 5 Million Hectare Forest Plantation (5 MHFP) (Nguyen 2008; Ngai 2009; To 
et al. 2014). 
Figure 7.1: Powerful interest desired outcomes (PIDOs) of the powerful relevant 
actors 




Chapter 8: Influence of Powerful Actors on Community Forestry 
8.1. Influence of powerful actors on community forestry 






Soc. Econ. Ecol. Soc. Econ. Ecol. 
Sang 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F 
FA 
Poverty alleviation, Empowerment, Forest condition -1 1 +1 
Hon 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F Control over the forests -1 1 +1 
Chen 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F Local 
Pol 
Poverty alleviation, community development -1 1 +1 
Cao Da 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F  -1 1 +1 
A Ma 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F District 
Gov. 
Poverty alleviation, community development -1 1 +1 
San 1 2 2 A, B, C, E, F  Personal perquisite -1 1 +1 
Coc Lac 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F 
FUGR 
Poverty alleviation, improvement of livelihood -1 1 +1 
Cang 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F Control over the forest users -1 1 +1 
Ngoang 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F 
Donor 
Poverty alleviation, forest condition, empowerment -1 1 +1 
Na Pan 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F Financial gains -1 1 +1 
Mu 2 2 2 A, B, C, E, F 
TA 
Poverty alleviation -1 1 +1 
Vo 
Khang 
2 2 2 A, B, C, E, F Control over the forest users, finance -1 1 +1 
Mo 2 2 2 A, B, C, D, E, F - FA codes A;                                    - Local Pol codes B;  
- District government codes C;         - FUGR codes D;  
- Donor codes E;                               - TA codes F.  
-1 1 +1 
Bac 
Hung 
2 2 2 A, B, C, F -1 1 +1 
Bo 1 2 3 A, B, C, F -1 1 +1 
Notes:  
- PIDOs: - Existing outcomes: 
-1 means powerful actors expect low outcomes 1 means low 
1 means powerful actors expect medium outcomes 2 means medium 
+1 means powerful actors expect high outcomes 3 means high 
 Formal interests   
 Informal interests    
The leading hypothesis of this analysis is that community forestry outcomes can be 
explained by the interests of powerful relevant actors. The summarized results of the 
outcomes and interests of the powerful actors in community forestry are presented in  
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Table 8.1. The table shows that different actors have their own interests in community 
forestry. On the basis of the assigned functions, tasks, and authorities, the powerful actors 
manipulate community forestry activities to their own ends. 
8.1.1. Forest administration 
As seen in Table 8.1, some actors involved in community forestry are considered powerful 
due to the calculated results presented in Chapter 5, Figure 5.4. Of these, the forest 
administration is identified as the only powerful actor appearing in all case studies that is 
directly involved in community forestry. As a state institution, the interests of the forest 
administration are defined via priority tasks and goals as stipulated in various acts and 
legal documents (LAs – 02, 05). The forest administration answers to the people’s 
committees at the corresponding levels for activities related to forests and forestry in the 
region. To ensure the success of its assigned forest protection and development, it builds 
relationships with other actors in the community forest network to influence the CF 
outcomes of community forestry to suit its own ends. During the implementation of 
community forest processes, the forest administration draws up legal documents as the 
basis for forestry practices and sets up/plans forestry land use. Examples include: 
- Decision No. 106/2006/QD-BNN on “Guidelines for Community Forest 
Management at hamlet level”; 
- Decision No.40/2005/QD-BNN “Regulations on exploitation of timber and 
other forest products”; 
- Dispatch No.2324/BNN-LN on “Instructions for technical standard and 
exploitation procedures in community forest”; 
- Circular No.38/2014/TT-BNNPTNT on “Instructions for a sustainable forest 
management plan”; 
These legal documents, issued by MARD, provide the forest administration with a legal 
means of ensuring that the tasks of forest protection and development will meet the forest 
administration’s aspirations for community forestry activities. At the local level, many 
official dispatches, decisions, and plans in support of the MARD legal documents have 
been passed to direct forestry activities according to the interests of the forest 
administration, including: 
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- Decision No. 2188/QĐ-UBND by the Son La People’s Committee on 
“Planning for Forest Protection and Development in Son La province to 2015 
and orientation to 2020”; 
- Decision No. 3011/QĐ-UB of the Provincial People’s Committee on the 
“Precarious promulgation of forest-land allocation policies applied in the 
province and regulations of beneficial policies on forestry land to the 
organizations, individuals, households that are assigned the forest and 
forestry land contract”; 
The forest administration also engages local institutions in community forestry/forestry 
activities by offering them facilities or even financial aid. For example, the traditional 
authority is nominated to be the head of the community forest committee, while the vice 
chairman of the Communal People’s Committee is nominated to be the leader of the forest 
protection group. It was also observed during the field survey that the forest administration 
signs a temporary labor contract for a village forest ranger post with a local forest user; this 
user is normally kin to the traditional authority (ISs – 94, 95, 105, 106). Through binding 
local institutions (instead of directly controlling local forest users), the forest administration 
gains indirect control over the forests and forest access.  
- “Commitment on Forest Protection and Forest Fire Prevention” applied to 
forest owners; 
- “Regulation on coordination between the Forest Ranger and the Militia in 
forest protection and management”, issued on 15th Sep 2011 by Thuan Chau 
Forest Protection Section; 
These legal documents, along with engagement with individuals and local institutions, 
provide the forest administration with the ability to drive the outcomes of community 
forestry to be in line with its own interests. Such interests strongly restrict the socio-
economic outcomes of community forestry in contrast with the task of forest rehabilitation 
(Nguyen 2006). 
8.1.2. Donors 
Donors are a powerful actor in community forestry as shown in Table 8.1. As presented in 
the previous chapter, the KfW7 project, established under the investment of the German 
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Bank for Reconstruction, aims to improve forest conditions and local people’s lives in Hoa 
Binh and Son La. Legal Acts 06 and 07 make it clear that the project mainly focuses on 
forest rehabilitation through three components: (i) afforestation; (ii) biodiversity; and (iii) 
community forestry. To easily implement community forestry in the field, project 
management boards are founded at different levels to engage other actors in the project.  
- One way a donor ensures that the outcomes of community forestry suit its goals is by 
selecting a political actor to be the director of the project management board at district 
level and the leader of the project working group at communal level (ISs – 05, 17, 20). 
Here, donors expect to make use of the power and influence of political actors to get the 
support and approval of local authorities, as well as to influence local institutions during the 
community forestry process.  
- Another method is to nominate a traditional authority to be the head of the community 
forest committee; that person will then be able to convince local forest users to comply 
with the local laws and forest protection regulations suggested by the donor and the forest 
administration (LAs – 25, 35).  
- Yet another tactic is to use professional knowledge and incentives to drive community 
forestry activities to be in line with the expected goals of the project. Observations from our 
fieldwork show that although local forest users might expect tree A, the donor suggests 
planting tree B to speed up the forest greening. In such cases, local forest users have to 
accept the donor’s suggestion in order to get paid. In addition to incentives, advanced 
knowledge is also applied to gain local forest users’ acceptance through the five-year 
forest management plan. Across the cases in Hoa Binh, although the number of trees in 
the forest stands is higher than defined in the desired-forest model, local forest users are 
persuaded to maintain it as compensation for other models (IS – 69). This strategy is 
confirmed to be providing incentives to encourage local people to support activities that 
met conservation interests rather than local livelihood needs (Berkes 2006). 
8.1.3. District government 
Although the district government does not really participate in community forestry 
practices, it is still considered a powerful actor as it can influence CF outcomes by 
approving decisions and policies related to the forests. An interview with the head of 
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District Department of Agriculture of Son La province illustrates that this actor holds veto 
power over the application for local users to harvest from planted forests.  
“… To maintain and improve the forest cover in the area, we have not approved any 
applications of the local people on harvesting the planted forests…” (ISs – 41, 42).  
This example proves that the district government through its administrative role can 
influence the outcomes of community forestry to suit its own political agenda regardless of 
the forest end users’ wills.  
8.2. Comparison of PIDOs with the outcomes of community forestry 
Figure 8.1: PIDOs and outcomes comparison 
 
With the assumption that the powerful actors wield their power to obtain certain outcomes, 
a comparison of the achieved outcomes and the desired interests of the powerful relevant 
actors (PIDO) is applied to confirm whether there is a connection between the interests of 
these actors and the outcomes of community forestry. To do so, the actors who either do 
not care about or do not influence community forestry will be omitted from the case 
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studies. This comparison is only applied to advanced cases, as these last long enough for 
the powerful actors to exert their influence on community forestry practices as shown in 
Figure 8.1.  
To test whether there exists a relationship between the interests of powerful actors and the 
outcomes of community forestry, the Spearman correlation was conducted with SPSS 23. 
The statistical results show that the correlation of their interests with the outcomes is 
significant, as the significant value (P) is at 0.011 smaller than 0.05. This indicates that the 
interests of powerful actors are indeed related to the outcomes of community forestry. The 
results also pointed out that the interests of powerful actors show a congruence of 37.12% 
for social outcomes, 9.44%, for economic outcomes, and 24.53% for ecological outcomes. 
That the share of middle social, economic, and ecological outcomes is higher than the 
share desired by powerful actors points out the challenges in community forestry in the 
research sites. 
It is further suggested from the social outcomes that the empowerment of direct forest 
users and community forest committees is merely due to their partial participation in 
community forestry activities rather than any meaningful devolution of power. In our 
research, there were no differences between those cases which involved international 
donors and those that didn’t. The appearance of political actors and public administration 
in these cases validates that community forestry programs are being implemented to serve 
state forestry goals. In other words, community forestry in Vietnam can be seen as "old 
wine in a new bottle." 
The economic outcome in the figure does not go beyond satisfying the subsistence of the 
local forest users. While nearly 80% of the powerful relevant actors expect low and middle 
economic outcomes, the forest end users reflect the real interests of the powerful relevant 
actors over the community forestry program.    




Chapter 9: Lessons Learned for Community Forestry in Vietnam 
This research has achieved a comprehensive understanding of community forestry in 
Vietnam as a whole and community forestry in the research areas in particular. Community 
forestry programs have made certain socioeconomic and ecological gains on the ground. 
Although forests managed by communities have been recognized and in existence for a 
long time, community forestry has only been implemented in Vietnam in recent years. The 
passing of legal acts like the Forest Land Allocation (LA - 40), and Land laws (amended in 
2013) (LA - 38) are seen as important milestones for implementation of community 
forestry, where the legal status of a local community is recognized as involved in the 
community forestry process. However, factors such as poverty, low educated levels, poor 
infrastructure, low direct income from the forests, and weak coordination among actors are 
barriers that obstruct the success of community forestry (Sikor and Nguyen 2007; Ngai 
2009; Tan and Sikor 2011; Lam 2012). Despite these obstacles, community forestry has 
significantly improved forest conditions. Forest activities such as assisted-forest 
regeneration, afforestation, and forest rehabilitation have created positive changes in the 
area and stock of forests in the research areas. In addition to these ecological results, 
meaningful opportunities for the livelihood of the local community have been created to 
directly benefit local forest users, despite the disparities in the cases.  
The obtained results on the influence of the powerful relevant actors in connection with the 
outcomes of community forestry provide a scientific and practical basis from which we can 
discuss outcomes for the following:  
- Genuine empowerment of local forest users in access to the forests. Although "Sổ Đỏ" 
certificates of land-use rights have been granted to forest recipients, the titles have not 
served as proof of full legal rights, as they have often stated that forested land is 
contracted to land holders. As a result, the "Sổ Đỏ" did not grant the holders the full tenure 
rights stipulated in the Land Law; they thus did not carry much value for the local forest 
users (Nguyen 2008; Ngai 2009). 
- The need to extend the types of forests allocated to the local community. Empirical 
findings show that the outcomes of community forestry are arranged by relevant actors' 
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interests. Tan and Sikor (2011) stressed that forestland allocation has not generated 
positive outcomes in many of the local communities but has contributed to forest 
management. Findings across the case studies prove that since the forests handed over to 
the local community are poor forests, the locals’ benefits from those forests are negligible.  
- Forest administration institutions as key entities responsible for forestry activities. 
Empirical findings clearly show that the responsibility for forest management overlaps 
between relevant actors such as the forest administration and district department of 
agriculture. Forest rangers, important actors in forest protection, still stand separate from 
forestry projects, especially in community forestry programs.  
- Improving cash income from community forests for local forest users by increasing 
payments for community forest management and protection. In practice, sources of 
income from the forestry activities make up only a small percentage of a household’s gross 
income.    
In general, there is convincing evidence and strong arguments to be made on the 
connection between real outcomes of community forestry and the influence of powerful 
relevant actors. Such empirical findings allow us to argue that the hypothesis that 
'community forestry activities and outcomes are influenced by the interests of powerful 
relevant actors' was correct. The empirical findings have also successfully explained that 
the outcomes of community forestry are an additional function of the interests of the 
powerful actors situated in the outer, rather than inner, circle of community forestry. This 
suggests that looking at powerful relevant actors is extremely important for analyzing a 
community forestry program. Community forestry practices will achieve great success if 
they are in line with the views of the relevant actors and their networks. Moreover, the 
disparity between the internal and relevant power of the actors needs to be taken into 
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LA – 01 
Luật số 12/2003/QH11, Quốc Hội nước Cộng hòa xã hội 
chủ nghĩa Việt Nam về “Luật bầu cử Hội đồng nhân 
dân”, ngày 26/11/2003. 
Law No. 12/2003/QH11 “Law on the election of 
deputies to the people’s council”, issued by 
National Assembly of Vietnam Socialist Republic, 
on 26
th





LA – 02 
Luật số: 29/2004/QH11, ngày 3 tháng 12 năm 2004 „Luật 
bảo vệ và Phát triển rừng“ 
Law No.: 29/2004/11th Parliament Session, date 





LA – 03 
Luật tổ chức “Hội đồng nhân dân và Ủy ban nhân dân” 
số 11/2003/QH11 do Quốc Hội nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ 
nghĩa Việt Nam ban hành ngày 26/11/2003 
Law on “organization of people’s council and 
people’s committee”, by Parliament of Vietnam 
Socialist Republic on 26
th




LA – 04 
Quyết định số 29/2011/QĐ-TTg của Thủ tướng chính phủ, 
ngày 30 tháng 1 năm 2011 về việc „Ban hành chuẩn hộ 
nghèo, cận nghèo“ áp dụng trong giai đoạn 2011 – 2015 
Decision No. 29/2001/QĐ-TTg of the Prime 
minister, 30 Jan 2011 about “Promulgating the 
standard of close to poverty and poor 





LA – 05 
Nghị định số 119/2006/NĐ-CP của Thủ tướng Chính phủ 
về “Tổ chức và hoạt động của Kiểm lâm” ngày 16 tháng 
10 năm 2006 
Decree No. 119/NĐ-CP, 16
th
 Oct 2006 of Prime 






LA – 06 
Quyết định số 2090/QĐ-DALN-KHKT ngày 25 tháng 10 
năm 2010 của Ban Quản lý các Dựa án Lâm nghiệp - Bộ 
NN&PTNT về việc „Hướng dẫn thực hiện một số hoạt 
động trong Quản lý rừng cộng đồng áp dụng cho dự 
Decision No. 2090/QĐ-DALN-KHKT, 25th Oct 2010 
of the management board of forestry projects – 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development on 
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án phát triển Lâm nghiệp ở Hòa Bình và Sơn La 
(KfW7)“ 
management applied to the Forestry 





LA - 07 
Quyết định số 1528/QĐ-BNN-HTQT ngày 26 tháng 5 năm 
2006 của Bộ NN và PTNT “Phê duyệt dự án phát triển 
lâm nghiệp ở Hòa Bình và Sơn La (KfW7)” 
Decision No. 1528/QĐ-BNN-HTQT of MARD on 
“Approving the Forestry Development Project in 







LA – 08 
Quyết định số 3809/QĐ-BNN-TCCB ngày 13 tháng 12 
năm 2006 vềviệc “Thành lập Ban Quản lý dự án trung 
ương – Dự án Phát triển Lâm nghiệp ở Hòa Bình và 
Sơn La (KfW7)” 
Decision No. 3809/QĐ-BNN-TCCB of MARD on 
“Establishing the state project management 
board – the Forestry Development Project in 







LA – 09 
Thông tư số 70/2007/TT-BNN “Hướng dẫn xây dựng và 
tổ chức thực hiện quy ước bảo vệ và phát triển rừng 
trong cộng đồng dân cư thôn” của Bộ NN&PTNT ngày 
1 tháng 8 năm 2007. 
Circular No. 70/2007/TT-BNN on “Guidelines on 
setting up and organizing the Convention of 
Forest Protection and Management applied in 
communal people community”, issued on 1
st
 Aug 




LA – 10 
Quyết định số 38/2005/QĐ-BNN ngày 6 tháng 7 năm 
2005 của Bộ trưởng Bộ NN&PTNT về việc “Ban hành 
định mức kinh tế kỹ thuật trồng rừng, khoanh nuôi 
xúc tiến tái sinh và bảo vệ rừng” 
Decision No. 38/2005/QĐ-BNN on “Promulgation 
of economic and technical norm for forest 
plantation, maintenance assisted natural 
regeneration and forest protection” by Ministry of 
MARD, issued on 6
th




LA – 11 
Quyết định số 83/2007/QĐ-BNN của Bộ trưởng Bộ 
NN&PTNT về “Nhiệm vụ công chức Kiểm lâm địa bàn 
cấp xã”, ngày 4 tháng 10 năm 2007 
Decision No. 83/2007/QĐ-BNN on “Assignment of 
civil service of the ranger at communal level” by 
Minister of MARD on 4
th
 Oct, 2007 
MARD 
Legal 
LA – 12 Thông tư số 35/2011/TT-BNN&PTNT của Bộ Nông nghiệp 
và Phát triển Nông thôn về “Hướng dẫn thực hiện khai 
Circular letter No. 35/2011/TT-BNNPTNT, issued 
on 20
th
 May 2011 of MARD, on “Guiding the 
MARD 
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LA – 13 
Hiệp định Tài chính và Vốn vay ngày 11.12.2006 giữa 
Ngân hàng Tái thiết Đức và Bộ tài chính – Nước cộng hòa 
xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt Nam 
Loans and Financial Agreement, signed on 11
th
 
Dec 2006 between German Reconstruction Bank 






LA – 14 
“Thông tư liên tịch” của Bộ NN&PTNT – Bộ Nội vụ số 
61/2008/TTLT-BNN-BNV ngày 15 tháng 5 năm 2008 
“Joint circular” of MARD – Ministry of the Interior, 









LA - 15 
“Thông tư liên tịch” số 62/2012/TTLT-BNNPTNT-BTC 
của Bộ NN&PTNT và Bộ Tài Chính về “Hướng dẫn cơ 
chế quản lý sử dụng tiền chi trả dịch vụ môi trường 
rừng” ngày 16 tháng 11 năm 2012. 
“Joint Circular” No. 62/2012/TLT-BNNPTNT-BTC of 
MARD and Ministry of Finance on “Guidelines for 
utilization and management mechanism of 
PES”, issued on 16
th






LA – 16 
Thông tư liên tịch số 80/2013/TTLT-BTC-BNN ngày 
14/6/2013 của Bộ Tài chính và Bộ NN&PTNT về “Thực 
hiện chế độ quản lý, sử dụng kinh phí sự nghiệp thực 
hiện bảo vệ và phát triển rừng” 
Joint Circular No. 80/2013/TTLT-BTC-BNN on 
“Implementation of management and use of 
business funds for forest development and 
protection”, issued on 14
th
 Jun 2013 by MARD 






LA – 17 
“Thông tư liên tịch” của Bộ TNMT và Bộ Nội vụ số 
03/2008/TTLT-BTNMT-BNV ngày 15 tháng 7 năm 2008 
“Joint circular” of Ministry of Environment and 
Resource – Ministry of Interior, No. 03/2008/TTLT-
BTNMT-BNV, issued on 15
th








LA – 18 
Quyết định số 100/QĐ-UB ngày 25 tháng 01 năm 2002 
của ủy ban nhân dân huyện Thuận Châu về việc „Cấp 
giấy chứng nhận quyền sử dụng đất“ 
Decision No. 100/QĐ-UB, 25th Jan 2002 of Thuan 
Chau district people’s committee on „License the 
certificate of land use rights” 
District 
Committee 





LA – 19 
Quyết định số 12/QĐ-UBND của ủy ban nhân dân xã 
Chiềng Bôm về việc “Thành lập Ban quản lý rừng cộng 
đồng”, ngày 25/11/2011 
Decision No. 12/QĐ-UBND of ChiengBom 
commune people’s committee on “Establishing the 
Community Forest Management Board”, issued 
on 25
th






LA – 20 
Quyết định số 127/QĐ-UBND của ủy ban nhân dân xã 
Chiềng Bôm về việc “Phê duyệt Quy chế hoạt động của 
Ban quản lý rừng cộng đồng”, ngày 25/11/2011 
Decision No. 127/QĐ-UBND of ChiengBom 
commune people’s committee on “Approving the 
operating regulation of the Community Forest 
Management Board”, issued on 25
th






LA – 21 
Quy ước Bảo vệ và Phát triển rừng bản Sẳng, xã Muổi 
Nọi 
Regulation of Forest Development and 
Protection, Sang village, Muoi Noi commune 




LA – 22 
Cam kết Bảo vệ rừng và Phòng chống cháy rừng với 
các chủ rừng, bản Sẳng, xã Muổi Nọi 
Commitment to Forest Protection and Forest 
Fire Prevention applied to forest owners, Sang 
village, Muoi Noi commune 
FA, Local Pol 
Legal 
Act 23 
LA - 23 
“Quy chế phối hợp hoạt động giữa lực lượng Kiểm 
lâm và Dân quân tự vệ trong công tác bảo vệ rừng” 
ngày 15 tháng 9 năm 2011 của Hạt kiểm lâm huyện 
Thuận Châu 
“Regulation on coordination between Forest 
Ranger and Militia in forest protection and 
management”, issued on 15
th
 Sep 2011 by Thuan 




LA - 24 
Quyết định số 2188/QĐ-UBND của ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh 
Sơn La về việc “Phê duyệt Quy hoạch Bảo vệ và Phát 
triển rừng tỉnh Sơn La đến năm 2015 và định hướng 
đến năm 2020”, ngày 8 tháng 9 năm 2008 
Decision No. 2188/QĐ-UBND of Son La People’s 
Committee on “Planning for Forest Protection 
and Development in Son La province to 2015 





LA – 25 
Quyết định số 2396/QĐ-UB của Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh 
Sơn La về việc “Phê duyệt phương án giao đất lâm 
nghiệp, giao rừng tự nhiên năm 2001 – 2003 cho tổ 
chức, cá nhân, hộ gia định và cộng đồng thôn bản” 
ngày 17 tháng 11 năm 2000 
Decision No. 2396/QĐ-UB of Provincial People’s 
Committee on “Approving the plan of allocating 
forestry land and natural forest to individual, 
houshold, and community (2001 – 2003)”, issued 
on 17
th
 Nov 2000 
Provincial 
Committee 





LA - 26 
Quyết định số 3011/QĐ-UB của Ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh 
Sơn La về việc “Ban hành tạm thời chính sách giao 
đất, giao rừng áp dụng tại địa phương và quy định 
chính sách hưởng lợi trên đất lâm nghiệp với tổ chức, 
cá nhân, hộ gia định và cộng đồng được giao, nhận 
khoán rừng và đất lâm nghiệp” 
Decion No. 3011/QĐ-UB of Provincial People’s 
Committee on “Precarious promulgation of 
forest-land allocation policies applied in the 
province and regulations of beneficial policies 
on forestry land to the organizations, 
individuals, households that are assigned the 





LA – 27 
Quyết định của Chi cục Kiểm lâm tỉnh Sơn La về việc 
“Ban hành quy chế làm việc của Hạt kiểm lâm huyện 
Thuận Châu”, 2008 
Decision on “Working regulations of Thuan Chau 
Forest Protection Section”, issued by Provincial 




LA - 28 
Quyết định số 126 của UBND xã Chiềng Bôm về việc 
“Thành lập ban quản lý rừng cộng đồng”, ngày 25 
tháng 11 năm 2011 
Decion No. 126 on “Establishment of Mo 
communal Community Forestry Committee” on 




LA – 29 “Quy chế hoạt động quản lý lâm nghiệp cộng đồng 
bản Mỏ” ngày 12 tháng 10 năm 2011 
“Working regulation on Community Forestry 





LA - 30 
Quyết định số 245/1998/QĐ-TTg của Thủ tướng Chính 
phủ về “Thực hiện trách nhiệm quản lý nhà nước của 
các cấp về rừng và đất lâm nghiệp”, ngày 21 tháng 12 
năm 1998. 
Decision No. 245/1998/QĐ-TTg of Prime Minister 
on “The implementation of State management 
responsibility at various levels over the forest 





LA - 31 
Quyết định số 2334/QĐ-UBND ngày 12 tháng 9 năm 2011 
về việc “Thành lập tổ công tác KfW7 xã Mường Khoa, 
huyện Bắc Yên, tỉnh Sơn La” của UBND huyện Bắc Yên 
Decision No. 2334/QĐ-UBND on “Establishment 
of KfW7 working group at Muong Khoa 
commune, Bac Yen District, Son La province”, 
issued by Bac Yen Provincial People’s Committee, 





LA - 32 Quyết định số 199/QĐ-UB ngày 1 tháng 8 năm 2004 về 
việc “Phê duyệt hương ước thôn bản” của UBND huyện 
Yên Châu 
Decision No. 199/QĐ-UB on “Approvement of the 
local regulation”, issued on 1st Aug 2004 by Yen 
Provincial 
Committee 
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Chau Provincial People’s Committee 
Legal 
Act 33 
LA - 33 
Quyết định số 783/1999/QĐ-UB của ủy ban nhân dân tỉnh 
Sơn La, ngày 19 tháng 5 năm 1999 về việc “Chuyển đổi 
các dự án 327/CT thành dự án 661” 
Decision No. 783/1999/QĐ-UB on “Changing 
327/CT projects to 661 project”, issued by Son La 





LA - 34 
Quyết định số 661/QĐ-TTg của Thủ tướng Chính phủ 
ngày 29 tháng 7 năm 1998 về “Mục tiêu, nhiệm vụ, 
chính sách và tổ chức thực hiện dự án trồng mới 5 
triệu hecta rừng” 
Decision No. 661/QĐ-TTg on “Objective, target, 
policy and organization for implementing 5-
million hectares forest plantation”, issued by 





LA – 35 
Nghị định số 02/CP của Thủ tướng Chính phủ ngày 15 
tháng 01 năm 1994 “Ban hành quy định về việc giao 
đất lâm nghiệp cho tổ chức, hộ gia đình, cá nhân sử 
dụng vào mục đích lâm nghiệp” 
Decree No. 02/CP on “Promulgating the regulation 
of  forestry land allocation to organizations, 
households, individuals used for forestry aim”,  





LA – 36 
Chỉ thị số 462/TTg của Thủ tướng Chính phủ về “Quản lý 
chặt chẽ việc Khai thác, Vận chuyển và Xuất khẩu gỗ”, 
ngày 11 tháng 9 năm 1993. 
Instruction No. 462/TTg on “Stringent control of 
the exportation, transportation and exploitation 
of wood”, issued by Vietnam Prime Minister on 





LA – 37 
Quyết định số 327/CT của Chủ tịch Hội đồng Bộ trưởng 
ngày 15 tháng 9 năm 1992 về “Một số chủ trương, 
chính sách sử dụng đất trống, đồi núi trọc, rừng, bãi 
bồi ven biển và mặt nước” 
Decision No. 327/CT on “The Policies on 
utilization of bare lands, hills and mountains; 
forests; coastal alluvials and water surfaces”, 






LA – 38 “Luật Đất đai” số 45/2013/QH13 ngày 29 tháng 11 năm 
2013 của Quốc Hội nước Cộng hòa xã hội chủ nghĩa Việt 
Nam 
“Land Law” No. 45/2013/QH13, approved by 





LA – 39 
Quyết định số 18/2007/QĐ-TTg của Thủ tướng Chính phủ 
“Phê duyệt Chiến lược phát triển lâm nghiệp Việt Nam 
2006 – 2020”, ngày 05 tháng 02 năm 2007 
Decision No. 18/2007/QĐ-TTg on “Approving the 
Vietnam Forestry Development Strategy 2006 – 
2020”, issued by Vietnam Prime Minister on 5th 
Prime 
Minister 






LA - 40 
Nghị định số 163/1999/NĐ-CP của Chính phủ : Về giao 
đất, cho thuê đất lâm nghiệp cho tổ chức, hộ gia đình 
và cá nhân sử dụng ổn định, lâu dài vào mục đích lâm 
nghiệpban hành ngày 16 tháng 11 năm 1999 
Decree No. 163/1999/NĐ-CP on “allocating and 
leasing forestry land to organizations, households 
and individuals for long-term utilization for forestry 






LA - 41 
Nghị định số 23/2006/NĐ-CP ngày 3 tháng 3 năm 2006 về 
việc “Thi hành luật Bảo vệ và Phát triển rừng” của 
Chính phủ 
Decree No. 23/2006/NĐ-CP on “Executing the 
Law of forest protection and development”, 
issued on 3
rd





LA - 42 
Thông tư số 38/2007/TT-BNN ngày 25 tháng 4 năm 2007 
về “hướng dẫn trình tự, thủ tục giao rừng, cho thuê 
rừng, thu hồi rừng cho tổ chức, cá nhân, hộ gia đình 
và cộng đồng dân cư thôn” của Bộ Nông nghiệp và 
Phát triển nông thôn 
Circular No. 38/2007/TT-BNN on “guiding 
procedures for allocation, lease, and withdrawal 
of forest to organizations, households, 
individuals and communities”, issued on 25
th
 Apr 





LA - 43 
Chỉ thị số 12/2003/C-TTg của Thủ tướng Chính phủ về 
“Tăng cường các biện pháp cấp bách để bảo vệ và 
phát triển rừng” ngày 16 tháng 5 năm 2003. 
Instruction No. 12/2003/CT-TTg on “Urgent 
strengthening of methods for Forest Protection 
and Development” issued on 16
th






LA - 44 
Nghị định số 64-CP ngày 27 tháng 9 năm 1993 của Chính 
Phủ về việc “Ban hành quy định về giao đất nông 
nghiệp cho hộ gia đình, cá nhân sử dụng ổn định lâu 
dài vào mục đích sản xuất nông nghiệp” 
Decree No. 64-CP on “Promulgating regulations 
on agricultural land allocation to households, 
individuals for stable and long-term use for 
agricultural purpose”, issued on 27
th





LA - 45 
Thông tư No. 346/1998/TT-TCĐC ngày 16 tháng 3 năm 
1998 của Tổng cục địa chính về “Hướng dẫn thủ tục 
đăng ký đất đai, lập hồ sơ địa chính và cấp giấy 
Circular No. 346/1998/TT-TCDC on “Instruction 
for procedures of land registration, setting up 
land-survey document, and licensing land-use 
General 
Department of 
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chứng nhận quyền sử dụng đất” do Tổng cục địa chính 
ban hành 
right certificate” issued on 16
th
 Mar 1998 by 




LA – 46 
Chỉ thị 462 của Thủ tướng Chính phủ ngày 11 tháng 9 
năm 1993 về việc “Quản lý chặt chẽ việc khai thác vận 
chuyển và xuất khẩu gỗ” 
Instruction No. 462-TTg on “strict management of 
wood exploitation, transportation and 
exportation”, issued on 11
th






LA - 47 
Thông tư số 70/2007/TT-BNN về việc “Hướng dẫn xây 
dựng và tổ chức thực hiện Quy ước bảo vệ và phát 
triển rừng cộng đồng dân cư thôn”, ngày 1 tháng 8 
năm 2007 
Circular No. 70/2007/TT-BNN on “Guidelines for 
construction and implementation of Forest 
Protection and Development Regulations”, issued 






LA – 48 
Quyết định số 106/2006/QĐ-BNN, ngày 27 tháng 11 năm 
2006 của Bộ Nông nghiệp và Phát triển Nông thôn về 
“Hướng dẫn quản lý rừng cộng đồng dân cư thôn” 
Decision No. 106/2006/QD-BNN on “Guidelines 
for Community Forest Management at hamlet 
level”, issued on Nov 27
th




LA - 49 
Quyết định số 59/2005/QĐ-BNN ngày 10 tháng 10 năm 
2005 của Bộ Nông nghiệp và Phát triển Nông thôn về việc 
ban hành “Quy định về kiểm tra, kiểm soát lâm sản” 
Decision No.59/2005/QD-BNN on promulgating 
“Regulation of forest product inspection and 
control”, issued on October 10
th




LA – 50 
Quyết định số 44/2006/QĐ-BNN ngày 01 tháng 6 năm 
2006 của Bộ Nông nghiệp và Phát triển Nông thôn về việc 
ban hành “Quy chế quản lý và đóng búa bài cây, búa 
kiểm lâm” 
Decision No.44/2006/QD-BNN on promulgating 
“Management regulations of the forest ranger’s 
hammer mark for tree elimination”, issued on 
June 1
st




LA - 51 
Quyết định số 40/2005/QĐ-BNN của Bộ Nông nghiệp và 
Phát triển nông thôn ngày 7 tháng 7 năm 2005 về việc 
“Ban hành quy chế về khai thác gỗ và lâm sản khác” 
Decision No.40/2005/QD-BNN on promulgating 
“Regulations on exploitation of timber and other 
forest products”, issued on July 7
th




LA - 52 Quyết định số 59/2014/QĐ-TTg của Thủ tướng Chính phủ 
ngày 22 tháng 10 năm 2014 về “Quy định chức năng, 
Decision No.59/QD-TTg on stipulating “functions, 
responsibilities, authorities and structure of 
Prime 
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Act 52 nhiệm vụ, quyền hạn và cơ cấu tổ chức của Tổng cục 
Lâm nghiệp thuộc Bộ Nông nghiệp và Phát triển Nông 
thôn” 
Vietnam Forestry Administration under the 
management of MARD”, issued on October 22
nd
 
2014 by Vietnam Prime Minister 
Minister 
Act 53 LA - 53 
Quyết định số 07/2012/QĐ-TTg của Thủ tướng Chính phủ 
ngày 8 tháng 2 năm 2012 về việc “Ban hành một số 
chính sách tang cường công tác bảo vệ rừng” 
Decision No.07/2012/QĐ-TTg on “Promulgating 
policies to improve the forest protection task”, 
issued on February 8
th




Act 54 LA - 54 
Quyết định số 184/HĐBT của Hội đồng Bộ trưởng ngày 6 
tháng 11 năm 1984 về việc “Đẩy mạnh giao đất giao 
rừng cho tập thể và nhân dân trồng cây gây rừng” 
Decision No.184/HDBT on “Enhancement of 
forestland allocation to people and community 
for afforestation”, issued on November 6
th




Act 55 LA - 55 
Chỉ thị số 38/2005/CT-TTg của Thủ tướng Chính phủ 
ngày 05 tháng 12 năm 2005 về việc “Rà soát, quy hoạch 
lại ba loại rừng” 
Decree No.38/2005/CT-TTg on “Checking and re-
planning three types of forest”, issued on 
December 5
th
 2005 by Prime Minister 
Prime 
Minister 
Act 56 LA - 56 
Nghị định số 09/2006/NĐ-CP ngày 16 tháng 1 năm 2006 
của Chính phủ về “Phòng cháy chữa cháy rừng” 
Decree No.09/2006/ND-CP on “Regulations of 
forest fire prevention and fight”, issued on 16
th
 
January 2006 by Government 
Government 
Act 57 LA – 57 
Công văn số 815/CV-QLR ngày 12 tháng 6 năm 2007 của 
Cục Lâm nghiệp về việc “Hướng dẫn mô hình cấu trúc 
rừng mong muốn cho rừng gỗ tự nhiên của cộng 
đồng” 
Official dispatch No.815/CV-QLR on “Instruction 
for designing model of forest-desired structure 
over the natural forests of community”, issued 
on 12
th
 June 2007 by Forestry Department 
Forestry 
Department 
Act 58 LA - 58 
Quyết định số 186/2006/QĐ-TTg của Thủ tướng Chính 
phủ ngày 14 tháng 8 năm 2006 về việc “Ban hành quy 
chế quản lý rừng” 
Decision No.186/2006/QD-TTg on “Enforcement 
of forest management regulation”, issued on 14
th
 
August 2006 by Prime Minister 
Prime 
Minister 
Act 59 LA – 59 
Thông tư số 38/2014/TT-BNNPTNT của Bộ Nông nghiệp 
và Phát triển Nông thôn ngày 3 tháng 11 năm 2014 về 
“Hướng dẫn phương án quản lý rừng bền vững” 
Circular No.38/2014/TT-BNNPTNT on “Instruction 
for sustainable forest management plan”, issued 
on 3
rd
 November 2014 by MARD 
MARD 
Act 60 LA - 60 
Công văn số 2324/BNN-LN ngày 21 tháng 8 năm 2007 
của Bộ Nông nghiệp và Phát triển Nông thôn về việc 
“Hướng dẫn các chỉ tiêu và thủ tục khai thác rừng 
cộng đồng” 
Dispatch No.2324/BNN-LN on “Instruction for 
technical standard and exploitation procedures 
of community forest”, issued on 21
st
 August 2007 
by MARD 
MARD 
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Appendix 2: Assessment on the outcomes of community forestry – A general guideline 
1. Economic outcomes 
Benefit for direct forest users Quantity (time series, if applicable) 
1. Forest products (including land-based products) 
- Fodder 
- Fuel wood 
- Poles/lumber 
- Timber 
- NTFPs (Foods, medical plants) 








- Income from selling forest products 
 
3. Services and community development 
- School 
- Health posts 
- Road 
- Irrigation canal/ Dams 
- Community building (cultural house, FUGRs 
office) 




2. Ecological outcomes 
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Inventory and monitoring tools Prior After 
1. Community-Ecosystem (stand level) 
- Aerial photographs, remote sensing 
- Ground-level photo stations 
- Physical habitat measures and resource inventories 
- Habitat suitability indices (HSI) 
- Censuses 
  
2. Population – Species 
- Censuses (counts, captures, signs, radio tracking) 
- Remote sensing 
- HSI 
- Species habitat modeling 
- Population viability analysis 
  
3. Field observations and CFUG’s review of existing programs (e.g. management plan review) 
What is written on biodiversity/forest health or related terms in the management plan of the CFs 
under study? What are the justifications in such statement? Is there any forest blocks allocated for 
biodiversity (species, habitat….) conservation, watershed protection? Composition of vegetation? 
Any other field observation? 
 




3. Social outcomes 
Access Level How is defined 
1. Access to information on forests High – Low 
- No regulation 
- Regulated through: group, 
memberships, agreements, 
regulations, rights, laws, etc. 
2. Access to decision-making process  
- Forest planning 
- Forest management 
- Forest use 
- Marketing 
- Others 
High – Low 
3. Access to forest land and resources Open access, 
limited, bans, 
permits 
* There are only preconditions, the most important thing whether these are implemented. 
Regulations, permits, bans might have put in place in particular CFs, but it is possible that users are 
not following such. In this case empowerment is considered as high.  
Outcomes Low middle high 
Social outcome 
(individual forest user) 
no access to 
information,  decision-
making and to the 
forest 
Access to information 
and decision-making 
Access to the forest 
Based on substantial 
individual user rights, 
substantial access to 
decision making 
(or illegal but 
substantial access) 
Economical outcome 
(individual forest user) 
no improvement in 
livelihood 




livelihood of the 
individual forest user 
Ecological outcome 
 (corresponding forest) 
no or negative 
improvement on forest 
growth and biodiversity 
improvement on 
forest growth 
Improvement on  
biodiversity 
 
Outcome Definition  Key facts 
Social Outcome: Empowerment of 
direct forest users 
▪ Access to forest information 
▪ Access to decision making 
▪ Access to forest land and resources 
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Low No empowerment No access to information’s, decision making 
and access to forest land the resources 
Middle Some empowerment Limited access to information, decision 
making and forest land and resources 
High Full empowerment Full access to information, decision making 
and forest land and resources 
Economical Outcome: Poverty alleviation of 
direct forest users 
▪ Forest products 
▪ Cash money 
▪ Community development 
Low No improvements in 
livelihood 
No access to forest products and no cash 
money 
Middle Slightly improved 
livelihood 
Access to community development which was 
financed through community forestry and or 
some small financial pay  
High Significantly improved 
livelihood 
Access to community development which was 
financed through community forestry and or 
financial pay outs which significantly improve 
the live standard 
Ecological outcome: Improved forest 
condition 
▪ Forest growth 
▪ Biodiversity 
Low No improvements on 
forest growth and 
biodiversity or reduced 
forest resources 
No management or uncontrolled management 
activities 
Middle A sustainable 
managed forest or 
increased ground 
forest surface 
Resource assessments, inventories, 
management plans, controlled harvesting 
activities, protection activities, e.g., fire 
management activities 
High Improved or an stable 
natural ecosystem 
related biodiversity 
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Appendix 3: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
No. Name of Interviewees Type of Actors Position Date 
 SON LA PROVINCE  
1 Vuong Van Quynh University Chief of Environment and Forest Ecology Insititute, Forestry University of 
Vietnam 
10 Oct 2012 
2 Phung Van Khoa University Deputy of Post Graduate Faculty, Forestry University of Vietnam 11 Oct 2012 
3 Tran QuangBao University Deputy of Training Department, Forestry University of Vietnam 11 Oct 2012 
4 Vu Duc Thuan Forest Administration2 Chief of forestry development department, Sonla Province 20 Oct 2012 
 ThuanChau District 
5 Truong Cong Phuong Donor Chief Coordinator, Management Board of KFW7 project, Thuanchau district 5 Nov 2012 
6 Luong Hong Phuong Donor An officer, Management board of KFW7 project, Thuanchau district 5 Nov 2012 
7 Quang Van Huong Forest administration 3 Vice director of Thuanchau Forest Protection Section 5 Nov 2012 
8 Pham Xuan Truong Forest administration 3 An officer of Thuanchau Forest Protection Section 5 Nov 2012 
9 Deo Van Ngoc Village administration Chairman of Muoinoi Commune 6 Nov 2012 
10 Lo Van Toan Village administration Vice chairman of Muoinoi Commune, Thuanchau district 6 Nov 2012 
11 Lo Van Ly Traditional Authority Chief of Muoinoi Commune, Thuanchau district 6 Nov 2012 
12 Deo Van Huong Forest user group Group Leader of forest patrol, Muoinoi Commune, Thuanchau district 6 Nov 2012 
13 Lanh Van Dinh Village administration An officer of Chiengbom Commune 7 Nov 2012 
14 Ha Van Dung Village administration Chairman of Chiengbom Commune 7 Nov 2012 
15 Lo Van Chieng Traditional authority Chief of Hon hamlet, leader of CF management board 7 Nov 2012 
16 Tran Quoc Hung District government Chief of Agriculture department, Thuanchau district 7 Nov 2012 
 Bac Yen District 
17 Mr. Thuan Forest administration Chief of Bac Yen forest protection section 8 Nov 2012 
18 Tran Duc Chiem District government Deputy of Environment and resource department 8 Nov 2012 
19 Tran QuangTu District government Deputy of Agriculture department 8 Nov 2012 
20 Pham Van Hung Donor Vice director of management board of KFW7, Chief coordinator 9 Nov 2012 
21 Vi Van Phu Forest administration 3 An officer of Forest Protection Section, Muongkhoa Commune 9 Nov 2012 
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22 Lu Van Chuyen Village administration Vice chairman of Muongkhoa commune, a member of KFW7 project 10 Nov 2012 
23 Lu Van Thang Village administration An agriculture and forestry officer, Muongkhoa commune 10 Nov 2012 
24 Quang Van Quy Traditional authority Chief of Chen hamlet, leader of CF management board 10 Nov 2012 
25 Lu Van Bieu Forest user group Group leader of forest patrol, Muongkhoa commune 10 Nov 2012 
26 Lo Van Au Village administration Vice chairman of Phieng Ban commune 11 Nov 2012 
27 LuongThi Quyen Village administration Leader of Agriculture and Forestry board 11 Nov 2012 
28 Hoang Van Dai Traditional authority Chief of hamlet, leader of CF management board 11 Nov 2012 
29 Luong Van Chien Forest user group Group leader of forest patrol, Phieng Ban commune 12 Nov 2012 
 Moc Chau District 
30 Sa DuyTien Forest enterprise Director of Moc Chau forest enterprise 15 Nov 2012 
31 Hoang Van Cuong Donor An officer of management board of KFW7 project, Moc Chau district 15 Nov 2012 
32 Duong Thi Ha Forest enterprise  An officer of Moc Chau forest enterprise 15 Nov 2012 
33 Tran Duc Hien District government Deputy of Moc Chau agriculture department 15 Nov 2012 
34 Nguyen Huu Hung District government An officer of Moc Chau agriculture department 15 Nov 2012 
35 Mong Van Binh Village administration Chairman of Long Sap commune 16 Nov 2012 
36 Lo Van Trong Traditional authority Chief of A Ma hamlet, leader of CF management board 16 Nov 2012 
37 Luong Van Cuong Village administration An officer of Long Sap people’s committee board  
38 Ngo Thi Trung Thanh Donor Chief coordinator of KFW7 project, an officer of Moc Chau forest enterprise 17 Nov 2012 
39 Mr. Chien Forest Administration A forest ranger of Xuan Nha Natural Reserve Area 22 Nov 2012 
40 Mr. Truong Forest Administration A forest ranger of Xuan Nha Natural Reserve Area 22 Nov 2012 
 Yen Chau District 
41 Hoang Van Dao Forest administration Director of forest protection section 28 Nov 2012 
42 Lai Huu Hung District government An officer of Agriculture Department 28 Nov 2012 
43 Nguyen Ngoc Dung District government Chief of Environment and resource department 29 Nov 2012 
44 Lo Thi Sim Forest administration A forest ranger, Yen Chau Forest protection section 29 Nov 2012 
45 Nguyen Nhu Viet Forest administration Chief of Forest protection station, Tu Nang commune 30 Nov 2012 
46 Lo Van Nhe Village administration Chairman of Tu Nang commune 30 Nov 2012 
47 Hoang Van Thuan Traditional authority Chief of Coc Lac hamlet, leader of CF management board, Tu Nang 30 Nov 2012 




48 Hoang Van Hien Forest user group Group leader of CF patrol 30 Nov 2012 
49 Dao Xuan Son Forest administration A forest ranger, Chieng Hac Forest protection section 31 Nov 2012 
50 Lo Van Doi Village administration Chairman of Chieng Hac commune 31 Nov 2012 
51 Ha Van Thanh Village administration Vice chairman of Chieng Hac commune 31 Nov 2012 
52 Ha Van Thuong Village administration An officer 31 Nov 2012 
53 Ha Van Phanh Traditional authority Chief of Cang hamlet, group leader of CF management board 1 Dec 2012 
54 Lu Van Dam Forest user group Cashier of CF management board, leader of CF patrol team 1 Dec 2012 
55 Me Van Hong Village administration Chairman of Chieng Khoi commune 3 Dec 2012 
56 Hoang Van Quang Traditional authority Chief of Ngoang hamlet, group leader of CF management board 3 Dec 2012 
57 Ha Van Keo Forest user group  Vice leader of CF patrol team 3 Dec 2012 
58 Hoang Van Kieu Forest user group Villager  3 Dec 2012 
59 Ha Van Truong Forest user group Villager 3 Dec 2012 
60 Lo Van Han Forest user group Villager 3 Dec 2012 
61 Lo Van Quy Forest user group Villager 3 Dec 2012 
62 Hoang Van Minh Village administration Chairman of Chieng Dong commune 4 Dec 2012 
63 Lo Van Dai Traditional authority Chief of Na Pan hamlet, leader of CF management board 4 Dec 2012 
64 Lo Van Tran Forest user group Villager, a representative of received-forest household 4 Dec 2012 
65 Nguyen Van Thuan Forest administration A forest ranger, Chieng Dong forest protection section 4 Dec 2012 
66 Duong Hong Hai Forest administration A forest ranger, Chief of legislation department, Yen Chau forest protection 
section 
7 Dec 2012 
67 Nguyen Van Kien Donor An officer of KFW  project management board 1 Jan 2013 
68 Le Hong Hai Consultant An independent advisor of KFW7 project 18 Feb 2013 
 HOA BINH PROVINCE 
69 Nguyen Thach Lam Donor A KFW coordinator in Hoa Binh province 25 Feb 2014 
 Kim Boi District 
70 Nguyen Manh Dan Forest Administration Head of Forest Protection Section 12 Mar 2014 
71 Mr. Tuyen Forest Administration Deputy of Forest Protection Section 12 Mar 2014 
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72 Bui Thanh Chuong Village Administration Chairman of Cuoi Ha commune 13 Mar 2014 
73 Quach Cong Minh Traditional Authority Chief of Mu hamlet 13 Mar 2014 
74 Mr. Phong Forest Administration A Forest ranger, Kim Boi Forest Protection Section 13 Mar 2014 
75 Quach Cong Quy Village Administration Chairman of Kim Tien commune 14 Mar 2014 
76 Bui Duc Thao Forest Patrol Team Villager 14 Mar 2014 
77 Bui Van Thien Forest Patrol Team Villager 14 Mar 2014 
78 Bui Van Mao Forest Patrol Team Villager 14 Mar 2014 
79 Bui Nhu Hien Traditional Authority Chief of Vo Khang hamlet 15 Mar 2014 
80 Bui Manh Tuan Traditional Authority Deputy of Vo Khang hamlet 15 Mar 2014 
81 Bui Van Thanh Forest Patrol Team Villager 15 Mar 2014 
82 Mr. Minh Forest Administration A forest ranger, Kim Boi Forest Protection Section 15 Mar 2014 
83 Bui Van Yen Village Administration Chairman of Kim Son commune 18 Mar 2014 
84 Bui Van Thu Traditional Authority Chief of Mo hamlet 18 Mar 2014 
85 Bui Van Vien Traditional Authority Deputy, and head of forest patrol team, Mo hamlet 18 Mar 2014 
86 Bui Van Thien Forest Patrol Team Villager 18 Mar 2014 
87 Mr. Quynh Forest Administration A forest ranger, Kim Boi Forest Protection Section 19 Mar 2014 
88 Bui Van Hieu Forest Patrol Team Villager 19 Mar 2014 
89 Dinh Cong Du Forest User Group Chief of San hamlet, head of CF management board  19 Mar 2014 
90 Bach Tien Sy Village Administration Chairman of Hop Dong commune 19 Mar 2014 
91 Ngo Van Quy Forest Administration 2 Director of Thuong Tien Natural Reserved Area 20 Mar 2014 
92 Nguyen Manh Tuyen Forest Administration 2 A technical officer of Thuong Tien Natural Reserved Area 20 Mar 2014 
93 Dinh Tat Thang District government Chief of Kim Boi Rural Department, and Vice Director of KFW7 provincial 
project 
22 Mar 2014 
94 Nguyen Viet Hoa District government Chief of Kim Boi Environment and Resource Department 22 Mar 2014 
 Tan Lac District 
95 Mr. Cham Forest Administration Head of Tan Lac Forest Protection Section 6 May 2014 
96 Mr. Dinh Forest Administration A forest ranger, Tan Lac Forest Protection Section 7 May 2014 
97 Bui Van Ben Village Administration Deputy of Quyet Thang commune 7 May 2014 





98 Bui Van Son Traditional Authority Deputy of Bac Hung hamlet, a member of the forest patrol team 7 May 2014 
99 Bui Van Vien Forest Patrol Team A villager, head of Bac Hung forest patrol team 7 May 2014 
100 Bui Van Chung Forest Administration A contract forest ranger at communal level 8 May 2014 
101 Bui Van Phong Village Administration Chairman of Ngo Luong commune 9 May 2014 
102 Bui Van Bao Forest Patrol Team Villager, head of the forest patrol team 9 May 2014 
103 Bui Van Quang Forest Patrol Team Villager, vice head of the forest patrol team 9 May 2014 
104 Nguyen Thai Son Forest Administration 2 A forest ranger of Ngo Luong – Ngoc Son Natural Reserved Area 9 May 2014 
105 Mr. Hung Forest Administration 2 A forest ranger of Ngo Luong – Ngoc Son Natural Reserved Area 9 May 2014 
106 Bui Thanh Truyen Village Administration Chairman of Nam Son commune 12 May 2014 
107 Nguyen Thanh Xuan Forest Administration  A forest ranger of Tan Lac Forest Protection Section 12 May 2014 
108 Dinh Van Lung Forest Patrol Team Villager, vice head of Nam Son Forest Patrol Team 12 May 2014 
109 Nguyen Tien Ngoc Forest Administration 2 A forest ranger of Ngo Luong – Ngoc Son Natural Reserved Area 12 May 2014 
110 Vu Quang Hung District Government Chief of Tan Lac Rural Department 16 May 2014 
111 Bui Van Nho District Government Deputy of Tan Lac Rural Department 16 May 2014 
112 Mr. Hien District Government Chief of Tan Lac Environment and Resource Department 17 May 2014 
113 Mrs. Nhung District Government An officer of Environment Resource Department 17 May 2014 
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Appendix 4: Questionnaires 
Questionnaire 1: Stakeholder identification, power assessment 
1. General information of stakeholder: 
- Name of stakeholder: ………………………………………………… Age: ………… Male/Female:  .................................. 
- Position: ………………………………………………………. Address:  ............................................................................. 
- How many members are there in your organization?  ................................................................................. 
- Please, mention about your tasks/responsibility in CF:  ............................................................................... 
 ......................................................................................................................................................................... 
2. CF is supported by many actors, what is/are your experience(s):  ..................................................................... 
- Please, mention the actors involving to the CF processes (in the last few years):  ...................................... 
- Many actors deal with CF, base on your collaboration and experiences, please mention 
the actors whom you have contacted with:  .......................................................................................................... 
- How often do you contact with them: 
+ Frequent: ……. time / time units 
+ Sometimes: ……. time / time units 
- Which actors give you the information?  ...................................................................................................... 
- How good is the information?  ...................................................................................................................... 
 No inf. (0)   Acceptable inf. (1)  Good inf. (2)  Very 
good inf. (3) 
3. Power elements: 
a. Trust: From your experiences and collaborations with actors, please put the level and 
reasons of trust to them in order: 
 Not at all (0) Less trust (1)  Trust (2)  Full trust (3) 
- Have you ever verified supplied information?  
 Always (0)   Never (1)   Sometimes (2) 
b. Incentive: Please mention who is (are) the stakeholder(s) giving you supports (financial, 
technical, material, and knowledge): 
0 no support 
1 support provided 
c. Coercion: Please, mention who is / are the stakeholder(s) absolutely necessary in order 
tosecure community forestry activities? (For example; managing to receive theapproval for 
forest use) 
0 not necessary 
1 necessary 




Questionnaire 2: Qualitative assessment (applied to powerful actors) 
Name of the respondent:  ................................................................ Date of interview: …………………………………….. 
1. Please, mention some information about your task in community forestry:  .................................................... 
 ................................................................................................................................................................................. 
2. Please, mention about the legal status of your institution:  ............................................................................... 
3. Relying on your experience, how do you assess about the importance of community forest?  ........................ 
 ................................................................................................................................................................................. 
4. Based on your experience and collaboration with other actors, who are the most helpful 
actors to you and why?  .......................................................................................................................................... 
5. Human resource: How many staffs (full-time and part-time) are there in your organization?  ........................ 
6. Financial resources:  
- Who finances to conduct CF activities?  
 State  Membership fee 
 Donor (please, names it)  ................................................................................................................................... 
 Donations (detail)  .............................................................................................................................................. 
 Others:  ............................................................................................................................................................... 
- Your organization is funded by:   
 State  Membership fee 
 Donor (please, names it)  ................................................................................................................................... 
 Donations (detail)  .............................................................................................................................................. 
 Others:  ............................................................................................................................................................... 
7. Interests:  
What will be optimal results from CF that you expect?  ......................................................................................... 
 Social outcomes   Ecological outcomes   Economic 
outcomes 




Questionnaire 3: CF’s outcome assessment 
A. Economic outcomes: 
I. Products and services: 
1. Please, mention the products that collected from community forests within the past years as 
following table: 
Products Quantity (time series, if applicable) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Fodder      
Fuel wood      
Poles/Lumber      
Timber      
Medicine plants      
NTFPs      
Others      
2. Please, mention community development services carried out by FUG: 
Service Investment Access to the direct forest 
user 
Health posts   
Rural electrification   
School   
Community buildings (e.g. 
FUG office building) 
  
Roads   
Irrigation system (canal, dams)   
Drinking water   
Others (details)   
II. Incomes and expenditures: 
1. Income status of the FUG: 
Income source Year Amount  Access of the direct 
forest users (if 
applicable) 
  VNs Euro  
Income from users     
Income from products 
(forest products, 
access permit…) 
    
Support from Forest 
administration 
    




    





     
b. The expenditure status of the FUG (will be collected from annual audit and financial reports 
and verified through interviews) 
Themes of expenditure    
Internal administration and office 
management of FUG or user’s 
committee 
   
Forest operations     
Forest management (protection, 
plantation, inventory…) 
   
Community development    
Livelihood promotion programs    
Social programs    
Education    
Supports to other institutions    
Other expenditures (entertainment, 
donations, etc.) 
   
 
B. Ecological outcomes 
1. Total area of community forest:  
Number of blocks:  .................................. their respective area:   
No. Prior After (now) 
a. Community-Ecosystem (stand level) 
- Aerial photographs / remote sensing 
- Ground-level photo stations 
- Physical habitat measures and resource inventories 
- Habitat suitability indices (HSI) 
- Censuses 
  
b. Population species censuses (counts, signs, capture, radio-tracking) 
- Remote sensing and HSI 
- Species-habitat modeling 
- Population viability analysis 
  
2. Field observations, CFUG review of existing programs: 
- What is written about biodiversity/forest health or related terms in the management plan of 
CFs under study? 
- What are the justifications in such statements? 
- Is there any forest block allocation for biodiversity (species) conservation, watershed 
management? 
- Composition of tree species in the forest? 
- Others 
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Appendix 5: Calculation formulas of the power elements 
I. Quantifying the value of power elements 
1. Dominant Information:  In which:   
 - Tq refers to the quality of community forestry information provided by partner actors 
and assigned the values 3, 2, 1 and 0 equaling to: very good information; 
acceptable or good information; unacceptable information; and no information 
respectively.  
 - Tv refers to the verification of provided information done by receiver, assigned the 
values 2, 1 or 0 equaling to: sometimes, never or always respectively. 
 - T shows the reliability of a stakeholder to the others in the community forestry 
network, from full trust, trust and no trust at all.  
2. Incentives: - I refers to the supports (finance, materials) provided by partner actors. 0 means no 
incentive; and 1 means there exists incentives either material; finance or 
disincentives.  
3. Coercion:  in which:  
 - Ci refers to one of the actors need to carry out activities related to the specific 
community forestry (0 not needed, 1 needed). 
 - Cp refers to the permission gotten from one of mentioned actors to carry out 
activities related to the specific community forestry (0 not needed, 1 needed). 
 - C is coercive power indication (0 no coercive power indication, 1 indication of 
coercive power, 2 strong coercive power indication). 
II. Identifying group of powerful actors – Qualitative calculation 
1. Percentage of relative power - Xi 
- Percentage of relative power – Xi (Dominant information) 
 
- Percentage of relative power – Xi (Incentive) 
 
- Percentage of relative power – Xi (Coercion) 
 
Xi is defined as the percentage of maximum amount that an actor gets from the evaluation of the 
other actors in the network.  
2. Individual Concentration Value – hi 
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Where, Xi is the sum of answers per actor for one power element, 
. is total given answers per power element.  
3. Concentration Ratio – Cri 
- r is the position of the sorted ratio of power per actor (hi); the sorting starts with highest hi value 
until the lowest, equal values can be sorted continually anyway, for r = 1,……, n 
- Cri of stakeholder 1 = hi of stakeholder 1 
- Cri of stakeholder 2 = Cri of stakeholder 1 + hi of stakeholder 2 
- Cri of stakeholder 3 = Cri of stakeholder 1 + hi of stakeholder 2 + hi of stakeholder 3 
- Cri of stakeholder n = Cri of stakeholder 1 + hi of stakeholder 2 + ………. + hi of stakeholder n 
4. Dominant Degree Value – Di 
 
Where, Cri is concentration ratio of each power element of respective stakeholder; ‘i' refers to the 
position of stakeholder after sorting; n refers to the total number of actors in the network.  
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Appendix 6: Summary of power diagnosis 
I_Dnr 
involvement 













T 1 0 1 1  0 1 0 0 1   
I 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 




T 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
I 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 




T 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
I 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
C 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
Cao Da  
(Muong Khoa) 
9 
T 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
I 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
C 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 
A Ma  
(Long Sap) 
10 
T 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
I 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 




T 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0  
I 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 
C 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
NO 
Coc Lac  
(Tu Nang) 
8 
T 1 1 1  0 0 1 0 0 
I 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 




T 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0  
I 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 




T 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0  
I 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
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C 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
Na Pan  
(Chieng Dong) 
8 
T 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
I 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 




T 1 1  1 0 1 0 0 
I 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 
C 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
Vo Khang  
(Kim Tien) 
8 
T 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
I 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 




T 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0  
I 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0  
C 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
Bac Hung  
(Quyet Chien) 
6 
T 1 1   0 1 0 0 
I 1 0 0 1 0 0 




T 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 
I 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Note: ‘1’ indicates ‘powerful’; ‘0’ indicates ‘not powerful’; blank is not involved 
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Appendix 6: Photos of community forestry activities in the research sites 
  
Pic 01: Pluck-rice machine Pic 02: Shell-corn machine 
  
Pic 03: Furniture equipped by KfW7 Pic 04: Big tree cut for fuel wood 
  
Pic 05: communal house of culture Pic 06: road for travel of local people 




Pic 07: Illegal logging Pic 08: sloping cultivation 
  
Pic 09: Corncob used for fuel Pic 10: fuel wood in blocks 
 




Appendix 7: Qualitative and Quantitative data of Hoa Binh and Son La case studies 
 





Power element: Trust Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 1 + 2 1 - 1 2 + 2 
N_Dnr 2 + 2 2 + 2 1 - 1 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 2 + 2 1 - 1 1 + 2 
D_Pol1 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FA L_Dnr TA Local Pol FPTr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 75 63,88889 44,44444 30,55556 16,66667 13,88889 0 
hi 0,306818 0,261364 0,181818 0,125 0,068182 0,056818 0 
Cri 0,306818 0,568182 0,75 0,875 0,943182 1 1 
Dmi 0,174221 0,198709 0,203125 0,196615 0,179533 0,166667 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
L_Dnr FA FPTr TA Local Pol D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 83,33333 50 16,66667 16,66667 0 0 0 
hi 0,5 0,3 0,1 0,1 0 0 0 
Cri 0,5 0,8 0,9 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,291667 0,328 0,2725 0,25 0,2 0,166667 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 FA Local Pol L_Dnr TA FPTr 
Xi 133,3333 133,3333 116,6667 83,33333 50 50 0 
hi 0,235294 0,235294 0,205882 0,147059 0,088235 0,088235 0 
Cri 0,25 0,485294 0,691176 0,838235 0,926471 1,014706 1,014706 
Dmi 0,15625 0,17074 0,183085 0,184382 0,174373 0,171821 #DIV/0! 
 



















Mu CF Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Local people still extract timber illegally; Local Pol 1 1 1 
Community Forestry in Vietnam: Actors and Political Process 
 
 211 
- Ask TA’s permission for collecting NTFPs; 
- Grazing livestock under the allocated forest; 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
N_Dnr 1 +1 +1 
TA -1 +1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 +1 +1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
2. Vo Khang CF, Kim Tien commune 
 
* Power elements 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: Trust Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 1 + 2 1 - 1 2 + 2 
N_Dnr 2 + 2 2 + 2 1 - 1 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 2 + 2 1 + 2 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
FA2 2 - 1 2 + 2 1 + 2 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA FA2 L_Dnr TA Local Pol FPTr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 73,80952 71,42857 59,52381 54,7619 30,95238 26,19048 16,66667 0 
hi 0,221429 0,214286 0,178571 0,164286 0,092857 0,078571 0,05 0 
Cri 0,221429 0,435714 0,614286 0,778571 0,871429 0,95 1 1 
Dmi 0,135627 0,147993 0,155537 0,163801 0,157388 0,151667 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
L_Dnr FA FA2 TA Local Pol FPTr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 71,42857 42,85714 42,85714 14,28571 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,416667 0,25 0,25 0,083333 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,416667 0,666667 0,916667 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,222222 0,240741 0,281481 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 Local Pol FA TA L_Dnr FA2 FPtr 
Xi 128,5714 114,2857 100 85,71429 57,14286 42,85714 42,85714 0 
hi 0,225 0,2 0,175 0,15 0,1 0,075 0,075 0 
Cri 0,225 0,425 0,6 0,75 0,85 0,925 1 1 
Dmi 0,136429 0,145417 0,152 0,15625 0,152 0,145417 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
 

























Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Local people still extract timber illegally; 
- Ask TA’s permission for collecting NTFPs; 
- Grazing livestock under the allocated forest; 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
N_Dnr 1 +1 +1 
TA -1 +1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 +1 +1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
FA2 -1 -1 +1 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
3. Mo CF, Kim Son commune 
* Power elements 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: Trust Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 1 + 2 1 - 1 2 + 2 
N_Dnr 2 + 2 2 + 2 1 - 1 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 1 + 2 1 + 2 2 + 2 
D_Pol1 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
FUGR 1 + 2 1 - 1 2 - 1 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 





* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA L_Dnr TA FUGR Local Pol FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 78,57143 69,04762 42,85714 38,09524 35,71429 28,57143 11,90476 0 
hi 0,257813 0,226563 0,140625 0,125 0,117188 0,09375 0,039063 0 
Cri 0,257813 0,484375 0,625 0,75 0,867188 0,960938 1 1 
Dmi 0,145159 0,161621 0,158333 0,15625 0,156283 0,154663 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
L_Dnr FA FUGR TA Local Pol FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 100 57,14286 28,57143 14,28571 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,5 0,285714 0,142857 0,071429 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,538462 0,824176 0,967033 1,038462 1,038462 1,038462 1,038462 1,038462 
Dmi 0,320372 0,344785 0,311935 0,26997 0,216174 0,180473 0,155537 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA Local Pol D_Pol 1 TA D_Pol 2 FUGR L_Dnr FPtr 
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Xi 142,8571 114,2857 114,2857 100 100 85,71429 28,57143 0 
hi 0,208333 0,166667 0,166667 0,145833 0,145833 0,125 0,041667 0 
Cri 0,208333 0,375 0,541667 0,6875 0,833333 0,958333 1 1 
Dmi 0,132937 0,135417 0,139815 0,142578 0,148148 0,153935 0,142857 #DIV/0! 



















Mo CF Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Local people still extract timber and hunting in 
Community forest illegally; 
- Free to collect NTFPs for subsistence; 
- Grazing livestock under the community forest freely; 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
- TA decides on liquidation and contribution of 
confiscated products.  
Local Pol 1 1 1 
N_Dnr 1 +1 +1 
TA 1 1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 +1 +1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
FUGR 1 1 1 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
4. San CF, Hop Dong commune 
 
* Power elements 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: Trust Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 1 + 2 1 - 1 2 + 2 
I_Dnr 2 + 2 2 + 2 1 - 1 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 2 + 2 1 + 2 2 + 2 
D_Pol1 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
FUGR 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 - 1 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA I_Dnr TA FUGR Local Pol FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 78,57143 69,04762 47,61905 40,47619 35,71429 28,57143 11,90476 0 
hi 0,251908 0,221374 0,152672 0,129771 0,114504 0,091603 0,038168 0 
Cri 0,251908 0,473282 0,625954 0,755725 0,870229 0,961832 1 1 
Dmi 0,143407 0,158237 0,158588 0,157698 0,157073 0,154915 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I_Dnr FA FUGR TA Local Pol FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 85,71429 42,85714 28,57143 14,28571 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,5 0,25 0,166667 0,083333 0 0 0 0 
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Cri 0,5 0,75 0,916667 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,285714 0,291667 0,281481 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 Local Pol FUGR TA I_Dnr FPtr 
Xi 128,5714 128,5714 114,2857 114,2857 100 85,71429 57,14286 0 
hi 0,176471 0,176471 0,156863 0,137255 0,156863 0,117647 0,078431 0 
Cri 0,183673 0,360144 0,517007 0,654262 0,811124 0,928772 1,007203 1,007203 
Dmi 0,128934 0,133088 0,135755 0,136898 0,143476 0,146306 0,144974 #DIV/0! 
 



















San CF Low Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Local people almost stop illegal logging, hunting 
in the community forest; 
- Only FUGR can collect NTFPs for sale and 
subsistence; 
- No Grazing livestock under the community forest; 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
- TA decides on liquidation and contribution of 
confiscated products.  
Local Pol 1 1 1 
I_Dnr 1 1 +1 
TA -1 +1 +1 
D_Pol1 -1 +1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
5. Bac Hung CF, Quyet Chien commune 
 
* Power elements 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: Trust Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 2 + 2 1 - 1 2 + 2 
FPtr 2 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
D_Pol1 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
FA TA Local Pol FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 56,66667 40 36,66667 26,66667 13,33333 0 
hi 0,326923 0,230769 0,211538 0,153846 0,076923 0 
Cri 0,326923 0,557692 0,769231 0,923077 1 1 
Dmi 0,197485 0,204419 0,21499 0,215976 0,2 #DIV/0! 
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- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
FA TA Local Pol FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 60 20 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,75 0,25 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,75 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,296875 0,333333 0,25 0,2 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
FA Local Pol D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 TA FPtr 
Xi 120 120 80 80 60 0 
hi 0,26087 0,26087 0,173913 0,173913 0,130435 0 
Cri 0,26087 0,521739 0,695652 0,869565 1 1 
Dmi 0,177316 0,193289 0,192187 0,197543 0,2 #DIV/0! 
 





















Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Local people encroach community forest 
sometimes; 
- Free to collect NTFPs, but ask TA’s permission to 
collect timber; 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
- TA decides on liquidation and contribution of 
confiscated products.  
Local Pol 1 1 1 
TA 1 +1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 +1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
6. Bo CF, Ngo Luong commune 
 
* Power elements 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: Trust Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 2 + 2 1 + 2 2 + 2 
FPtr 2 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
D_Pol1 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
FA2 2 + 1 1 + 2 2 + 2 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 










* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FA FA2 Local Pol TA FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 69,44444 50 47,22222 44,44444 36,11111 11,11111 0 
hi 0,268817 0,193548 0,182796 0,172043 0,139785 0,043011 0 
Cri 0,268817 0,462366 0,645161 0,817204 0,956989 1 1 
Dmi 0,161367 0,164701 0,170222 0,178094 0,184091 0,166667 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FA TA Local Pol FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 FA2 
Xi 50 16,66667 0 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,75 0,25 0 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,75 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,29375 0,333333 0,25 0,2 0,166667 #DIV/0! #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FA Local Pol D_Pol 1 TA D_Pol 2 FA2 FPtr 
Xi 83,33333 83,33333 83,33333 66,66667 66,66667 50 0 
hi 0,192308 0,192308 0,192308 0,153846 0,153846 0,115385 0 
Cri 0,192308 0,384615 0,576923 0,730769 0,884615 1 1 
Dmi 0,14571 0,149704 0,155695 0,157668 0,163166 0,166667 #DIV/0! 
 



















Bo CF Low Medium High FA 1 -1 +1 
- Local people do not extract timber from community 
forest; 
- Free to collect NTFPs, but only for subsistence; 
- There is plan and inventory of biodiversity; 
- TA decides on liquidation and contribution of 
confiscated products.  
Local Pol -1 1 1 
FPtr 0 +1 1 
TA -1 +1 +1 
D_Pol1 -1 +1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
FA2 -1 1 +1 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 







Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 2 - 1 1 - 1 1 + 2 
FUGR 1 + 2 1 + 2 1 + 2 
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I_Dnr 1 + 2 2 + 2 1 +
30
 2 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 0 1 1 - 1 
TA 2 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
Con 2 + 2 2 - 1 1 - 1 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA Con TA Dnr L_Pol FUGR FPtr D_Pol1 D_Pol2 
Xi 77,08 66,67 62,5 45,83 41,67 33,33 22,92 4,17 2,08 
hi 0,216374 0,187135 0,175439 0,128655 0,116959 0,093567 0,064327 0,011696 0,005848 
Cri 0,216374 0,403509 0,578947 0,707602 0,824561 0,918129 0,982456 0,994152 1 
Dmi 0,123576 0,132238 0,141274 0,142275 0,143675 0,142728 0,138042 0,123576 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Power 
indicator Dnr Con FA L_Pol FUGr FPtr TA D_Pol1 D_Pol2 
Xi 62,5 50 37,5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,416667 0,333333 0,25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,416667 0,75 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,216146 0,290179 0,333333 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 0,125 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Power 
indicator FA D_Pol2 D_Pol1 L_Pol Dnr TA FUGr FPtr Con 
Xi 112,5 75 62,5 50 12,5 12,5 0 0 0 
hi 0,346154 0,230769 0,192308 0,153846 0,038462 0,038462 0 0 0 
Cri 0,346154 0,576923 0,769231 0,923077 0,961538 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,173262 0,191991 0,206114 0,214201 0,185281 0,166667 0,142857 0,125 #DIV/0! 
 



















Sang CF Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Local people still extract timber illegally; 
- Still do farming under the allocated forest crown; 
- Grazing livestock under the allocated forest; 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
FUGR -1 1 1 
I_Dnr 1 +1 +1 
TA -1 +1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
Con 1 1 1 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
                                                          
30
 Check and take over result of the afforestation activity, then decide to whether transfer money to the 
forest user’s bank account or not. 
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(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
8. Hon CF, Chieng Bom commune 
 
* Power element: 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: dominant 
information 
Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 2 - 1 1 - 1 1 + 2 
FUGR 2 + 2 1 + 2 1 + 2 
I_Dnr 2 + 2 2 + 2 1 + 2 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 2 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
Con 2 + 2 2 - 1 1 - 1 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA Con Dnr TA Local Pol FUGr FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 77,08333 66,66667 54,16667 41,66667 37,5 33,33333 18,75 2,083333 0 
hi 0,232704 0,201258 0,163522 0,125786 0,113208 0,100629 0,056604 0,006289 0 
Cri 0,232704 0,433962 0,597484 0,72327 0,836478 0,937107 0,993711 1 1 
Dmi 0,127744 0,139933 0,145999 0,146096 0,146624 0,14768 0,141086 0,125 #DIV/0! 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA Dnr Con Local Pol FUGr FPtr TA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 62,5 62,5 50 0 0 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,357143 0,357143 0,285714 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,357143 0,714286 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,179209 0,266764 0,333333 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 0,125 #DIV/0! 




1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA D_Pol 2 D_Pol 1 Local Pol Dnr TA FUGr FPtr Con 
Xi 125 100 62,5 50 25 12,5 0 0 0 
hi 0,333333 0,266667 0,166667 0,133333 0,066667 0,033333 0 0 0 
Cri 0,344828 0,611494 0,778161 0,911494 0,978161 1,011494 1,011494 1,011494 1,011494 
Dmi 0,172562 0,208525 0,210047 0,209272 0,191479 0,170564 0,146226 0,128022 #DIV/0! 
 



















Hon CF Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
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- Limited access to the community forest; 
- Forbid medicinal plant collection; 
 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
FUGR -1 1 1 
I_Dnr 1 +1 +1 
TA -1 +1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
Con 1 1 1 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
9. Chen CF, Phieng Ban commnue 
 
* Power element: 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: dominant 
information 
Power element: Incentive 
(disincentive) 
Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 + 2 
FUGR 1 + 2 1 + 2 1 + 2 
I_Dnr 2 + 2 2 + 2 1 + 2 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 2 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
Con 2 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA Dnr Con TA Local Pol FUGr FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 87,5 72,91667 62,5 54,16667 37,5 31,25 18,75 4,166667 4,166667 
hi 0,234637 0,195531 0,167598 0,145251 0,100559 0,083799 0,050279 0,011173 0,011173 
Cri 0,234637 0,430168 0,597765 0,743017 0,843575 0,927374 0,977654 0,988827 1 
Dmi 0,128277 0,138909 0,146073 0,151227 0,148441 0,145095 0,136793 0,122347 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dnr FA Con TA Local Pol FUGr FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 62,5 50 25 12,5 0 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,416667 0,333333 0,166667 0,083333 0 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,416667 0,75 0,916667 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,216146 0,290179 0,28125 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 0,125 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA D_Pol 2 D_Pol 1 Local Pol Dnr FUGr FPtr TA Con 
Xi 137,5 100 62,5 50 25 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,366667 0,266667 0,166667 0,133333 0,066667 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,366667 0,633333 0,8 0,933333 1 1 1 1 1 
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Dmi 0,184583 0,219762 0,22 0,218667 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 0,125 #DIV/0! 
 



















Chen CF Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Reduce the impacts on the community forest 
- Limit the collection of forest products (hunting, bamboo 
shoot) 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
FUGR -1 1 1 
I_Dnr 1 +1 +1 
TA -1 +1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
Con 0 1 1 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
10. Cao Da CF, Muong Khoa commune 
 
* Power element 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: dominant 
information 
Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 2 - 1 1 - 1 1 + 2 
FUGR 1 + 2 1 + 2 1 + 2 
I_Dnr 2 + 2 2 + 2 1 + 2 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 2 + 2 1 + 2 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
Con 2 + 2 2 - 1 1 - 1 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA Dnr Con TA Local Pol FUGr FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 87,5 68,75 62,5 54,16667 50 35,41667 29,16667 0 0 
hi 0,225806 0,177419 0,16129 0,139785 0,129032 0,091398 0,075269 0 0 
Cri 0,230769 0,408189 0,569479 0,709264 0,838296 0,929694 1,004963 1,004963 1,004963 
Dmi 0,127219 0,133343 0,138993 0,142669 0,147085 0,145703 0,144291 0,126268 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Dnr FA Con FUGr TA Local Pol FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 62,5 37,5 37,5 12,5 12,5 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,384615 0,230769 0,230769 0,076923 0,076923 0 0 0 0 
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Cri 0,416667 0,647436 0,878205 0,955128 1,032051 1,032051 1,032051 1,032051 1,032051 
Dmi 0,216146 0,227344 0,259554 0,22847 0,213283 0,177864 0,152675 0,134169 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 Local Pol Dnr FUGr FPtr TA Con 
Xi 137,5 62,5 62,5 50 37,5 12,5 0 0 0 
hi 0,37931 0,172414 0,172414 0,137931 0,103448 0,034483 0 0 0 
Cri 0,354839 0,527253 0,699666 0,837597 0,941046 0,975528 0,975528 0,975528 0,975528 
Dmi 0,17794 0,170925 0,178211 0,180667 0,177982 0,158809 0,13625 0,119556 #DIV/0! 
 





















Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Reduce the impacts on the community forest 
- Limit the collection of forest products (hunting, bamboo 
shoot) 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
FUGR -1 1 1 
I_Dnr 1 +1 +1 
TA -1 +1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
Con 0 1 1 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
11. A Ma CF, Long Sap commune 
 
* Power element 
Actor 
classification 




Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 2 - 1 1 - 1 1 + 2 
FUGR 1 + 2 1 + 2 1 + 2 
I_Dnr 2 + 2 2 + 2 1 + 2 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 1 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
Con 2 + 2 2 - 1 1 - 1 
Fb 2 - 1 2 + 2 1 + 2 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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indicator Con FA Dnr Local Pol Fb FUGr FPr TA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 66,66667 55,55556 51,85185 40,74074 37,03704 27,77778 22,22222 18,51852 3,703704 0 
hi 0,205714 0,171429 0,16 0,125714 0,114286 0,085714 0,068571 0,057143 0,011429 0 
Cri 0,2 0,371429 0,531429 0,657143 0,771429 0,857143 0,925714 0,982857 0,994286 0,994286 
Dmi 0,111111 0,118367 0,125504 0,127551 0,129469 0,127551 0,12426 0,120898 0,109878 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FA Dnr Con Fb Local Pol FUGr FPtr TA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 44,44444 44,44444 44,44444 44,44444 0 0 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,25 0,25 0,25 0,25 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,25 0,5 0,75 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,125 0,15625 0,196429 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 0,125 0,111111 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
FA D_Pol 2 D_Pol 1 Local Pol Fb Dnr FUGr FPtr TA Con 
Xi 111,1111 88,88889 77,77778 33,33333 33,33333 11,11111 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,3125 0,25 0,21875 0,09375 0,09375 0,03125 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,3125 0,5625 0,78125 0,875 0,96875 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,150174 0,182129 0,210286 0,19401 0,187891 0,166667 0,142857 0,125 0,111111 #DIV/0! 
 



















A Ma CF Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Free to collect fuel wood, but not for sale; 
medicinal plants 
- Forbid logging 
 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
FUGR -1 1 1 
I_Dnr 1 +1 +1 
TA -1 +1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
Con 0 1 1 
Fb 0 +1 +1 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
12. Coc Lac CF, Tu Nang commune 
 
* Power element 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: dominant 
information 
Power element: Incentive Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 1 + 2 1 - 1 1 + 2 
FUGr 1 + 2 1 + 2 1 + 2 
N_Dnr 1 - 1 2 + 2 1 + 2 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 1 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
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- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA TA FUGr Local Pol L_Dnr FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 66,66667 38,09524 30,95238 28,57143 28,57143 23,80952 9,52381 7,142857 
hi 0,285714 0,163265 0,132653 0,122449 0,122449 0,102041 0,040816 0,030612 
Cri 0,285714 0,44898 0,581633 0,704082 0,826531 0,928571 0,969388 1 
Dmi 0,154519 0,151395 0,147772 0,145825 0,146661 0,146259 0,135182 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA L_Dnr FUGr 
Local 
Pol FPr TA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 57,14286 57,14286 14,28571 0 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,444444 0,444444 0,111111 0 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,444444 0,888889 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,241623 0,397119 0,333333 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA D_Pol 2 D_Pol 1 Local Pol FUGr L_Dnr FPtr TA 
Xi 114,2857 85,71429 71,42857 42,85714 14,28571 0 0 0 
hi 0,347826 0,26087 0,217391 0,130435 0,043478 0 0 0 
Cri 0,347826 0,608696 0,826087 0,956522 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,181745 0,210775 0,233522 0,229206 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
 





















Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Local people still extract timber illegally; 
- Still do farming under the allocated forest canopy; 
- Limited access to the community forest 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
FUGR 0 1 1 
N_Dnr 0 1 +1 
TA -1 1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
13. Cang CF, Chieng Hac commune 
 




* Power element 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: dominant 
information 




QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 2 + 2 1 - 1 2 + 2 
FUGr 1 + 2 1 + 2 1 + 2 
N_Dnr 2 - 1 2 + 2 1 + 2 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 1 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
Ext 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA Local Pol L_Dnr TA FUGr D_Pol 1 Ext D_Pol 2 FPtr 
Xi 75 54,16667 41,66667 29,16667 27,08333 20,83333 20,83333 10,41667 8,333333 
hi 0,26087 0,188406 0,144928 0,101449 0,094203 0,072464 0,072464 0,036232 0,028986 
Cri 0,264706 0,453112 0,598039 0,699488 0,793691 0,866155 0,938619 0,974851 1,003836 
Dmi 0,137651 0,145382 0,146146 0,140382 0,13663 0,131009 0,127742 0,119424 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA L_Dnr FUGr Ext Local Pol FPtr TA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 62,5 62,5 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,357143 0,357143 0,142857 0,142857 0 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,357143 0,714286 0,857143 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,179209 0,266764 0,248299 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 0,125 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
FA D_Pol 2 D_Pol 1 Local Pol FUGr L_Dnr FPtr TA Ext 
Xi 137,5 112,5 87,5 75 25 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,314286 0,257143 0,2 0,171429 0,057143 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,314286 0,571429 0,771429 0,942857 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,157551 0,189504 0,207075 0,222898 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 0,125 #DIV/0! 
 



















Cang CF Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Still do farming under the allocated forest canopy; 
- Slash and burn still happens 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
FUGR -1 1 1 
N_Dnr 0 1 +1 
TA -1 1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 1 1 
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D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
14. Ngoang CF, Chieng Khoi commune 
 
* Power element 
Actor 
classification 




Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 1 + 2 1 - 1 2 + 2 
FUGR 1 + 2 2 + 2 1 + 2 
N_Dnr 2 - 1 2 + 2 1 + 2 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 1 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA L_Dnr Local Pol FUGr TA FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 78,57143 47,61905 33,33333 33,33333 28,57143 16,66667 16,66667 4,761905 
hi 0,302752 0,183486 0,12844 0,12844 0,110092 0,06422 0,06422 0,018349 
Cri 0,292035 0,475522 0,603962 0,732402 0,842494 0,906714 0,970934 0,989283 
Dmi 0,156887 0,158907 0,152959 0,152005 0,150229 0,141373 0,135518 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA L_Dnr FUGr Local Pol FPtr TA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 57,14286 57,14286 28,57143 0 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,4 0,4 0,2 0 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,4 0,8 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,211429 0,326667 0,333333 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 Local Pol FUGr L_Dnr FPtr TA 
Xi 157,1429 85,71429 71,42857 57,14286 14,28571 0 0 0 
hi 0,407407 0,222222 0,185185 0,148148 0,037037 0 0 0 
Cri 0,407407 0,62963 0,814815 0,962963 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,216147 0,221079 0,228166 0,232167 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
 
























Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Limited access to community forest 
- Slash and burn, illegal logging still happened 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
FUGR -1 1 1 
N_Dnr 0 1 +1 
TA -1 1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
(0) means powerful actors do not desire a specific outcome for final end user 
 
15. Na Pan CF, Chieng Dong commune 
 
* Power element 
Actor 
classification 
Power element: dominant 
information 
Power element: Incentive 
(disincentive) 
Power element: Coercion 
QT QL R QT QL R QT QL R 
FA 2 + 2 2 + 2 2 + 2 
Local Pol 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
FUGR 1 + 2 1 + 2 1 + 2 
N_Dnr 1 - 1 2 + 2 1 + 2 
FPtr 1 - 1 1 - 1 1 - 1 
TA 1 + 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 
D_Pol1 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
D_Pol2 1 - 1 1 - 1 2 + 2 
- Group of powerful actors:  
- Group of less powerful actors:  
- Power source observed: 





- Not checked: 
- Quantitative data 
- Qualitative data 






* Dominance factors 
- Dominance factor of dominant information 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA L_Dnr FUGr Local Pol TA FPtr D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 78,57143 38,09524 35,71429 33,33333 33,33333 26,19048 11,90476 4,761905 
hi 0,3 0,145455 0,136364 0,127273 0,127273 0,1 0,045455 0,018182 
Cri 0,3 0,445455 0,581818 0,709091 0,836364 0,936364 0,981818 1 
Dmi 0,16 0,150468 0,147813 0,14686 0,148826 0,148154 0,13804 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of incentives 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA L_Dnr FUGr Local Pol FPtr TA D_Pol 1 D_Pol 2 
Xi 57,14286 57,14286 14,28571 0 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,444444 0,444444 0,111111 0 0 0 0 0 
Cri 0,444444 0,888889 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,241623 0,397119 0,333333 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
- Dominance factor of coercion 
Power 
indicator 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FA D_Pol 2 D_Pol 1 Local Pol FUGr L_Dnr FPr TA 
Xi 157,1429 85,71429 71,42857 57,14286 0 0 0 0 
hi 0,423077 0,230769 0,192308 0,153846 0 0 0 0 
Community Forestry in Vietnam: Actors and Political Process 
 
 227 
Cri 0,423077 0,653846 0,846154 1 1 1 1 1 
Dmi 0,226543 0,233728 0,243393 0,25 0,2 0,166667 0,142857 #DIV/0! 
 





















Medium Medium Medium FA 1 -1 +1 
- Local people still extract timber illegally; 
- Still do farming under the allocated forest canopy; 
- There is no plan or inventory of biodiversity; 
Local Pol 1 1 1 
FUGR -1 1 1 
N_Dnr 0 1 +1 
TA -1 1 1 
D_Pol1 -1 1 1 
D_Pol2 -1 0 0 
PIDO (Powerful Interest Desired Outcome) 
(+1) means powerful actors desire a high outcome for final end user 
(1) means powerful actors desire a medium outcome for final end user 
(-1) means powerful actors desire a low outcome for final end user 
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